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Costly Citizenship: The Supply and Demand of Political Membership in Europe, 1970-2014

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Costly Citizenship: The Supply and Demand of Political Membership in Europe, 1970-2014

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Your Christ, Jewish

Your car, Japanese

Your pizza, Italian

Your democracy, Greek

Your coffee, Brazilian

Your vacation, Turkish

Your numbers, Arabic

Your handwriting, Latin

And your neighbor is just a foreigner?

-German street poster, 1993

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Costly Citizenship: The Supply and Demand of Political Membership in Europe, 1970-2014

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As Europe has struggled to adapt to the modern reality of mass migration in recent decades, the question of citizenship has emerged as an increasingly salient political topic across the continent. Numerous scholars have begun to analyze the evolution of citizenship regimes in Europe, the politics of citizenship policymaking, and the consequences of such policies for citizenship acquisition and immigrant integration. This dissertation advances a new theoretical understanding of citizenship policymaking and citizenship acquisition together within a framework of supply and demand. According to the theory, naturalization rates, and the corresponding level of integration required to naturalize, are the equilibrium result of the interaction between the political forces supplying citizenship and the varying determinants of immigrant demand for citizenship. This dissertation examines both in turn. On the supply side, I first argue that citizenship policy in Europe results not simply from the influence of radical right parties, but from broader modes of party competition that provide electoral incentives to either liberalize or restrict access to citizenship. Using a new quantitative measurement of citizenship policies across sixteen European countries from 1970 to 2014, I reveal how left party competition

is associated with more liberal citizenship policy change, while right party competition and radical right electoral threats engender more restrictive policies. I then utilize my citizenship policy index alongside other political, economic, and social variables on the demand side to examine the aggregate level structure under which citizenship acquisition occurs across European countries and across time. Finally, through a combination of quantitative and qualitative evidence gathered on two federal countries in Europe, Germany and Austria, I show that these same aggregate level variables operating at the national level may also operate within them.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter 1: Introduction

The Challenge of Integration and Citizenship in Europe Today

On the evening of November 13, 2015, Parisians were enjoying another relaxing Friday night in the City of Lights: dinner and drinks in street cafes near the Canal Saint-Martin, an international football match at the Stade de France, a musical performance at the historic Bataclan theatre. This otherwise tranquil European scene was suddenly shattered, however, by a coordinated series of suicide bombings and mass shootings, leaving 130 people dead and nearly 400 people seriously injured. Then, just four months later on March 22, 2016, as travelers at Brussels Airport were checking in for their flights and commuting to work near the Maalbeek metro station, three additional suicide attacks similarly ripped apart this pedestrian European morning, killing many others.

In the weeks following these heinous attacks, it became clear that an Islamic terrorist cell located in the Molenbeek neighborhood of Brussels with links to Islamic State (ISIS) had planned and implemented the carnage. These highly trained and well-equipped jihadists, many of whom had experience fighting alongside ISIS in the Syrian civil war and had developed networks that crisscrossed the European continent, had forcefully and dramatically inserted the dangers of Islamic terrorism into the heart of Europe. However surprising many of these revelations have been for Europe, perhaps most shocking was the identity of the known terrorists. They were neither immigrants nor asylum seekers. They were European citizens.

This sobering fact has led many to raise questions about immigrant integration and citizenship in European societies. What conditions could have lead

French and Belgian citizens of immigrant descent to perform such carnage? Why did Belgium and France even grant these clearly unassimilated individuals nationality? While attacks by homegrown Islamic extremists are a rather recent phenomenon in Europe, attempts to incorporate immigrants and their native-born descendants in Europe are not. Indeed, from the earliest models of incorporation identified by scholars through the present day, European governments have long endeavored to manage and integrate immigrant populations (Brubaker 1992; Castles and Miller 2003; Favell 1998). In the 1960s and 1970s, for example, countries such as the Netherlands and Germany employed ad hoc measures to accommodate guest workers while concurrently seeking to prevent their long-term integration in favor of their return migration. In the 1980s and 1990s, many countries, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, and Sweden, adopted more multicultural approaches, whereby immigrant minorities are accommodated not on the basis of their assimilation but their ethnic or racial group membership. More recently, especially since the 1998 Dutch Newcomers Integration Act *(Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers)*, governments seem to have converged on formal integration programs to incorporate immigrants into their political, economic, and social systems (Joppke 2007b, 2007a; De Hart and van Oers 2006; Goodman 2010a).

Whether the origins of these immigration flows were post-colonial in nature or more strictly labor-based, whether countries' policies have been open or restrictive, the size and diversity of this immigrant population and its descendants have increasingly frustrated European publics and challenged European governments. The Molenbeek district in Brussels from which the most recent terror

attacks were planned is a tragic if not extreme example of this challenge: many in this predominantly Muslim community do not speak the local language, do not attend Belgian schools, have little contact with native Belgians and little understanding of Belgian values or culture. This so-called *Parallelgesellschaft,* or parallel society, is likewise plagued by exceptionally high unemployment rates and suffers from crippling poverty. The poorly integrated and disaffected youth of these unassimilated communities are more often lured into criminal gangs or jihadist networks rather than recruited to participate in broader Belgian society. Yet, like those perpetrators of the Paris and Brussels attacks, most of those living in Molenbeek are Belgian citizens, with the same rights and obligations and formal political ties as those who can trace their familial heritage to the revolution of the 1830s. The same situation occurs to varying degrees within most countries across Europe today. And, as a decade of homegrown Islamic terrorist acts in Europe – from the 2005 London bombings to the 2015 Charlie Hebdo shootings in Paris to the 2016 attacks in Brussels – demonstrates, the challenge of integrating Europe's immigrant population and forging new citizens is increasingly consequential.

That native-born French and Belgian citizens, and not immigrants, carried out these recent acts of terrorism highlights the intricate relationship between integration and citizenship in Europe today and underscores the necessity of ensuring Europe's citizens are integrated members of society. Because citizenship demarcates an important legal boundary between member and non-member in a self-governing political community, countries across Europe have increasingly employed citizenship policy to facilitate immigrant integration into their political

communities, especially in recent years. While some countries tend to view citizenship as a means to integrate immigrants, others view it as a reward for successful integration. In either case, these new efforts aim to link immigrant integration with citizenship. Indeed, from the introduction of formal language requirements in countries as disparate as Portugal and Finland, to robust civic integration tests in the once avowedly multicultural Netherlands, to the introduction of partial *jus soli* in a once ethnocentric Germany, few states in Western Europe have left citizenship policy unaltered in recent years as they endeavor to stipulate the precise terms of membership. But in this context, the focus on citizenship and coupling of formal integration requirements with it also raises questions about political membership, national identity, and democratic inclusiveness with a population whose citizenship status is a double-edged sword: an opportunity for inclusion and advancement, yet too often a miscarried formality.

The Causes and Consequences of Citizenship Policy

In this increasingly tense political context, what are the causes, and what are the consequences of citizenship policy in Europe? This is the focus of this study. Yet within this single question are embedded a number of puzzling, interrelated phenomena. The first involves citizenship policy as a dependent variable. What determines the institutional contours of citizenship policy requirements that regulate immigrant acquisition of citizenship across countries and across time? European citizenship laws have evolved significantly since World War II, provoking scholars to debate whether policies have converged or remained historically distinct (Joppke 2007a, 2007b; Hansen 1998; Hansen and Weil 2001; Vink and de Groot

2010; De Hart and van Oers 2006; Joppke and Morawska 2003). One vast literature on this subject has examined these national citizenship orientations and the various historical and macrostructural determinants of citizenship in Europe (Brubaker 1992; Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996; Favell 1998; Castles and Miller 2003; Joppke 2003b; Schain 2008; Howard 2009; Janoski 2010; Joppke 2010), while another has focused more acutely on the proximate electoral correlates of citizenship policy change in recent years (Schain 2008; Howard 2010; Goodman 2014; Janoski 2010). However, few of these existing studies entail systematic analyses of the direction, content, or timing of such policy change. In addition, despite the development of a number of policy indices in recent years to compare these policies,[1] their utility for assessing the patterns of long-term continuity, change, and convergence remains limited in theory and scope.

Second, given variation in citizenship policies across countries, who acquires citizenship, and under what conditions? Many scholars across the social sciences have investigated aspects of the naturalization question empirically (Yang 1994; Jones-Correa 2001b; Diehl and Blohm 2003; Dronkers and Vink 2012; Vink et al. 2013; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010; Janoski 2010; OECD 2011; Koopmans et al. 2012). Explanations typically focus either on individual factors such as the level of economic, social, or cultural adaptation to the receiving country, or on institutional and other structural factors such as toleration of dual citizenship or distinct characteristics of the country of origin. However, there is much about naturalization

[1] These indices include the CITLAW indicators (Jeffers et al. 2012), MIPEX (Huddleston et al. 2011a), CIVIX (Goodman 2010a), Howard's (2010, 2009) Citizenship Policy Index (CPI), Koopmans et al.'s (2005; 2012) Index of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI), and Janoski's (2010) Barriers to Nationality Index (BNI).

that remains poorly understood.[2] How does citizenship policy change affect naturalization? What political, economic, and structural forces shape naturalization trends? Without detailed cross-national and longitudinal measures of citizenship policy, the relationship between these policies and naturalization across European countries and time has largely evaded the attention of scholars (although see Janoski 2010). More strikingly, because of what Rokkan (1970) long ago termed "whole-nation bias," a focus on national-level policies and factors has glossed over the local context that shapes naturalization and integration decisions in a given country. Thus variation in naturalization patterns *within* countries has received even less scrutiny (Worbs 2008; Thränhardt 2008).

Finally, how does citizenship acquisition affect immigrant integration? Is citizenship a means to immigrant integration, or does citizenship signal the completion of the integration process? Do higher acquisition rates correspond with more integrated immigrants, or less? As more and more states attach integration prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship, these questions have begun generating an increasingly extensive body of research (Bijl and Verweij 2012). However, disentangling the causal relationship between citizenship acquisition and integration is complex due to selection effects. For example, because one's level of attachment to the country of settlement is a significant factor in predicting one's proclivity to naturalize, it may be that immigrants who naturalize are already better integrated economically and socially prior to naturalization (Liebig and Von Haaren

[2] I define naturalization in this study as the acquisition of citizenship by an individual who was not born in the country granting such citizenship. Unless noted, I include *jus soli* acquisitions under this definition. I thus use the term naturalization, citizenship acquisition, and nationality acquisition interchangeably throughout this dissertation.

2011). It may also be that citizenship policies that include numerous integration requirements automatically 'screen' those less integrated from the pool of those eligible for naturalization. Each of these problems means that citizenship acquisition may be inherently associated with the better integration outcomes among naturalized migrants, and would lead to the biased conclusion that citizenship is associated with better integration outcomes.

This dissertation seeks to address the first two of these questions regarding the causes and consequences of citizenship policy in Europe, and apply its findings to our understanding of the third. While the project's focus may appeal specifically to scholars of the immigration and citizenship subfield of political science, understanding the causes and effects of citizenship acquisition is of profound academic significance and is arguably foundational for comparative study of politics. In the beginning of Book III of *Politics*, Aristotle suggests that we cannot assess the attributes of states and governments without first answering the question, "who is the citizen?" Citizenship lies at the heart of democratic governance in particular: as Linz and Stepan (1996) argue, "[w]ithout a state, there can be no citizenship; without citizenship, there can be no democracy" (28). Indeed, definitions of democracy that center on the notion of 'rule by the people' presuppose the identification and delineation of who 'the people' are.[3] Yet in an increasingly interconnected world with borders too porous to prevent the migration of workers or families fleeing war and poverty abroad, immigration challenges our

[3] Dahl (1989, 120; 2005, 189) maintains that 'inclusive citizenship' is one of the required institutions of modern democracy. For O'Donnell (2001), "the individual correlate of a democratic regime is political citizenship, which consists of the legal assignment of the rights entailed by the democratic wager" (19).

understanding of the relationship between citizenship and democracy. How should democracies accommodate their foreign citizens? What rights should they have, what freedoms should they enjoy? In what political decisions should their voice be heard? On the one hand, excluding foreign residents on a permanent basis may be more akin to tyranny than democracy (Walzer 1983). Yet including immigrants on a maximalist basis, with all the rights, freedoms, duties, and expectations of citizenship without the formal acquisition of it, although more in line with a liberal conception of democracy, is usually politically unsustainable in practice due to nativist pressures over time. Between these two extremes democracies must fluctuate, and their location along this spectrum in many ways defines one critical level of their democratic inclusiveness. In this sense, the policies regulating the acquisition of citizenship, and the myriad factors that structure these decisions, are thus decisive elements of any democratic polity, serving as powerful political instruments of inclusion and exclusion, and reflecting in part how representative its institutions are of those living under them. The questions investigated in this dissertation – who may acquire citizenship, who may not, and what criteria are used to adjudicate between the two – are thus central questions for any modern democracy. As Europe faces the challenge of resettling and incorporating millions of asylum seekers from abroad, the questions are especially timely.

The Plan of the Dissertation

This study is organized into seven chapters. In Chapter 2, I will situate the current study within the relevant literature on citizenship policy change, naturalization, and integration, and discuss the motivating questions more

extensively. Because it treats a number of theoretically ambiguous concepts, the next chapter will also address these conceptual concerns.

In Chapter 3, I will advance a new theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between citizenship policy, naturalization, and integration in European societies. I first argue that citizenship policy in Europe results not from national models of incorporation or policy path dependence, but from both immediate electoral competition among political parties and demographic pressures. I then situate citizenship policy alongside varying ideological and electoral contexts, all of which contribute to what I call the *political supply of citizenship*. Finally, I theorize how different socioeconomic, legal, and political contexts structure the lives of immigrants and create what I call an *immigrant demand for citizenship*. Naturalization rates, and the corresponding level of integration required to naturalize, are the equilibrium result of the interaction between this varying immigrant demand for citizenship and the respective political supply of citizenship. The framework offers a number of testable hypotheses that will guide the empirical analysis of subsequent chapters.

In Chapter 4, I discuss my conceptualization and measurement of a country's citizenship policy, which I use to capture the institutionalized component of political supply. This new theoretical conceptualization and measurement of citizenship policies spans sixteen Western European countries from 1970 to present. This integration cost of citizenship index (ICCI) casts citizenship policies in terms of their integration-based criteria of membership and captures what I consider to be their underlying purpose: structuring immigrant incentives to acquire citizenship

according to different state strategies of incorporation. I then present an empirical analysis of European citizenship trends over the last 45 years that offers new insights to a number of unanswered questions within the citizenship literature.

I begin testing my hypotheses regarding the causes and consequences of citizenship policy in Chapters 5 and 6. First, using citizenship policy as my dependent variable, I show how citizenship policy change in Europe results not from left or right party power as suggested in previous research, but from interparty competition. Using several measures of electoral competition, I find that countries with stronger competition among left parties are associated with more liberal citizenship policies, while countries with more party competition and electoral threat from the right of the political spectrum engender more restrictive policies. However, the effect of politics on citizenship policy change are more nuanced than previous research suggests. I then show that alternative explanations for citizenship policy change - principally one of path dependence from citizenship starting points - largely fails to account for the contours or direction of change today. However, the size of the foreign born population, especially in the early postwar decades, may compel changes in citizenship policy in subsequent decades by means of a limited path-dependent mechanism. In Chapter 6, I then employ citizenship and its components as independent variables of political supply in several time-series cross-sectional analyses of naturalization across fifteen European countries since 1980. The primary determinant of immigrant demand that I draw upon is the socioeconomic context in the settlement country drawn primarily from data on unemployment and GDP growth. Here I find that key components of

citizenship policy, the political orientation of governments, and socioeconomic contexts largely structure naturalization outcomes in Europe. The final section of the chapter then investigates how the changing value of citizenship vis-à-vis the country of origin and the country of settlement in the wake of the Euro crisis both alters the demand for citizenship and bolsters naturalization incentives among Europe's intra-EU migrants.

The subsequent chapter, Chapter 7, examines these acquisition dynamics through a more comparative approach. Here I will first apply my supply and demand framework to a within-case analysis of naturalization at the *Land* (state) level in Germany and Austria. The federal political system in each of these countries means that the *Länder* maintain some administrative control over the implementation and interpretation of national citizenship and integration policy, leading to interesting variation in naturalization rates within Germany and Austria. Such a within-case analysis at the *Land*-level of two countries very similar in terms of history, culture, and political system permits me to compare very similar cases that differ primarily with respect to the dependent variable. This facilitates identification of the remaining independent variables that may cause the variation on the dependent variable. It also helps identify the more proximate determinants of naturalization that may be significant subnationally but are often obscured or indistinguishable in large-n cross-national comparisons. In other words, this investigation permits me to hold many national-level variables like citizenship policy constant, while focusing on local political context and socioeconomic factors that vary across *Länder*. My statistical findings will be supplemented by substantive

qualitative evidence gleaned from interviews of policymakers and immigrants across several German and Austrian *Länder* that most clearly exhibit the desired variation in naturalization rates as well as relevant contexts of interest to my project. By demonstrating that the relationship between my independent variables of interest and citizenship acquisition holds in the qualitative evidence gathered for these cases, I find further confirmation of my theory.

Chapter 8 presents my conclusions from the previous chapters and discusses the contributions of the study to the literature on citizenship and integration in Europe. It then discusses some of the implications of my theory for the politics of citizenship in Europe today, showing how the tradeoffs between citizenship and integration are problematic for the long-term incorporation of immigrants. Finally, on the basis of the theory, I explore briefly some of the implications of the theory for European citizenship policymaking during a critical time in the continent's collective history.

Chapter 2: Situating the Supply and Demand of Citizenship in Europe

Immigration is a modern reality in Western Europe. According to Eurostat (2015f), some 48 million residents, or 12 percent of the fifteen pre-2004 accession states of the European Union (EU-15) population, were foreign-born in 2014, and two-thirds of them originated from outside the EU. The current asylum crisis has brought over a million newcomers from abroad, and promises to bring more. Though the distribution of this foreign population is diverse. The relative size of this foreign-born population ranges from 5.5 percent in Finland to 43.3 percent in Luxembourg. Roughly one in ten people in Austria, Luxembourg, and Sweden were born outside the EU. Furthermore, given the relative ethnic homogeneity within most European countries at the end of World War II and a lack of non-European immigrants, this demographic shift has been a remarkably dramatic development over the course of six short decades. For many post-colonial states, decolonization accounts for much of this shift. In 1951, just over 3 percent of the British population was born outside the UK and Ireland; that number of foreign-born had nearly doubled by 1981. In 2011, foreign-born residents numbered 7.5 million, comprising 13 percent of the resident population (British Office for National Statistics 17 December 2013). Similarly, France's foreign population roughly doubled from 2 million in 1946 to nearly 4 million in 1975. Today some 8.7 percent of the French population are immigrants (INSEE 2012, 2005).

Other European countries actively recruited foreign guest workers in the postwar decades. Germany, desperate for workers to fuel its postwar *Wirtschaftswunder*, saw its foreign population skyrocket after the late 1950s.

According to the German Federal Statistical Office (2015), there were 686,000 foreigners in Germany in 1960; by 1975 there were 4 million foreigners living in the country, and by 2010, more than 7 million. Austria similarly signed labor recruitment agreements with Spain (1962), Turkey (1964) and Yugoslavia (1966), leading to a similarly sharp increase in foreigners living in Austria. The size of the foreign worker population drastically grew from 1.6 percent in 1965 to 7.2 percent a decade later (Stern and Valchars 2013). Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Sweden also recruited foreign labor after the war, mostly from Southern Europe and the Mediterranean. The Netherlands experienced mass immigration through both post-colonial flows and active guest worker channels. The foreign populations in each of these countries have also increased starkly in the last few decades.

Given the different historical trajectories of Western European states and their diverse experiences with immigration and foreigners in the modern period, it is not surprising that citizenship policy on the continent varies widely and has evolved markedly. Modern citizenship policy in the United Kingdom, for example, strongly reflects its imperial past. The British Nationality Act of 1772 granted birthright citizenship (*jus soli*) to anyone born within the empire, and the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act of 1914 standardized this comparatively liberal regime throughout the empire in the early twentieth century (Janoski 2010; Hansen 2000). Furthermore, the first citizenship policy of the post-war period, the 1948 British Nationality Act, preserved this status of British subjecthood, effectively maintaining a generally open citizenship regime for several subsequent decades (Fransman 1998; Janoski 2010). Since then, as the immigrant population has

increased, Britain has enacted at least six major revisions to its citizenship policy. The citizenship policy trajectories of other post-colonial states, such as France and the Netherlands, largely follow this trajectory.

On the other hand, a state like Germany situates its citizenship tradition in the years of ethnonational consolidation in the late 19th century, when the Prussian-led government sought to establish the inner homogeneity of the German nation. The resulting 1913 Imperial Citizenship Law, and its reliance on descent-based citizenship (*jus sanguinis*), "was designed as a defensive measure to prevent the naturalization of foreigners deemed inassimilable and culturally inferior rather than as a means to promote the integration of foreign residents" (Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009, 45; see also Brubaker 1992; Goswinkel 2001). Despite the rapidly increasing immigrant population after the 1960s, however, this highly restrictive 1913 law remained largely unaltered until the turn of the century, with at least seven major policy revisions occurring since 1990.[4]

Explaining Citizenship Policy

What determines the institutional contours of citizenship policy that regulate immigrant acquisition of citizenship across countries and across time? Despite the theoretical importance of citizenship for our understanding of immigration politics and the widespread scholarly attention the subject has attracted, the question of citizenship policy and policy change remained relatively undertheorized and inductive, rather than deductive, in nature. The literature examining the contours of

[4] As a point of comparison, the requirements for the acquisition of citizenship in the United States have not substantively changed since the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952

citizenship policy focus on various historical, structural, and electoral factors, but as we will see, few entail systematic analyses of the direction, content, or timing of such policy change.

Extant explanations for the choice of citizenship policy fall into either broadly macrohistorical or domestic-political categories. One early comparative perspective on citizenship policy explains variation by situating different contemporary institutions within dissimilar macrohistorical legacies. Drawing on the literature of national models (Brubaker 1992; Favell 1998; Castles and Miller 2003; Koopmans et al. 2005; Schain 2008), this perspective maintains that institutions governing access to nationality reflect the resiliency of national historical differences that limit policy change within nationally defined paths. Some situate this starting point during early nation-building periods. Whereas a country like France developed an assimilationist and inclusive form of citizenship based on its statist, revolutionary past, a country like Germany developed an ethnic form of citizenship based on its more *Volk*-centered definitions of nationhood (Brubaker 1992). Others such as Howard (2009, 2006) and Janoski (2010) adopt slightly different variables of departure, suggesting that early democratizers or former colonial powers will have more liberal and less onerous barriers to citizenship. In either case, the rules for membership in the political community, and the policy instruments like *jus sanguinis* or *jus soli* for granting it, reflect and perpetuate the contours of these long-established national orientations over time.

However, as many scholars have analyzed extensively (Joppke 2007b, 2007a; Triadafilopoulos 2011; Goodman 2012a), there have been a number of apparent

departures from earlier national models, such as the 1998 Dutch Newcomers Integration Act *(Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers)* and Germany's watershed Nationality Act (*Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*) in 2000. Furthermore, that many governments in recent years have actively begun coupling new civic integration requirements to the acquisition of citizenship – in the form of language tests, economic restrictions, or civic exams - has reinvigorated debates over national models and possible mechanisms of policy change. For some, the shift to integration requirements represents *restrictive* convergence at the further expense of national models of citizenship as earlier trends had. As Joppke (2007a) argues, the rise of civic requirements represents 'the weakening of national distinctiveness, and a convergence with respect to the general direction and content of integration policy. The notion of national models no longer makes sense, if it ever did' (1-2). Similarly, Freeman (2004) concurs that "the staying power of these national models looks more and more dubious" (948).

In response to these recent changes in citizenship policy underway in Europe, a growing body of work has begun to examine the domestic politics of citizenship. From a strictly ideological perspective, leftist parties generally favor more open citizenship policies. These parties tend to favor social egalitarianism and solidarity among the working class of which many immigrants are part, and may be more prone to see immigrants as constituents or potential constituents. As Messina (2007) notes, "the left's traditional policy agenda tends to dovetail with the perceived interests of immigrants" (208). They also tend to favor citizenship legislation that grants immigrants access to political, economic, or social structures

in efforts to stimulate their integration into society (Joppke 2003a, 430-31; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010, 774; Bird et al. 2011). Conversely, conservative and right-of-center parties are more likely to favor more restrictive citizenship policies, in part because of concerns about the negative impact of immigration on social services, crime and terrorism, or national identity (Bale 2003; Ireland 2004). Conservative parties also tend to advance the idea that citizenship is a personal incentive to integrate and should serve as a reward for successful integration. Eased access, such as permitting dual citizenship, undermines the incentive to integrate (Schuck 1998). Electorally, because the median voter in advanced democracies tends toward restrictionism, conservative parties often have an interest in playing on these sentiments and highlighting immigration and nationality issues as strategies in party competition (Cornelius et al. 2004; Lahav 2004; Ivarsflaten 2005). Hence by this straightforward logic, citizenship policy should liberalize when leftist parties are in power, and become more restrictive when conservative parties are in power.

Electoral threats may complicate these dynamics. The rise of far right parties has attracted widespread attention from scholars in recent years (Givens 2005; Mudde 2007). The mobilization of anti-immigrant public opinion by these parties on the extreme right is thought to present a challenge to both left-of-center and right-of-center parties on the immigration and citizenship issue. Drawing on spatial theories of party and voter behavior (Downs 1957; Meguid 2005), conservative parties that may prefer to take a neutral stance on immigration can risk losing segments of their base to populist parties on the far right over the issue, and may move to accommodate a more extreme position. Similarly, because leftist parties

draw support from the native-born working class as well as immigrants, any leftist party perceived to favor immigrant issues at the expense of native-born labor could lose constituents to far right parties and possibly empower the formation of center-right governments (Bale et al. 2010). Alonso and Fonseca (2012) go so far as to conclude from their study that the extreme right's effect on conservative parties is likely minimal, and its "main impact is not on the mainstream Right but on the Left" (880; see also Bale 2008). More generally, Howard (2009) finds that "the issue is not simply whether a center-left or center-right government is in power, but whether the far right is active and mobilized on the issue of immigration and citizenship reform" (61; see also Givens and Luedtke 2005; Schain 2006). In the presence of electoral competition from far right parties, then, this 'contagion from the right' thesis predicts that neither mainstream conservative nor leftist parties would favor policy liberalization, and that policies may in fact become more restrictive.

Others draw different conclusions. Citizenship policies may change over time, but the inclusive or exclusive policy legacies inherited from the past set the parameters of political debate and constrain change within institutionally defined paths. Electoral configurations and the ideological positions of governments motivate policy change *within* lasting and resilient national models. The observed diversity of approaches to civic integration 'do not signal departures from national approaches to citizenship, but rather fortify them' (Goodman 2012a, 692). In other words, policy change reinforces distinct national approaches of incorporation.

A growing number of scholars have combined these dynamic models of electoral politics with earlier national models arguments (Goodman 2012a;

Mouritsen 2013).[5] This perspective maintains that domestic politics interacts with the inclusive or exclusive policy legacies inherited from the past. From this perspective, all countries have pre-existing institutional orientations of national belonging, but rather than remain relatively static fixtures over time, they structure the decisions and choices of politicians seeking new policies. Left- and right-oriented governments may articulate preferences on citizenship and belonging in response to new realities, but previous institutional decisions have an important feedback effect on their policy-making, setting the parameters within which they debate and enact policy change. Citizenship policies may thus change over time, but the inclusive or exclusive policy legacies inherited from the past set the parameters of political debate and constrain change within institutionally defined paths. For example, in her meticulous case-study analysis of civic integration policies across six European countries, Goodman (2014) argues that "[c]itizenship orientations not only reflect state priorities for inclusion or exclusion through formal rules, but also implicit understandings of nationhood and other scripts of belonging" inherited from past institutional legacies (78). In this way, new civic integration policies and membership requirements 'do not signal departures from national approaches to citizenship, but rather fortify them' (15).

Existing explanations for citizenship policy change contain a number of ambiguities that require theoretical clarification. First, the more structural and macrohistorical explanations seem appropriate for assessing policy starting points and defining broad institutional groupings, but it is unclear how they might account

[5] This perspective draws in particular from early historical institutionalist work by Hall (1993) and Pierson (1993, 2004).

for year-to-year policy adjustments or even more radical changes that deviate from long-standing institutional origins. Electoral explanations focus on the political preferences of domestic policymakers in determining citizenship policy, and the ideological orientation of governments in particular, but the relationship between party politics and policy change leave a number of questions unanswered. First, if leftist parties are consistently pro-immigrant, how do we account for the liberalizations that do not occur – the dogs that do not bark – when leftist parties are in government? Norway was governed by the left-of-center Norwegian Labour Party (DNA) during much of the 1980s and early 1990s without any significant threat from the far right, for example, yet no policy liberalization of its rather exclusive policy occurred. Second, when is far-right mobilization relevant to actual policy change? The liberal VVD in the Netherlands helped pave the way for the overtly restrictive turn away from multiculturalism long before Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders arrived on the far right to advocate a restrictionist agenda. The UK Conservatives have had little difficulty pursuing a restrictionist agenda in the absence of far-right party pressure. In Denmark, the anti-immigrant Danish People's Party has long helped activate restrictive public sentiment, yet their presence did not forestall the significant Social Democrat-led policy liberalization in 2014.

Furthermore, a focus on the right and far right in particular omits any consideration of the effects that Green and other parties with clear pro-immigrant agendas might have from the far left. On immigration issues generally, left parties are threatened electorally not only by conservative and far-right demands for restriction, but also by Green and far-left advocacy of more liberal, egalitarian, and

multicultural polices. Mainstream Social Democratic and Socialist parties thus risk losing conservative working class constituents to an ascendant far right if they appear as too pro-immigrant, but also risk alienating their more progressive and left-libertarian voters toward other emergent left parties if they adopt a harder line (Bale et al. 2010). This competition, and attempts to resist and later adopt right-wing positions, have caused the Dutch Labor Party (PvdA) to lose core voters to the Green Left (*GroenLinks*) and Socialist Party (SP) throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, in part while also fending off a growing threat from the right-wing List Pim Fortuyn. The Austrian Social Democrats (SPÖ) and Danish Social Democrats (*Socialdemokratiet*) have likewise been squeezed by the populist challenge of Haider's Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the Danish People's Party (DF) on the right and the Austrian Greens and Danish Social Liberals (*Radikale Venstre*) on the left. For this reason, explanations of citizenship policy change in Europe arguably need to incorporate the electoral threat from the left as much as they do that from the right.

Recent adaptations of the national model/path-dependent literature also have their ambiguities. Goodman (2014) discounts as underspecified those approaches that give pride of place to government preferences, stating "an exclusive focus on the ideological orientation of government can overlook who the real actors are behind membership policy" (75). Instead, government orientations are constrained by the national understandings of membership, where traditionally exclusive citizenship legacies set the parameters of acceptable policy that leftist governments may pursue and enact, and vice versa with conservative parties in

inclusive policy environments (77-80). However, aside from the problem of identifying what qualifies as a restrictive or inclusive membership setting, the mechanism by which this policy context actually impinges on the preferences and actions of elected officials is not altogether clear. It seems unlikely that non-conservative parties censor their favorable positions toward dual citizenship based on what policies were handed down to them from governments of decades prior. Indeed, despite operating in the archetypically exclusive Germany, four of the five national parties (i.e. all but the right-of-center Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU)) had by the early 1990s begun calling for combinations of *jus soli* and dual citizenship where neither existed before. On the other hand, despite inheriting a long legacy of easy access to Belgian nationality, the Christian Democrats and conservative-liberal VLD parties have shown little equivocation in recent years advancing and passing more stringent integration requirements attached to naturalization. As I argue in Chapter 3, the context of government ideology does indeed matter, but operates through a much more proximate electoral mechanism.

Finally, aside from detail-rich qualitative accounts, testing these arguments empirically has been difficult. In the absence of useful data covering a sufficient number of years or countries, much of the quantitative empirical work has been confined to assessments of official party positions on immigration derived from manifestos and expert surveys (Downs 2001; Bale 2003; Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008; Van Spanje 2010; Alonso and Fonseca 2012). While the use of these indicators as dependent variables of analysis has yielded important insights about the plausibility of the so-called 'contagion from the right' thesis and its effects on

party positions, they tell us little about actual policymaking across countries or over time. How do party positions on immigration and citizenship translate into policy? Do radical right parties matter for policy outputs, or simply for party positions? The only scholar to test the relationship between citizenship policy change in particular and radical right parties quantitatively is Howard (2010), but finds a positive relationship between radical right party strength and restrictive policy change on the basis of only two data points, one in the 1980s and one in 2008. Whether the extreme right has any substantive effects on actual policy outputs beyond these two dates remains an unanswered question that existing analyses are unable to address.

To answer these questions more precisely, I advance a theory in Chapter 3 that focuses on when policymakers have an electoral incentive to liberalize (or restrict) access to citizenship and the conditions compel them to do so. I incorporate more straightforward considerations of the ideological orientation of governments, the contagion of radical right parties, or the effects of membership context. Instead, this domestic politics approach that I present situates citizenship policy change within a proximate electoral context that structures nearly all government policymaking and that serves as the causal mechanism for factors such as ideological orientations, radical right preferences, and national membership settings to play a role in policy outputs.

Explaining Naturalization

Thus far I have focused more on the main component of the political supply of citizenship in Europe, i.e. the formal policies that regulate immigrant access to citizenship. I turn now to the second major question addressed in this dissertation:

given variation in citizenship policies across countries, who acquires citizenship, and under what conditions? Like citizenship policy, naturalization rates have varied widely since the 1970s across European countries. We observe this variation in Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, which graphically depict naturalization rates by European country and by mean naturalization rate across time. As we see in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, for example, countries such as Luxembourg, Italy, Germany, and Greece have had consistently lower naturalization rates over time, while others such as the Netherlands, Great Britain, Portugal, and Sweden exhibit much higher naturalization

Figure 2.1: Naturalization Rates Across Europe, 1970-2014



rates over time. Furthermore, naturalization rates vary much less over time in countries like Luxembourg, Italy, and France than they do in Belgium, Netherlands, or Portugal. In addition, the mean naturalization rate in Europe has varied across years as well, as Figure 2.3 reveals. Immigrants acquired citizenship at a very low rate in the mid-1970s and in the late to early 1990s, while the acquisition rate reached its decades-long high point of 38.44 citizenships per 1,000 immigrants in 2000. What accounts for such variation?

Extant explanations to account for variation in naturalization rates have drawn from a diverse literature spanning geographic regions and social science disciplines. Generally, however, there are three theoretical approaches to explaining

Figure 2.2: Naturalization Heterogeneity across European Countries



Figure 2.3: Naturalization Heterogeneity across Time



such variation. One approach largely focuses on the individual-level characteristics and motivations of immigrants. Drawing on theories of political participation (Verba and Nie 1972), this tradition finds generally that higher socioeconomic status and higher levels of education and language proficiency are the main predictors of immigrant naturalization (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1986, 1990; Portes and Curtis 1987; Yang 1994; Jones-Correa 1998; Bevelander and Veenman 2006; Chiswick and Miller 2008). Length of stay, not surprisingly, has also been shown to increase the propensity to naturalize. The reason is that, as Yang (1994) argues, the "costs, benefits and meaning of naturalization are the most immediate considerations in immigrants' decisions to naturalize" (451). At the individual level, there are a number of political, civic, economic, and social rights and privileges that accrue to citizens that are often denied permanent residents. There are also a number of

financial and procedural costs that must be born in order to naturalize. Thus, as successful economic, social, and cultural adaptation to the receiving country increase and those same ties to the country of origin diminish, the benefits of acquiring political membership in the receiving country increasingly outweigh the costs of severing former country ties or applying for citizenship. Naturalization implies a formal commitment to a country, and those with higher levels of integration and adaptation in the country of settlement should be more likely to formalize this commitment.

However, with a few exceptions, the political science literature on this subject has been predominantly developed from the US case, and thus has not been able to assess the potential institutional and structural determinants of naturalization and integration from a more systematic and cross-national perspective. Rather, this body of literature has largely incorporated naturalization and immigrant integration into broader existing models of minority political participation, rather than treat these processes as distinct phenomena subject to changing institutional and structural variables.[6]

One variant of this individual-level work examines the economic incentives of naturalization. If immigrants perceive that citizens earn more, perform better, or are more upwardly mobile in the labor market than non-citizens, the economically motivated immigrant may opt for naturalization to earn this potential premium. The premium may take any number of forms: reduced hiring costs for citizens, more access to certain types of employment or educational opportunities reserved for

[6] Exceptions include Bloemraad (2002) in the North American case and Dronkers and Vink (2012) in Europe.

citizens, or less potential job discrimination based on citizenship status. It may serve as a device that naturalized immigrants may use to signal a level of integration, investment in a country, and reliability to employers who may otherwise question an applicant's commitment to stay in a country. It could also give naturalized immigrants access to better wages over time, as well as housing and credit (DeVoretz 2008; OECD 2011, 17-18).[7]

The majority of attention has gone to individual-level characteristics of immigrants themselves. Most of these studies explain variation in naturalization by citing the various costs and benefits that accrue to immigrants based on their relative access to personal resources (education, income, and language) or their degree of socialization and adaptation in the country of destination. But as Jones-Correa (2001a) argues, these costs and benefits derive from institutional and contextual factors "that set constraints and boundaries for political participation, and therefore encourage the selective mobilization of political actors" some of whom have the resources to participate in naturalization, some of whom do not. In other words, immigrants' decisions to naturalize are structured in large part by the institutional and contextual incentives and disincentives they face. For this reason, he argues that scholars should "pay significantly more attention to the institutional and social context in which immigrants make decisions about participation" (Jones-Correa 2001a, 54).

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[7] Although few political scientists have examined the economics of naturalization, a number of economists have explored this citizenship premium in both the North American and European context (Bratsberg et al. 2002; Bevelander 2000; DeVoretz 2008; DeVoretz and Pivnenko 2004; Bevelander and Veenman 2008; OECD 2011). However, the evidence for any post-naturalization wage premium or labor-market participation is so far mixed, likely because citizenship acquisition and the economic effects are likely endogenous (DeVoretz 2008).

To this end, a second theoretical approach examines contextual determinants of naturalization. Many scholars have investigated country of origin factors that serve as 'push' factors of migration that also might determine immigrant proclivities toward naturalization. Some have stressed the cultural and linguistic differences between immigrants' countries of origin and destination, physical distance from the country of settlement, the comparative benefits of living in a developed country versus returning to a poorer and less secure developing one, or the regime type of the country of origin (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990; Yang 1994; Bueker 2005; Chiswick and Miller 2008). Because these country of origin factors vary according to immigrant subpopulation, they often interact with individual-level characteristics to affect naturalization and integration outcomes (Liang 1994; Bueker 2005; Vink et al. 2013).

Similarly, the characteristics of the country of settlement may also serve as 'pull' factors of citizenship acquisition. Socioeconomic context, for example, may incentivize or disincentivize naturalization. This receiving country factor has found very mixed empirical support however. Dronkers and Vink (2012) test GDP per capita in the receiving country but find it has no significant effect on citizenship acquisition, while Vink, Prokic-Breuer, and Dronkers (2013) conversely find that employment status matters for naturalization, but only for immigrants from less developed countries. Janoski (2010) includes economic variables in his study of naturalization rates in Europe, but they function only as controls and have no substantive effects on naturalization in his analysis. The social context of immigrant naturalization has also received attention, with a strong focus on variables such as

the size of the ethnic group, the residential segregation, and opportunities for social contact between co-ethnics and the native-born (Portes and Curtis 1987; Liang 1994; Bueker 2006).[8] Although the evidence regarding these determinants is also quite mixed, recent studies suggest that ethnic isolation diminishes the propensity to naturalize, while higher numbers of naturalized co-ethnics increases this propensity (Logan et al. 2012). They also find that a context of welcoming attitudes encourages naturalization.

A third and final group of explanations instead emphasizes the role of institutional variables. This perspective, more predominant in the comparative than in the exclusively American-centered literature, has examined the effects of differing institutional approaches to citizenship that define varying opportunity structures and barriers to citizenship and integration. Work deriving from Brubaker's (1992) seminal comparative study of the ethnocultural and civic-republican national models of Germany and France exemplifies this approach (see also Favell 1998; Castles and Miller 2003; Koopmans et al. 2005; Schain 2008). Empirically, most studies within this approach focus on the citizenship policies of states themselves. More than any other institutional factor, citizenship policy directly stipulates the conditions under which immigrants may acquire citizenship and reflect different state approaches and strategies of incorporation. They also varies widely across

[8] The role of Islam in Europe has generated enormous discussion in recent years (Pauly 2004; Modood et al. 2006; Klausen 2009, 2005; Caldwell 2009), a factor whose effect on naturalization has not been extensively investigated but may be highly relevant. To my knowledge, only Dronkers and Vink (2012) have tested the relationship empirically, and find that while Muslim immigrants are no less likely to naturalize than other non-Muslim immigrants, second-generation Muslims are less likely. That naturalization and integration outcomes vary significantly across jurisdictions among the same Muslim immigrant groups suggests that other variables may be more relevant (Engelen 2006; Maxwell 2012).

countries, from provisions for dual citizenship to birthright citizenship (jus soli), from language exams to welfare requirements (Vink and de Groot 2010; Goodman 2010b).

The empirical work investigating the institutional determinants of citizenship acquisition remain in its infancy, but these factors have generated a growing literature in recent years. The incentivizing role of dual citizenship has attracted the most attention (Jones-Correa 1998, 2001b; Bloemraad 2004; Faist 2007; Chiswick and Miller 2008; Mazzolari 2009; Vink et al. 2013), although the provision of birthright (*jus soli*) citizenship has now been tested as well (Dronkers and Vink 2012). Required years of residence, language exams and civic integration tests, welfare and legal requirements function according to a similar logic. Others have looked beyond citizenship policy at other institutional factors, such as the relative availability of government welfare services to immigrants in the United States (Jones-Correa 2001b; Bloemraad 2002; Logan et al. 2012).[9]

One strength of this theoretical perspective is that it permits analysis of the institutionally-induced costs and benefits of citizenship acquisition that may interact with individual-level resources and incentives. According to Yang (1994), the benefits of citizenship often include the right of voting,[10] family sponsorship, a new passport and travel flexibility, as well as improved access to employment, welfare, and educational benefits, while the costs entail additional national

[9] In the United States, for example, scholars have examined how the passage of Proposition 187 and the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, both of which limited welfare benefits to non-citizens, affected immigrant interest in naturalization.

[10] Given that many European countries now grant local voting rights to immigrants regardless of citizenship status, whether such rights affect the incentives to integrate into receiving countries and integration outcomes is still an open question.

obligations to the receiving country, such as military service, loss of homeland rights, the psychological cost of renouncing one's homeland, residency requirements, language requirements, and administrative costs related to applications and naturalization exams. Within the political opportunity structure of citizenship law, or what Freeman (2004) calls 'the intersection of institutional incentive structures and the strategic decisions of migrants themselves' (950), immigrants must navigate the legal contours of state policy that shape immigrant behavior and strategy regarding integration and citizenship acquisition. Citizenship requirements and other institutional factors provide this structure and facilitate access for some and impose restrictions on others, from the cultural cost of giving up one's former citizenship to the linguistic cost of learning a new language. These rules of the nationality acquisition game, to paraphrase North (1990), incentivize some able and willing migrants to pay the respective cost of citizenship for membership, while they discourage or screen altogether others from doing so.

While these institutional drivers of citizenship acquisition have received some theoretical and empirical treatment in the literature, much of the empirical work focused on Europe has been based on country case studies (Diehl and Blohm 2003; Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos 2012; Euwals et al. 2010) or cross-national survey data limited to a single year (Dronkers and Vink 2012; Vink et al. 2013). But evaluations based on single years or a handful of cases constrains our ability to evaluate the correlates of citizenship policy across countries and across time, rendering it difficult to draw inferences about the institutional effects of policy.[11]

[11] The one prominent exception is Janoski (2010), which I discuss in Chapter 6.

Furthermore, as diverse and extensive as this institutional and context-focused literature has become, a number of questions remain, the answers to which would greatly enhance our understanding of citizenship acquisition. The first set of questions regards the effects of policy. How exactly does policy matter for naturalization outcomes? Which specific citizenship requirements affect immigrants' incentives to naturalize, and which do not? How do policy changes over time affect acquisitions over time? The second set of questions regards the effects of context in the country of settlement. How might the context in which immigrants find themselves incentivize or disincentivize their citizenship acquisition? Can politics affect citizenship acquisition beyond policy?

Citizenship Policy Indices

To assess citizenship policies empirically and avoid subjective and untestable generalizations made by the national models literature, there has been a proliferation of efforts to quantify citizenship policies across countries and over time. The comparison and analysis of these indices has even attracted attention, leading one observer to muse skeptically that with 'almost as many indices as there are such studies… one might wonder whether it matters which indices we use' (Helbling 2013, 555). But while each of these indices contributes valuable empirical insights into the specific phenomena for which they were developed, their utility for assessing the causes and consequences of long-term citizenship policy change remains limited. Some are coded for single years and are thus limited in their ability to measure long-term temporal change (CITLAW by Jeffers et al. (2012); MIPEX by Huddleston and Niessen (2011a)), while others such as Goodman's (2010a, 2014)

CIVIX focus meticulously on the extent and sequencing of the single dimension of citizenship acquisition. A number of recent indices do measure citizenship policy in select years over longer spans of time, including Howard's (2009, 2010, 2006) Citizenship Policy Index (CPI), Koopmans et al.'s (2005; 2012) Index of Citizenship Rights for Immigrants (ICRI), and Janoski's (2010) Barriers to Nationality Index (BNI). There remain however a number of limitations in these indices that impede our ability to draw inferences about policy changes, their proximate and long-term causes, and their immediate effects on integration and naturalization.

First, examining diachronic change on the basis of a few years may lead to inaccurate conclusions about the stability and homogeneity of different regime types. For example, although the CPI records net restrictions for Austria between two data points in the 1980s and 2008, the ICRI and BNI also measure citizenship in 1990 and 2002 and reveal Austria liberalized in the 1980s while it restricted access in subsequent decades. All three indices indicate net liberalization for the Netherlands, but the two latter indices suggest that this liberalization occurred primarily in the 1980s, followed by a subsequent restrictive backlash. The CPI codes France as a net liberalizer from the 1980s to 2008, while overlooking the important restrictions imposed in the 1980s that the BNI and ICRI discern. In order to make inferences about how electoral politics and other time-bound variables reinforce or upend national citizenship orientations, or how these policies affect immediate naturalization and integration outcomes, we cannot simply assume that countries retain their comparative levels of restrictiveness or accessibility within wider intervals.

Second, abbreviated time frames may be problematic for the inferences that we draw about continuity and change. Howard (2006, 2010) treats the 1980s as the starting point for the CPI, with an effective cut-off date of 1990, since 'in most cases the laws in the 1980s were identical to – or closely in line with – the historical origins of each country's laws' (2010, 738). But the BNI codes an additional year, 1970, which suggests that six of the countries in Howard's study changed their policy sharply during the 1970s. Sweden's initial post-war citizenship law, for example, was among the more restrictive in Europe, institutionalizing the principle of *jus sanguinis*, avoidance of dual citizenship, and requiring language proficiency, good conduct, and proof of economic self-sufficiency, before it began to liberalize in the 1970s and 1980s (Sandesjö and Björk 2005, 1996; Bernitz 2012). Belgium occupies the second-most liberal position in the CPI if we take the 1980s as a starting point, but begins as the most restrictive with the BNI's 1970 reference point. As a consequence, one would conclude from the former that Belgium's trajectory has reinforced its liberal orientation over the period, while Belgium would appear as among the strongest deviators from its starting point according to the latter.

This critique may suggest that more recent indices such as the BNI and ICRI which include additional years as data points thus fill in any necessary temporary gaps left by earlier indices such as the CPI. On its face this is true, yet they too leave decades-long spans of time unaccounted for. While this may not be a problem for assessing long-term continuity and change over the course of decades, it is problematic if we are interested in more proximate causes and effects of citizenship

policy within those decades. For example, France and the Netherlands both altered their citizenship policies several times during the course of the 1990s, including both restrictions and liberalizations, neither of which are necessarily measured by existing indices. Over the last decade, citizenship policies have changed on a nearly annual basis in many European countries. What specific electoral motivations have caused these changes? Have these changes affected immigrants' proclivity to acquire citizenship? Taking measures of policy at the bookends of each decade mean that we miss these intra-decadal dynamics, meaning that scholars currently lack the measures to sufficiently answer these questions. In order to draw inferences about how electoral politics or other proximate variables reinforce or upend citizenship orientations, or how these policies affect immediate naturalization outcomes, we cannot simply assume that countries retain their comparative levels of restrictiveness or accessibility within wider intervals.

Finally, the theoretical underpinnings of existing indices often remain ambiguous. As Helbling (2011) notes, 'existing citizenship indicators seem to measure the same theoretical concept but that it is unclear what this concept is… scholars seldom specify what they really seek to explain' (4). Some indices, for example, are conceptualized in terms of policy inclusiveness (Howard 2006, 452; Koopmans et al. 2012, 1223). But conceptualizing citizenship policies as inclusive or non-inclusive may be problematic theoretically since, as Goodman (2012b) effectively argues elsewhere, "policies may not necessarily or neatly graft onto an inclusive-exclusive scale" (177). The ICRI, for example, measures policy on two dimensions of inclusiveness, but the rationale for distinguishing the two dimensions

is not theoretically straightforward. Residential requirements and welfare and social security dependence, for example, are used to indicate either an ethnic or civic-territorial conception of citizenship, but it is unclear how these indicators relate to either ethnicity or civic-territoriality. Dual citizenship is an indicator of individual inclusiveness in an earlier version of the ICRI but an indicator of cultural inclusiveness in a more recent version, calling into question just how independent the two dimensions are.

Measures of inclusiveness also beg the questions, inclusive for whom, and by what metric? Indices like MIPEX measure nationality polices according to whether they "facilitate or hinder participation" and to their impact on integration (Huddleston et al. 2011a, 7-8) without specifying the mechanism by which this occurs. MIPEX awards low scores for citizenship tests or restrictions on dual citizenship that purportedly undermine successful integration. But as Goodman (2012b, 177-78) points out, these impediments to integration may actually enable it. Language requirements may be exclusive for some immigrants, but foster inclusion for others. Tests and restrictions on dual citizenship may hinder participation, but they might also facilitate it. Immigrants who acquire citizenship easily in France may be more, or less, integrated than immigrants in Germany who acquire it after a rigorous screening process. The causal relationship between citizenship requirements and integration is then arguably an empirical question for investigation rather a basis for an index, and comparing citizenship policies in terms of their presumed effects could lead analysts to generate misleading hypotheses about a policy's effects, or draw biased conclusions about citizenship's relationship

to integration. Specifying measures of the underlying institutional structure of citizenship acquisition is necessarily and logically prior to creating measures in terms of their outcomes.

Conclusion

As the preceding review reveals, a prodigious amount of work exists on the causes and consequences of citizenship policy. The literature examining the causes of citizenship policy focus on various historical, structural, and electoral factors, but few entail systematic analyses of the direction, content, or timing of such policy change. The literature examining the consequences of citizenship policy on naturalization and integration focus on individual, contextual, or institutional factors, but are likewise limited in their assessments of these trends over significant amounts of time or space. Neither the literature on the causes nor on the consequences of citizenship policy speak to one another, but as I posit in the next chapter, these causes and consequences are interrelated and need to be understood as different sides of the same coin.

However, to draw inferences about policy changes and their causes and effects, we first need a more theoretically precise conceptualization of citizenship policy. As I argue in Chapter 4, citizenship policies are not so much inclusive or exclusive, but differentially inclusive according to varying state strategies of integration. They are non-inclusive in that they purposefully disincentivize citizenship acquisition for certain immigrant populations, but inclusive in that they incentivize acquisition among others. Likewise, they are differentially integration-promoting, incentivizing one form of integration in some countries and another

form of integration in others. Once we have a more theoretically precise and methodologically expansive measure of citizenship, we will be better positioned to assess its causes and consequences in Europe.

Chapter 3: The Supply and Demand of Citizenship

As diverse and extensive as the citizenship literature has become, I argued in the previous chapter that a number of questions about the causes and consequences of citizenship remain, the answers to which would greatly enhance our understanding of citizenship policymaking and citizenship acquisition. In terms of citizenship policymaking, structural and macrohistorical accounts seem limited for assessing policy change on an annual basis, while electoral explanations tend to focus too strongly on the ideological preferences of domestic policymakers, and the preferences of the far right in particular, in determining citizenship policy. But these accounts fail to explain the circumstances under which far-right mobilization is relevant for policy change, or the role that other parties, especially those on the left, might play in citizenship policymaking. Testing these arguments empirically has further been hampered by the lack of measures of policy covering a sufficient number of years or countries. In terms of citizenship acquisition, I suggested that more attention needs to be paid to institutionally and contextually-induced costs and benefits that structure the naturalization decisions of immigrants, but absent detailed policy measures, we still know relatively little regarding the impact of policy on naturalization outcomes. We also know relatively little about other political factors beyond formal policy that might affect these outcomes.

In this chapter I advance a new theoretical framework for understanding the incentive structure governing citizenship policymaking, citizenship acquisition, and immigrant integration in Europe. I first argue that citizenship policy in Europe results from both unique electoral competition among political parties as well as

demographic pressures inherited from past citizenship policy legacies. I then situate citizenship policy alongside varying ideological contexts that comprise what I call the *political supply of citizenship*. Finally, I theorize how different socioeconomic, legal, and political contexts structure the lives of immigrants and create what I call an *immigrant demand for citizenship*. Naturalization rates, and the corresponding level of integration required to naturalize, are the equilibrium result of the interaction between this varying immigrant demand for citizenship and the respective political supply of citizenship. The framework here generates a number of testable hypotheses that guide the empirical analysis of subsequent chapters. I also discuss some additional implications from the theory that may contribute to our understanding of citizenship policymaking and the politics of immigration in Europe today.Figure 3.1 below captures my theoretical framework.

Explaining Citizenship Policymaking: Party Competition and Demographic Change

My explanation for citizenship policymaking is located in the upper-left corner of the theoretical framework in Figure 3.1. Building on the theoretical and empirical literature reviewed in Chapter 2, I situate citizenship policy outcomes within a proximate electoral context that structures nearly all government policymaking and that gives policymakers an electoral incentive to liberalize (or restrict) access to citizenship when certain conditions compel them to do so. In the most straightforward interpretation of the model without feedback from previous naturalization and integration outcomes, citizenship policy as a variable results from the electoral incentives of policy makers and the size and composition of the

immigrant population. First, rather than focus on the particular ideological orientation of the government, or the strength of the radical right in particular, I argue that concerns about electoral competition on both sides of the spectrum drives citizenship policymaking. Let us first consider the right of the political spectrum. Here, mainstream conservative and Christian Democratic parties in many country contexts face competition from other right parties, especially but not always from the far right. Other ascendant mainstream right-of-center parties may also provide this threat. As Bale (2008) forcefully argues, "to privilege 'reacting to the far right' as the explanatory variable for policy change on migration and multiculturalism effected (or urged on other parties) by the centre right is a mistake." In the competition for vote share, all right-of-center parties may be tempted to politicize the immigration issue if it strengthens their electoral hand. Consequently, in an electoral atmosphere dominated by electoral competition on the right, I would expect right-of-center governments to be most likely to enact policies that restrict access to citizenship and increase the requirements to acquire it. Where far right parties join the government, citizenship policy is highly likely to be restricted. Because left-of-center parties may likewise be tempted toward restrictive positions where the immigration issue is politicized, I would also expect centrist governments and grand coalitions to be more prone to restrictive change where right party competition is high.

At the opposite end of the political spectrum, I expect electoral competition on the left to incentivize left-oriented governments to liberalize citizenship policy. This is due to the fact that immigrant voters function as an important constituency

Figure 3.1: A Supply and Demand Model of Citizenship Policy and Citizenship Acquisition



for traditional socialist and labor/working-class political parties, but other new parties on the left are increasingly adopting pro-immigrant and multicultural positions on the issue as well. In recent decades, as new parties such as the Greens have arisen to create new competition for traditional left parties, mainstream and traditional left-of-center parties find themselves facing smaller vote margins on the left caused by increased left-of-center party competition. In contexts with heightened left party competition, left-oriented governments and governments with far left party participation should be more likely to liberalize citizenship policy in an attempt to curry favor with left-libertarians and potential immigrant voters. Because parties of the far left do not usually threaten to steal votes from traditional right-of-center parties, left party competition should have little effect on right-of-center governments.

This theoretical intuition about citizenship policymaking leads to my first general hypothesis:

> ***H.CP1:*** *Policy change should be most likely to occur under governments that emerge from the side of the spectrum where competition is strongest.*

Right-of-center governments emerging in party systems with greater right party competition should be more likely to restrict their citizenship policies in a given year, while left-of-center governments in contexts of greater left party competition should be more likely to liberalize their citizenship policies. What happens in the absence of significant right or left party competition, or in the presence of both? In the absence of strong right party competition, all parties should have less incentive to politicize immigration and citizenship, and the likelihood of

restriction diminishes. Where little substantive left party competition exists, I likewise expect the likelihood of liberalization to be much lower. When both are absent, few governments should have the electoral incentive to politicize the issue, and thus I expect little policy change from the current status quo. When competition is heightened on both sides of the political spectrum, however, the predictions are a bit more nuanced but follow a similar logic. Policy change should still occur most frequently under governments facing the acute electoral threat, but source of competition is more relative. Thus stronger competition on the right relative to the left should compel right-oriented governments to restrict policy, and vice versa with left-oriented governments.

Second, the size of the naturalized immigrant population in liberal democracies may function as an additional and potentially alternative mechanism for citizenship policy stasis and liberal change. As Freeman (1995) argues, "the direction of policy in liberal democracies is mostly a function of which fragments of the public have the incentives and resources to organize around immigration issues" since "immigration tends to produce concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, giving those who benefit from immigration greater incentives to organize than persons who bear its costs" (885).[12] In other words, vote-maximizing elected officials have every incentive to cater to vocal and well-organized constituents at the expense of the restrictionist but generally unorganized mass public, and well-organized pro-

[12] This argument builds on an earlier work by Wilson (1980) investigating the type of politics that arises depending on whether the benefits and costs are concentrated or diffuse.

immigrant constituencies have every incentive to vocalize their interests over those of the public.

Among those that have such an incentive are the democracy's previously naturalized immigrants themselves. Countries that initially had relatively open immigration and citizenship regimes in the post-war period, such as the United Kingdom or France, developed sizable and increasingly organized immigrant electorates in the subsequent decades, whereas countries such as Germany did not. These immigrants who acquired citizenship then also acquired the right to vote, and in many cases developed tight-knit constituencies in favor of immigrant rights (Koopmans et al. 2012, 1234). These organized immigrant electorates in such countries became better able to encourage pro-immigrant policy reforms, or at least help sustain previously pro-immigrant policies. My expectation is that sizable immigrant populations in the earlier postwar period should affect future policy change, but the effect should be conditional. Countries with initially accessible citizenship regimes enabled a sizable and increasingly organized immigrant electorate to develop in the subsequent decades that may help sustain pro-immigrant policies over time. Conversely, restrictive countries like Germany, Denmark, or Greece lacked the initial development of organized immigrant constituencies that would serve as a powerful electoral incentive to legislate pro-immigrant policies in later periods. Even a restrictive country like Austria with a larger immigrant population in the early postwar period might witness not an organized immigrant constituency to sustain policy, but over time a radical right

backlash against a large non-citizen population, creating an incentive to formulate even more restrictive policies. This leads to my second hypothesis:

> ***H.CP2:*** *Larger immigrant populations in countries with generally liberal citizenship policies in the post-war years will help sustain accessible, liberalized policies in subsequent decades, while larger immigrant populations in countries with generally restrictive citizenship policies in the post-war years will be unable to forestall pressures for restrictive policies in subsequent decades.*

An alternative explanation to the one just discussed stems from a path dependency perspective (Goodman 2012a; Mouritsen 2013). Adopting the perspective of Pierson (1993), the effects of a previous policy becoming causes of later policy outputs, and domestic politics interacts with the inclusive or exclusive policy legacies inherited from the past. Left- and right-oriented governments may articulate preferences on citizenship and belonging, but previous policy decisions set the parameters within which they debate and enact policy change. As Goodman (2014) argues, "[c]itizenship orientations not only reflect state priorities for inclusion or exclusion through formal rules, but also implicit understandings of nationhood and other scripts of belonging" inherited from past institutional legacies (78). In this way, government orientations are constrained by the national understandings of membership, where traditionally exclusive citizenship legacies set the parameters of acceptable policy that leftist governments may pursue and enact, and vice versa with conservative parties in inclusive policy environments (Goodman 2014). Thus the earlier starting point of citizenship policy largely

explains the future development of it. The general path-dependent hypothesis as an alternative explanation for citizenship policy stasis would be formulated as follows:

> ***H.CP3:*** *Citizenship policies will remain largely similar in their degree of accessibility or restrictiveness to citizenship policies of the postwar period.*

In Chapter 5, I discuss the theory in more detail, offer more specific empirical implications of the theory, and test the theory across sixteen European countries from 1970 to the present using the Integration Cost of Citizenship Index as my dependent variable. I now turn to the second component of my broader theoretical framework, the political supply and immigrant demand for citizenship.

Explaining Citizenship Acquisition: Overview and Definitions

Variation in naturalization across European countries and over time can be explained by what I describe as the *integration context of naturalization*. In this study I use the term integration to refer to the process by which immigrants achieve equal and permanent membership in the requisite domains of life as defined by the receiving country.[13] The degree of integration is simply the extent to which immigrants have assumed membership within these domains. However, as Joppke and Morawska (2003) and Freeman (2004) both point out, any discussion on integration presupposes the existence of a well-integrated society. Thus the particular integration context – the economic, political, and social milieu within which immigrants live, naturalize, and ultimately integrate – may not be so

[13] These domains may entail belonging in economic, social, linguistic, cultural, civic, and/or legal domains of belonging. This process entails both the agency of individual immigrants as well as the larger institutional structures that facilitate access for these immigrants. For further discussion of integration as a concept, Bauböck (2006).

coherently integrated itself. If this is the case, then any discussion of naturalization – the process of acquiring citizenship in a country by meeting some threshold of integration-related criteria – should consider how this integration context conditions this process. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine significant interest in acquiring citizenship among immigrants living in economically depressed, post-industrial communities, or likewise much interest in offering it among populist politicians who thrive on the nativist, xenophobic sentiment of their disillusioned and socially atomized constituencies. Naturalization rates then may reflect the conduciveness of the immigrant's environment for acquiring citizenship as much as his or her individual attributes or willingness to acquire it.

Unlike previous work that examines the effects of citizenship policies on naturalization or integration, or individual-level correlates of naturalization decisions, I seek to uncover how these forces operate in tandem. I argue that naturalization as a phenomenon cannot be understood without reference to the broader structures and contexts that affect their perceptions of and demand for citizenship, and the political interests of policymakers who supply citizenship according to legislated criteria. I thus seek to explain naturalization as a product of immigrant responses to their integration context and the political interests of policymakers responsible for citizenship and naturalization decisions, as represented in Figure 3.1 above.

My theory conceptualizes the citizenship acquisition process in terms of a kind of marketplace for citizenship, with an immigrant demand for citizenship and a political supply of citizenship determining the equilibrium naturalization rate in a

given time period and place.[14] Immigrant demand for citizenship can be high or low, and political willingness to supply citizenship to immigrants can be likewise high or low. The number of naturalizations varies from high to low according to the intersection of these two variables. The variable naturalization rate also entails a certain cost at which immigrants will be willing to acquire citizenship and political actors will be willing to supply it. Although this cost can be understood at a basic level in terms of the monetary and administrative costs that must be paid in order to acquire a new passport, there are other non-monetary and non-administrative costs (see Yang 1994). The requirements for citizenship increasingly reflect the immigrant applicant's level of integration into the society. Examples include learning a new language, which may be viewed as a form of cultural integration, or giving up one's former citizenship, which may be interpreted as a form of civic, economic, or psychological integration. Even paying the required application fees may reflect one's economic integration.

Therefore, I define the *integration cost of citizenship* as the net price in terms of integration that an immigrant must 'pay' in order to acquire citizenship in a given naturalization context. In some contexts policymakers may demand that a high integration cost be paid, while in other cases a lower integration price will suffice. Like the naturalization rate, the equilibrium integration cost is endogenous to the supply and demand of citizenship and thus the same variables that determine their

[14] By casting naturalization in supply and demand terms, I am not arguing that citizenship acquisition is a purely economic decision subject to purely economic forces. As the subsequent explication reveals, the theorized price of citizenship, as well as the factors that affect immigrant demand, political supply, and the equilibrium price, reflect political, social, psychological, and economic forces.

values. The variables that shift the demand and supply of citizenship, which I elaborate upon below, are thus factors that indirectly determine the naturalization rates and integration cost in a given context. In other words, *I hypothesize that the political supply of citizenship and the immigrant demand for citizenship determine the naturalization rate and level of integration expected of new citizens in any given country context*. The dynamics of this unregulated marketplace are illustrated in Figure 3.2 below.

Immigrant Demand for Citizenship Acquisition

While citizenship acquisition is not exactly conducted within a formal marketplace, and a passport is not exactly a good or service to be demanded by a purchasing public in the same way that vehicles or appliance repairs are demanded, I argue that this framework is nonetheless quite useful for understanding why some immigrants may naturalize while others do not. As the law of supply and demand demonstrates in basic microeconomics, the quantity of any good or service demanded increases as the price of the good or service decreases. I expect the demand schedule for citizenship to follow a similar trend: as the integration cost required for naturalization increases, immigrant demand for citizenship should generally decrease. This makes intuitive sense, since fewer immigrants should choose to naturalize when it is relatively more costly to do so, and more immigrants should naturalize when it is relatively less costly to do so.

Figure 3.2: The Supply and Demand of Citizenship, No Citizenship Policy



Graphically, this correlation between rate of naturalization and costliness of naturalization suggests a negatively sloped curve, as depicted by the line *D* in Figure 3.2 above.[15]

Holding price constant, immigrant demand for citizenship also changes in response to exogenous variables, similar to the shifts in the demand schedule postulated in economics. In economics, these shifts may result from changes in one's level of disposable income, in one's expectations about the future value of the good or service, in the value of other substitutable options, or in one's tastes for the good or service. Similarly, when analyzing citizenship, I argue that similar shifts in demand may result from exogenous changes in one's socioeconomic or political circumstances, in one's assessment of the future value of citizenship for socioeconomic and political prospects, in the value of other citizenship status options (namely retaining the citizenship of the country of origin), or in one's cultural or identity-related 'tastes'.

First, let us explore the first exogenous determinant of demand shifts. How might socioeconomic and political context affect the immigrant demand for citizenship and thus shapes naturalization decisions? In areas with strong economic growth and high employment rates, and where immigrant skill level corresponds to job availability, immigrant unemployment and immigrant dependence on welfare

[15] I do not make any assumptions regarding the elasticity of citizenship demand, or the responsiveness of demand for citizenship to changes in the costliness of naturalizing. However, to the extent that immigrants are eligible for acquiring citizenship in a given country, I assume that such immigrants will behave rationally to the extent that they are responsive to the costliness of citizenship in the host country vis-à-vis their permanent resident status or their citizenship in their country of origin. In other words, I assume that immigrants will respond to changes in relative costliness and change their citizenship status when it is in their best interest to do so.

should be lower. I interpret this as an indicator of higher socioeconomic attachment to a given society. Concurrently, incidence of xenophobia and discrimination against foreigners should remain lower and marginalized, which eliminates a major social and cultural obstacle to seeking citizenship. *Ceteris paribus*, I would expect demand for citizenship to increase, because high socioeconomic integration means that one can and will afford the commensurate costs of political and cultural integration required to naturalize. Unencumbered by scarce resources, immigrants in such dynamic contexts may find that the benefits of naturalization outweigh its costs.

However, in poor socioeconomic contexts, the result is just the opposite, and more tragic. Because of deindustrialization since the 1970s across the developed world, and in many areas in which Europe's early waves of migrants settled, the once abundant factories that offered Europe's predominantly low- and middle-class immigrants the prospects for socioeconomic advancement and participation have disappeared, leaving behind a population of generally low-skill labor that is ill-prepared for a post-industrial, services-based economy. All members of this class feel these effects, but the non-native segment is more dramatically impacted. Fewer places of employment offer immigrants and their offspring less economic stability, fewer opportunities for social interaction, less social capital, and fewer avenues for political engagement. To paraphrase Hirschman (1970), for many immigrants *exit* - return migration or social ghettoization - may be a more preferable strategy to *loyalty* – in this case, citizenship acquisition. Within these socioeconomic circumstances, I would expect demand for citizenship to decrease, because low socioeconomic integration means that one is likely unable and unwilling to pay the

commensurate costs of political, economic, and social integration necessary to acquire citizenship. Simply put, immigrants in such circumstances could find better uses of their scarce resources and better returns for their cultural and political loyalties. Furthermore, citizenship in the receiving country may be essentially valueless in the present: it delivers no additional socioeconomic benefits or security, nor would it help validate or reflect a certain socioeconomic status. The costs of citizenship would seem to outweigh its benefits.

Second and relatedly, immigrant demand for citizenship in one year should increase as the perceived future economic or political value of citizenship status increases, or the expected future cost of citizenship increases. For some immigrants, changes in one's assessment of the future value of citizenship may affect the demand for citizenship today. If an economically integrated immigrant believes that naturalizing in the country of residence will enhance his or her socioeconomic, political, or cultural prospects in the future rather than remain an immigrant or return to his or her country of origin where the prospects for the future are worse, we might expect that more immigrants will desire citizenship. Citizenship likely brings greater economic opportunity and future job security, as suggested by existing empirical evidence (Bevelander and Veenman 2006; Euwals et al. 2010; OECD 2011). It might also enhance one's sense of belonging and reflect a certain social status (Diehl and Blohm 2003). To the extent that one becomes economically well-integrated in a society, political citizenship is one's means of participating as a full and permanent member of that society in the future. I expect this optimism to be more prevalent among immigrants in more dynamic and prosperous contexts.

Conversely, an immigrant facing more bleak socioeconomic prospects in the country of settlement in the future may be equally pessimistic that naturalizing in the country of residence will not enhance his or her socioeconomic, political, or cultural prospects in the future. With high unemployment among natives and immigrants alike, citizenship may only have a marginal effect on future employment opportunities.

In other cases, expected changes in the cost of citizenship in the future may incentivize citizenship acquisition in the present. If immigrants anticipate that citizenship will be more or less expensive in the future, then citizenship acquisition might appear more or less valuable today than waiting until the cost of it changes. Because countries are adjusting citizenship policies with increased regularity in Europe today, such policy changes are potentially newsworthy items, especially among immigrant communities. Assuming at least some immigrants are well-informed about national policies affecting their own status and that of their community, it may well be the case that knowledge of future changes in the requirements for citizenship – of higher or lower language standards, a new citizenship exam, future acceptance of dual citizenship, or higher or reduced fees to acquire citizenship – affect the rationale motivating naturalization decisions. Citizenship today without the rigors of a citizenship exam or relinquishing your original citizenship appears much more valuable than the same nationality status next year acquired after hours of studying for a citizenship exam or giving up your original citizenship. Furthermore, as xenophobia and radical right party support surges in numerous countries across Europe, public discussions about future

changes in the cost of citizenship might incentivize additional acquisitions today, rather than delays until the political climate worsens and citizenship becomes more costly. In this fluid policy environment, I expect more immigrants to demand citizenship ahead of more restrictive citizenship policy changes, and more immigrants to demand citizenship after waiting for more liberal and accessible changes.

Third, the relative value of non-citizenship vis-à-vis other legal status options may change today or in the future, causing shifts in overall immigrant demand for citizenship. These may take the form of either changes in the value of non-citizenship status in the country of residence, or the value of retaining citizenship status with the country of origin. On the one hand, changing the value of non-citizenship may affect the demand for naturalization in a country. The growing importance of *jus domicilii* in immigrant-receiving democracies, whereby permanent residents are granted domestic rights on the basis of their domicile in the country rather than their birthright or citizenship status, is perhaps the most important factor here. Many receiving countries have extended a number of civil, political, and social rights to legal permanent residents in recent years, leading to a decoupling of formal citizenship from much of its substance (Hollifield 1992; Bauböck 1994; Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996; Sassen 1998; Joppke 1999, 2001). According to Hammar (1990), this trend has resulted in a status called denizenship, whereby immigrants enjoy a relatively secure residence status as well as rights nearly commensurate with citizens. In addition, seventeen European countries now grant resident non-citizens the right to participate in local elections (Groenendijk

2008; Hayduk and Wucker 2004). While national elections still remain largely reserved for citizens only, this trend may likewise reduce the value of citizenship vis-à-vis denizenship. Moreover, since the introduction of EU citizenship for intra-EU migrants, the benefits of naturalizing in another European country are in most circumstances negligible compared to the benefits of retaining citizenship in the country of origin. Not surprisingly, such trends that increase the value of non-citizenship should dampen immigrant demand for naturalization. Rendering non-citizenship more costly may have the opposite effect on demand. For instance, the heated public rhetoric and political discussions in the United States surrounding the rights and privileges of non-citizens during the 1990s, and numerous ensuing efforts to curtail those rights and privileges, contributed to an increase in naturalizations in the years prior to the policy changes, as previous research has found (Jones-Correa 2001a; Escobar 2004). Likewise, if the future status of non-citizens becomes less hospitable, then such conditions may incentivize more acquisitions. Thus I expect decreases in the value of non-citizenship should bolster demand for citizenship and increase naturalization rates.

On the other hand, changes in the value of citizenship in the country of origin may have similar effects on immigrant demand for citizenship in the receiving country. Countries of origin vary in their citizenship policy toward their immigrants abroad, and many may attempt to render their own passports more valuable as an attempt to maintain immigrant loyalty and transnational ties from abroad. An increasing number of sending countries are extending dual citizenship or additional political and economic rights to immigrants to retain their loyalty (Freeman and

Ogelman 1998; Itzigsohn 2000; Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001; Jones-Correa 2001a; Escobar 2004; Faist and Kivisto 2007; Faist 2007; Bloemraad et al. 2008). These range from property and inheritance rights to welfare benefits to the right to vote from abroad (Itzigsohn 2000; Bauböck 2006). This may have the effect of diminishing demand for citizenship in the receiving country. In addition, the economic or political circumstances in the country of origin may affect demand for citizenship in the country of settlement. If economic conditions become especially dismal or the political context more precarious back home, immigrants may desire to severe ties to such a context, increasing the demand for citizenship in the country of settlement. Conversely, if the economic performance of the country of origin exceeds that of the host country, immigrants may be incentivized to return home in greater numbers rather than naturalize. Hence immigrants may consider retaining citizenship in their country of origin as valuable insurance should their prospects in the country of settlement diminish, or acquire it in their country of settlement if conditions back home deteriorate. In this case, demand for citizenship in the receiving country varies according to alternative status options.

Fourth, it may be that immigrants choose to naturalize or not simply due to changing cultural identities or preferences for the culture of the receiving country. Stronger identification with the host country may increase demand for citizenship in the host country. Thus it may be that second-generation immigrants 'feel' more German or Dutch than their parents and thus opt for citizenship in their respective country. Likewise, weakened identification with or cultural preference for the host country may diminish one's desire for naturalization. In elementary economic

terms, as 'tastes' or preferences regarding the host country change, demand for that citizenship should change accordingly.

Each of these factors then may increase or decrease overall demand for citizenship among immigrants, at a given integration price. The changing level of demand for citizenship is illustrated by the curves labeled D_1 and D_2 in Figure 3.2. My hypotheses for the demand for citizenship are based on how immigrants respond to these factors deriving from their integration context:

> ***H.D1:*** *The strength of the socioeconomic context of a country should be positively associated with the immigrant demand for citizenship, which should increase commensurate naturalization rates.*
>
> ***H.D2:*** *As the perceived future economic or political value of citizenship status in the country increases, or as the expected future cost of citizenship increases, immigrant demand for citizenship in the current year should increase, reflected in increased naturalization rates.*
>
> ***H.D3:*** *As the relative value of non-citizenship decreases, immigrant demand for citizenship – and consequently naturalization rates – should increase.*
>
> ***H.D4:*** *As identification with the host country's culture increases, immigrant demand for citizenship should increase alongside naturalization rates.*[16]

In Chapter 6, I revisit and operationalize these hypotheses in more detail in order to test the theoretical framework.

[16] Because identification with the host country's culture is a variable not readily discernible at the national level, I do not test this hypothesis in this project. However, the expectation is fully in line with previous work on the subject as reviewed in Chapter 2.

The Political Supply of Citizenship and the Cost of Integration

Determining rates of citizenship acquisition also requires us to assess the integration context in terms of the willingness of political actors to provide citizenship, i.e. the political supply of citizenship. In economics, as the price of a quantity of a good or service increases, the willingness of firms to supply that good or service increases. Similarly, in a state without a national citizenship policy, I would expect the willingness of that state to supply citizenship to immigrants to increase as the level of integration achieved by immigrants increases, as depicted by the *S* curve in Figure 3.2. In other words, the extent to which a state naturalizes new citizens in a given context is increasing in the degree of immigrant assimilation within that context.

I make the assumption that in such a context, policymakers would be relatively willing and able to adjust the number of naturalizations granted in response to the costliness of citizenship, since the costs of increasing or decreasing naturalizations are negligible for policymakers. Thus supply of citizenship is relatively elastic, in that relatively small changes in the costliness of citizenship (in terms of integration) cause observable changes in the quantity policymakers are willing and able to supply.

In a model without citizenship policy regulations, my explanation for shifts in political supply at a given integration cost mirrors the determinants of citizenship policy making and follows a logic similar to the shifts in supply postulated in economics. Specifically, I argue that two political motivations alter policymakers' preferences for higher or lower citizenship acquisitions among immigrants: political ideology and electoral incentives. Generally speaking, Labor, Social Democratic, and

Green parties should favor more open citizenship policies and are more likely to be pro-immigrant in orientation because of their traditional ideological association with the interests of the working class and socioeconomically disadvantaged, a constituency of which immigrants are often a part (Joppke 2003a; Lahav 2004; Breunig and Luedtke 2008; Messina 2007; Bird et al. 2011). Ideologically, these policymakers locate the causes of socioeconomic disadvantage and hardship of immigrants in the structural obstacles of society, and thus tend to support policies that grant immigrants greater access to political, economic, or social structures in efforts to overcome these obstacles and stimulate integration into society (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010). Citizenship acquisition, by this view, would be a significant means of increasing immigrant access. Independent of citizenship policy, I would expect to see the supply of citizenship increase in ideologically amenable and left-oriented contexts.

Conversely, conservative parties are more likely to favor restrictive citizenship policy (Joppke 2003a). While not inherently opposed to immigration or immigrants, conservative parties tend to be more anti-immigrant because of constituent concerns about the negative economic impact of immigration, the increased burdens on social services, increased crime rates, and the threat posed to national identity from increased diversity (Ireland 2004). Ideologically, conservative policymakers locate the causes of immigrants' socioeconomic disadvantage and non-integration in the interests, motivations, and cultural orientations of individual immigrants and communities. Consequently, rather than grant greater rights or access for immigrants, conservative parties tend to posit that

citizenship should act as a personal incentive to integrate, and thus citizenship is a reward for successful integration for which immigrants should aspire (Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010; Schuck 1998; Renshon 2001). Thus the expectation is that the supply of citizenship will be lower in contexts where ideologically conservative policymakers are in power.

Electoral competition may also affect the political supply of citizenship as well. I theorize that closer and more intense party competition generally creates narrow margins of victory for political parties in elections, and such competition may lead political actors to seek additional votes among groups such as immigrants and newly naturalized voters. Because Labor, Social Democratic, and Green parties tend to see immigrants as constituents or potential constituents, and tend to favor legislation that addresses their concerns and maintains their loyalty, electoral competition among them may lead to increasingly open and less restrictive citizenship policy proposals. To the extent that political actors and bureaucracies have some discretion over citizenship policy implementation and naturalization decisions, I hypothesize that greater party competition on the left of the political spectrum should compel more permissive policy interpretations and emphasis on naturalization, creating a hospitable context for citizenship acquisition.

Conversely, because the median voter in advanced democracies tends toward restrictionism, conservative parties often have an electoral interest in playing on these sentiments and highlighting immigration and nationality issues as strategies in party competition (Cornelius et al. 2004; Lahav 2004; Faist et al. 2004). Furthermore, a greater degree of competition on the right of the political spectrum,

such as threats from radical right parties, should compel more restrictive policy interpretations, creating a context that seeks to control naturalizations and citizenship conferral (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Givens 2005). The radical right might also create an inhospitable context even with left parties in power. Because leftist parties draw support from the native-born working class as well as immigrants, any leftist party perceived to favor immigrant issues at the expense of native-born labor will lose many of these constituents to radical right parties. Leftist parties may then be forced to take more restrictive positions on citizenship than they otherwise would in order to avoid the loss of core working-class constituents. Thus in electoral contexts with strong radical right parties, one would expect that the supply of citizenship may be significantly lower than in contexts where they are absent.

In this baseline model without citizenship policy, as portrayed in Figure 3.2, the equilibrium level of naturalizations and the integration price required in such a country would be located at the intersection of the demand and supply curves, at N^* and IC^* respectively. The expected naturalization rates established by immigrant demand and political supply described above assumes a kind of 'marketplace' for citizenship without national political regulation or standardization. However, no (at least modern democratic) state grants citizenship based exclusively on policymakers' largesse, generosity, or political ideology alone. Instead, most countries legislate citizenship laws that stipulate the conditions under which immigrants may join the political community. Such laws define the membership criteria by which members of the political community are distinguished from non-

members. Drawing an analogy between the economic theory of clubs and club goods and the state, the members of states may offer collective benefits to its members and those willing to bear the costs and responsibilities of membership, as well as admit or exclude whomever they choose by whatever criteria they choose.[17] In this sense, citizenship policies are the entry criteria for membership in the political community. In some countries, policymakers may demand that potential immigrant members meet stringent criteria in order to acquire citizenship, while others may offer membership on more accessible terms.

Across Europe, such citizenship policies establish a nationally uniform minimum threshold in terms of a certain integration price required for membership, increasingly above what many might suggest is the equilibrium price as depicted in Figure 3.2. These laws thus become a 'price floor' in economic terms, an established minimum level of integration that any immigrant must achieve in order to acquire citizenship, independent of the number demanding naturalization. This is represented by a constant, horizontal curve located at a given integration price, and for the moment we can simply interpret this as the effective supply curve, labeled *S* in Figure 3.3.

To locate the relative position of a country's citizenship policy, we simply examine the net costliness of integration requirements that policymakers embed within a given citizenship policy. For example, we might classify a policy that

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[17] On the economic theory of clubs, see Buchanan (1965). As applied to countries and citizenship, see Walzer (1983, 35-63) and Straubhaar (2003). By drawing this analogy between club membership and state membership, I wish to highlight the parallels between these concepts rather than presuppose that public states function in exactly the same manner as private clubs. Nor do I claim that states *should* function like clubs, or that clubs approximate the appropriate membership criteria (see Carens 1987, 267-68).

Figure 3.3: The Supply and Demand of Citizenship, With Citizenship Policy



permits dual citizenship and requires no native language skill or civic knowledge as a minimally costly threshold of supply such as S_2, while a policy that proscribes dual citizenship and requires language and civic proficiency is a more stringent supply threshold, such as S_1. Given a national citizenship policy, the equilibrium number of naturalizations and equilibrium integration cost is depicted at the intersection of the solid lines in Figure 3.3. In Chapter 4, I will classify European citizenship policies according to different integration-related criteria so that we can begin assessing how these varying cost thresholds affect naturalization rates in Europe.

One may initially think that the inclusion of a national citizenship law renders political determinants less important than the legal stipulations of a respective policy for naturalization rates. However, even in contexts with nationally legislated citizenship policies, we might still expect exogenous shifts in political ideology or electoral incentives to affect equilibrium naturalization rates. This relationship may occur through two related mechanisms. First, shifts in political ideology and electoral incentives may cause explicitly liberal or restrictive changes in the various dimensions of citizenship policy and hence shift naturalization rates in a positive or negative direction. Depending on the political orientation of the respective government, policymakers may legislate new dimensions of integration within citizenship policy as prerequisites of immigrant naturalization. Left-of-center governments may perceive low rates of naturalization, high immigrant unemployment, and high rates of welfare use among immigrants as evidence that immigrants require additional support in acquiring citizenship and integrating into their respective contexts. The net effect would be fewer barriers to citizenship

acquisition, less stringent integration requirements, a lower integration cost threshold, and a more liberalized citizenship policy, resulting in higher naturalization rates following such a change. Any policy that renders permanent resident status less costly vis-à-vis national citizenship – a change in the relative value of citizenship - would have the opposite effect.

Conversely, conservative governments perceive high immigrant unemployment and welfare use as evidence that immigrants need to integrate or be more willing to integrate into the host country, and respond with more stringent integration requirements, a higher integration cost threshold, and a more restrictive overall citizenship policy. The net result is an overall decrease in naturalization rates following a restrictive change in citizenship policy. Similarly, any policy that renders permanent resident status more costly vis-à-vis national citizenship would have the effect of increasing naturalization rates.

The second mechanism through which shifts in political ideology and electoral incentives may cause changes in the supply of citizenship is more subtle. This stems from the level of administrative and regulatory capacity of governments to decide how best to implement citizenship law in practice, or the ambiguity built into many national citizenship policies that grant policymakers significant political discretion and flexibility in interpreting and implementing citizenship law. Governments enjoy significant leeway in the administrative application of the law: some may choose to increase the fees for naturalization on an annual basis or reduce them, subsidize language and civics courses for immigrants or require them to pay their own way, or raise the bureaucratic hurdles necessary to surmount in

order to naturalize, or make efforts to streamline them. Such changes can heavily influence access to citizenship beyond the formal scope of the law itself. Another source of potential political influence might be in the realm of policy ambiguity. Until the last decade, for example, most countries with language requirements assessed an applicant's proficiency by means of an oral interview. The topic of conversation, the length of the interview, and the level of fluency and comprehensibility was either regulated by administrative regulations handed down by governments, or left to the discretion of the local government, the local citizenship office, and even the interviewer herself. What passes for proficiency under a left-oriented government may not meet the standards of a more conservative government.

Each of these factors then may increase or decrease overall political supply of citizenship, at a given integration price. My hypotheses for the political supply of citizenship are based on how politicians' motivations develop:

> ***H.S1:*** *As the costliness of citizenship supplied increases, the commensurate naturalization rates should decrease.*
>
> ***H.S2:*** *As the result of political influence beyond formal citizenship policy, left-oriented governments should be positively associated and right-oriented governments negatively associated with naturalization rates.*
>
> ***H.S3*** *As the degree of legal discretion over the implementation of citizenship policy decreases, naturalization rates should decrease under left-oriented governments and increase under right-oriented governments.*

H.S4: *Left party competition should be positively associated with naturalization rates and right party competition should be negatively associated with naturalization rates.*

Hypothesizing the Equilibrium Naturalization Rate and Integration Cost

This theoretical framework offers a number of hypotheses regarding the determinants of demand and supply of citizenship in European countries. While it is the supply and demand curves that directly determine the equilibrium naturalization rate and integration cost in a given country or region, each comprises a number of diverse contextual factors which shift these curves and thus indirectly affect naturalization rates and integration. Before examining how shifts in supply and demand determine the equilibrium naturalization rate and integration price, however, I summarize my hypotheses here in Table 3.1.

The combination of these socioeconomic and political contextual dynamics generates several predictions regarding rates of citizenship acquisition as well as the level of integration required to acquire it. These predictions can be located at the numbered intersections in Figure 3.3. First, at point 1 where demand and supply are both lower – for instance in contexts with weak economies and conservative/radical right party strength – I expect, not surprisingly, naturalization rates that are correspondingly low. At point 4, conversely, where demand and supply are both high – for instance in dynamic socioeconomic regions with strong left party presence and a liberalized citizenship policy – I expect the highest naturalization rates.

Table 3.1: Determinants of Demand for and Supply of Citizenship

Aggregate Variable	**Contextual Variable**	**Value**	**Effect on Citizenship Acquisition**
Immigrant Demand for Citizenship	Socioeconomic Context	Strong	Increase
		Weak	Decrease
	Future Value of Citizenship	Increase	Increase
		Decrease	Decrease
	Relative Value of Non-Citizenship Status	Increase	Decrease
		Decrease	Increase
	Identification with Host Country Culture	High	Increase
		Low	Decrease
Political Supply of Citizenship	Policy-Defined Cost	Increase	Decrease
		Decrease	Increase
	Political Ideology	Leftist	Increase
		Conservative	Decrease
	Electoral Politics	Left Competition	Increase
		Radical Right	Decrease
	Decreased Discretion	Under Leftist Governments	Decrease
		Under Rightist Governments	Increase

In between these two extremes, I expect a more median naturalization rate where there is significant political willingness to confer citizenship to immigrants but weak interest among immigrants to acquire it, and median naturalization rates where there is high immigrant interest in citizenship but lagging political interest in granting it.

Second, the political supply of citizenship alone regulates the integration cost of citizenship in a given context.[18] Where there is low political willingness to grant citizenship, perhaps due to strong conservative ideology or radical right party presence, policymakers may impose a higher integration cost on immigrants for

[18] To see why, compare Figures 3.2 and 3.3. In Figure 3.2, those supplying citizenship respond to changes in the integration cost by increasing or decreasing naturalizations. In Figure 3.3, however, citizenship policy renders the political supply curve horizontal, meaning that in theory an infinite range of naturalizations is associated with the given cost set by the citizenship policy, and changes in overall cost stipulated by the policy have no effect on quantity supplied.

citizenship acquisition. Thus I would expect only those immigrants who are highly integrated in socioeconomic, political, and cultural terms to acquire citizenship. By the reverse logic, where there is high political willingness to grant citizenship, for instance due to a stronger left-of-center party presence, policymakers will be less exacting in terms of the integration price required for citizenship. Hence the average level of socioeconomic, political, and cultural integration among naturalized immigrants will be much lower in these contexts than among naturalized immigrants in the aforementioned areas. These relationships are graphically represented in Figure 3.3 and in Table 3.2 above.

Conclusion

In this chapter I advanced a theoretical framework for understanding citizenship policymaking, citizenship acquisition, and immigrant integration in Europe. I first investigated what I called the *political supply of citizenship*, specifically arguing that unique electoral competition among political parties and demographic pressures inherited from past citizenship policies shape contemporary citizenship policy outcomes. I then situated this *political supply of citizenship* alongside the different socioeconomic, legal, and political contexts that structure the lives of immigrants and create what I termed the *immigrant demand for citizenship*. Using a basic supply and demand market model, I revealed how naturalization rates, and the corresponding level of integration required to naturalize, are the equilibrium result of the interaction between this varying immigrant demand for citizenship and the respective political supply of citizenship. The framework in this chapter not only generated a number of testable hypotheses, summarized in Table 3.1, which will be

evaluated empirically in the following chapters. It also raised several additional implications about citizenship policy making and the integration of immigrants which will be discussed in the Chapter 8 conclusion.

Chapter 4: Quantifying Policy: the Integration Cost of Citizenship Index

European governments have been feverishly debating and restructuring citizenship policy over the last few decades as they seek to manage the effects of mass immigration to their societies. As the pace of this political activity has intensified, it has provoked widespread scholarly interest in this policy area. Have policies regulating access to citizenship converged upon a shared or similar set of requirements, or diverged in their orientations? Have they become more inclusive or restrictive, and why? Do they reflect new state strategies of incorporation or rather demonstrate the resiliency of long-standing national approaches? Scholars have taken up the challenge and produced a large body of work conceptualizing and quantifying citizenship acquisition policies across Europe (Howard 2009, 2010; Janoski 2010; Huddleston et al. 2011b; Koopmans et al. 2012). The proliferation of these comparative measures has yielded valuable tools for analysis as well as many important insights into this dynamic and ever more critical policy area. The comparison and analysis of these indices has even attracted academic attention, leading one observer to muse skeptically that with 'almost as many indices as there are such studies… one might wonder whether it matters which indices we use' (Helbling 2013, 555).

As I discussed in Chapter 3, whatever the logic and utility of existing indices, none offers a fully satisfactory framework that facilitates the analysis of citizenship trends across cases, time, and policy requirement categories. Scholars who examine many countries in a single year cannot shed light on changing dynamics over time, while those that take snapshots of specific years or consider only a few policy

components miss valuable dynamics that occur beyond or within the scope of their studies. Other quantifications rest on theoretically ambiguous definitions and assumptions that may be problematic for generating hypotheses about citizenship policies or for drawing inferences about their effects. In response, I advance a conceptualization and measurement of citizenship policy that captures what I consider to be its underlying purpose: to structure immigrant incentives to acquire citizenship according to different state strategies of incorporation. The criteria for membership, an incentive structure that I call the integration cost of citizenship, stipulate the terms of access to the national 'club' and represent the net 'entrance fee' immigrants must pay for such access in terms of their integration. The costs differ in terms of the state strategies of incorporation they reflect and the incentives they create for potential members of the political community.

In this chapter I present my theoretical framework for understanding citizenship policy and integration and introduce a new comparative quantification of citizenship policies that spans sixteen Western European countries from 1970 to present. To illustrate its utility for assessing citizenship policy across recent decades in Europe, I then use my Integration Cost of Citizenship Index (ICCI) to perform what I believe to be the most extensive quantitative analysis to date of recent trends in European citizenship policy. The investigation reveals contrasting trends of simultaneous convergence and divergence over the last four decades. I also find that while a few European states have reinforced their traditional strategies of citizenship and incorporation, most states have abandoned their post-war policy origins as their strategies for incorporating newcomers have generally adapted to

new realities. The final section then situates the ICCI within the larger study of citizenship policy making and citizenship acquisition and discuss its use in subsequent chapters.

The Integration Cost of Citizenship

I advance a conceptualization of citizenship policy that specifies theoretically what citizenship policy does: structures the incentives of immigrants seeking to acquire citizenship through formal state strategies of integration. In order to avoid ambiguity, I regard citizenship as giving formal 'institutional expression to the state's prerogative of inclusion and exclusion' (Hansen and Weil 2001, 1). Citizenship, in this view, is the institutional device that denotes and distinguishes membership in a political community. Rather than a set of rights, duties, or identities that link individuals to the nation-state, I treat citizenship as a legal status, 'a second gate that migrants have to pass in order to become full members of the polity' (Bauböck 2006, 18-19). Attaining citizenship is, in short, attaining political membership. Furthermore, I use the term integration to refer to the process by which immigrants achieve equal and permanent membership in the requisite domains of life as defined by the receiving country.[19] The degree of integration is simply the extent to which immigrants have assumed membership within these domains.

[19] These domains may entail belonging in economic, social, linguistic, cultural, civic, and/or legal domains of belonging. This process entails both the agency of individual immigrants as well as the larger institutional structures that facilitate access for these immigrants. For further discussion of integration as a concept, see Givens (2007).

While some theorize the regulation of citizenship as one dimension of immigrant rights or as a mechanism of integration, I posit that citizenship policies *at a minimum* formalize the degree of integration an immigrant must exhibit as qualification for membership.[20] In other words, these policies define the integration-related membership criteria that structure the lines of inclusion and exclusion in a polity. These various criteria to attain membership comprise what I call the integration cost of citizenship. Following the logic of clubs,[21] states use citizenship policy to regulate access to the national 'club,' and the integration cost of citizenship is simply the 'entrance fee' for membership in the national community in terms of one's integration. In some countries, policymakers may demand that immigrants exhibit high levels of integration in many domains of life in order to acquire citizenship, and thus they assign a high social, cultural, or civic cost to citizenship acquisition. In this case, the acquisition of citizenship is a relatively costly signal to the state and public that the membership criteria have been met. In other countries, a presumption of integration, or a low level of observable integration, suffices for political membership in the community, and thus the assigned cost that immigrants must pay in that country is markedly lower.

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[20] As Goodman (2013) notes, for most political scientists and sociologists, 'citizenship acquisition is one type of integration (legal integration), and sits laterally to other kinds of integration-promoting policies… [t]herefore, we can interpret citizenship policy indices as fitting into integration policy indices as a subset category' (49). This is, however, only an assumption about the relationship between citizenship and integration, rather than a statement of empirical fact. Nonetheless, even if citizenship is a mechanism of integration in some states, these states only grant citizenship to those immigrants that complete, or pay the cost of, that integration process. Thus we can reasonably assume citizenship acquisition is a signal of integration by the immigrants seeking it; whether or not it helps to integrate is an empirical question to which the following analysis is largely agnostic.

[21] On the economic theory of clubs, see Buchanan (1965) and Sandler and Tschirhart (1997). As applied to countries and citizenship, see Walzer (1983, 35-63), Straubhaar (2003), and Joppke (2010, 157-159).

Conceptualizing citizenship in these terms is theoretically advantageous over previous efforts. It first permits us to analyze citizenship according to the opportunity structures and the institutionally-induced incentives toward citizenship acquisition without the normative bias built into indices of inclusivity. As many scholars have observed,[22] a vast range of requirements shapes citizenship acquisition and integration outcomes among immigrants, yet these requirements may be inclusive for some, exclusive for others, and neutral for still others. Within what Freeman (2004) calls 'the intersection of institutional incentive structures and the strategic decisions of migrants themselves' (950), these requirements function not as markers of inclusivity but as legal contours of state policy that shape immigrant behavior regarding nationality acquisition and integration. The integration costs of citizenship provide this structure and facilitate access for some and impose restrictions on others, from the cultural cost of giving up one's former citizenship to the linguistic cost of learning a new language. Such institutionally defined costs incentivize some able and willing migrants to pay the respective price of membership, while they discourage or screen altogether others from doing so.[23]

[22] For empirical work on this topic see Yang (1994), Bevelander and Veenman (2006), DeVoretz (2008), OECD (2010, 2011), Dronkers and Vink (2012), and Vink, Prokic-Breuer and Dronkers (2013).

[23] Some may object that conceptualizing citizenship policy in terms of cost is inappropriate, since acquiring citizenship may derive from more than simple rational economic calculus. However, the theory advanced here makes no claims about the material or economic interests of immigrants which operate under different citizenship policies, only that immigrants respond to the institutional parameters stipulated by these policies. As I discuss in the following section, institutionally structured costs are broadly defined and may also be social, cultural, linguistic, or civic, and entail factors such as time, commitment, relationships, and status. Furthermore, as nearly any immigrant or naturalization officer in Europe will confess, the relative costs and benefits associated with citizenship acquisition are the primary reason for either applying for citizenship or not.

Assuming citizenship policies are the rules of the nationality acquisition game in a state, to paraphrase North (1990), they actually then serve a dual purpose: not only do they function as the institutional rules that shape the choices and strategies of the immigrant population vis-à-vis citizenship, but they also reflect states' strategies vis-à-vis that population of potential citizens. State approaches have varied between costly, illiberal, and particularistic thresholds to preserve membership for ethnic kin, to accessible, liberal, and universalist criteria to enable assimilation through civic membership. With this conceptualization, we are able to capture and compare these state approaches to incorporation with reference to the distinct constellations of costs they impose rather than vague notions of inclusivity. For example, Kraler (2006) identifies two distinct paradigms in recent decades, 'one that sees citizenship as a means to integrate newcomers more fully into the national community and therefore welcomes the timely acquisition of citizenship, and a second which sees citizenship as a "prize", a reward and honour granted by the state' for successful integration (47). In the former paradigm, states craft liberal and accessible citizenship policies with low cost thresholds to facilitate immigrant integration. The 1983 Dutch *Minderhedennota* advanced such an integration policy, and the government's 1994 *Contourennota* further strengthened the formal relationship between citizenship and integration whereby the latter was the goal of the former (Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken 1983, 1994). Likewise, the 1984 Belgian Law on Nationality granted citizenship on the basis of 'evidence of a real desire to integrate into Belgian society' in the future and a 'willingness for integration and not an already fully achieved stage of integration' (Ministerie van

Justitie 1984). By lowering the integration cost of citizenship, both countries explicitly intended to incentivize integration by means of citizenship, a state strategy of integration-through-citizenship.

Other states at other times have used integration requirements to elicit a costly and observable signal of one's integration, whereby citizenship is granted at the end point of the integration process. This has long been the perspective of the German CDU/CSU, for example, asserting since the 1990s that citizenship acquisition is 'the completion of successful integration' and 'is not a means of, but the strong expression of, successful integration.'[24] Austrian policymakers have long regarded citizenship as the 'highest good' rewarded at the end of a successful integration process, and the Dutch government declared in 2003 that 'naturalization can only been seen as the crown of integration' rather than a form of it.[25] For such policymakers, certain costs are imposed to screen, if not fully prohibit, certain immigrants from membership on the basis of low levels of integration. This reflects a citizenship-through-integration strategy.

By conceptualizing citizenship policies in terms of their integration-based incentive structures, we can understand more objectively the purpose of citizenship policy: to structure immigrant incentives to naturalize according to state strategies of membership. In addition to a better understanding of these state strategies, however, we can also use the constellations of costs captured in the index to derive a number of observable implications regarding the policies' effects on citizenship acquisition and the degree and type of integration they yield. In this way, the

[24] CDU-CSU (1998), 3; CDU-CSU (2013), 41.
[25] Tweede Kamer (2004), 11.

relationship between citizenship and integration is not assumed, but rather mediated by the integration cost associated with acquisition.

Quantifying the Integration Cost of Citizenship

To comparatively evaluate the costliness of citizenship policy in terms of immigrant integration, I have coded an Integration Cost of Citizenship Index (ICCI) for 16 European citizenship policies from 1970 to the present.[26] The ICCI scores citizenship policy requirements in terms of nine cost domains: linguistic, economic, civic, legal, social, cultural, lineal, familial, and ethnic. As stipulated in Table 4.1, most indicators are scored on an ordinal scale with 0.5-point intervals between 0 and 2, with some limited exceptions. A total ICCI score for a given country-year is a straightforward additive aggregation of these component costs.[27] However, I employ two sub-dimensions for theoretical and methodological reasons. One dimension captures what I call latent integration costs, which prioritize relational, group-based criteria for membership. These are fundamentally *ascriptive* and reflect a state's presumption of integration rather than an observation of it directly. Policies that score high on this dimension exact high standards of latent integration

[26] The countries include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Great Britain. Data came primarily from formal legislation and legal texts accessed from government ministries and websites and from EUDO Citizenship Observatory's National Citizenship Laws database. Secondary accounts, especially EUDO's individual Country Reports, were also instrumental in filling in some annual gaps where legal sources were unavailable or ambiguous. The values reported here correspond with policies in force rather than simply passed by the legislature, although both sets of data as well as a full disclosure of the methodology can be found on the author's website.

[27] In keeping with the prevailing practice of other indices in the field, I weight each component equally and impose no relative weighting scheme on the various components of the total ICCI score. Both theoretically and empirically, I know of no reason to weight certain costs more than others, since different integration requirements should assume different degrees of costliness for different individual immigrants, but on average should be relatively equivalent in terms of cost.

on those acquiring citizenship, incentivizing acquisition for groups such as coethnics abroad, while pricing others out of the market entirely. Nonetheless, latent cost criteria render it difficult for immigrants to demonstrate their level of integration, and difficult for the state to observe it. Dual citizenship in Germany has been highly contentious exactly because of assumptions about the lack of cultural integration it signals. That Rotterdam's first Muslim mayor had retained his Moroccan citizenship was galling to the local Livable Rotterdam party in 2009 exactly because it suggested an incomplete integration into Dutch society. Thus latent integration costs send crude signals of integration to those granting membership.

Latent integration criteria include social, cultural, lineal, and ethnic costs. I measure social cost as one's length of residence in country, taken as the normalized average number of years in residence per type of naturalization, up to a total of two points. The assumption here is the longer the residence, the more socially integrated an immigrant should be. I measure cultural cost in terms of dual citizenship, with full acceptance of dual citizenship coded zero for least costly cultural integration, and a ban on dual citizenship coded two, with gradations for partial toleration. Provisions on *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* measure lineal cost, with exclusive *jus soli* coded zero as least costly to acquire, and exclusive *jus sanguinis* coded two for being much more presumptive about one's integration by descent alone. Finally, I include an additional ethnic cost if the state grants special accessibility for ethnic kin or ethnic familiarity.

The other dimension includes what I call manifest integration criteria. Policies with higher manifest scores are *descriptive* and make few assumptions about immigrants'

qualifications for membership. Instead, states attempt to observe and measure integration directly. Governments can specify integration thresholds to be met and grant membership accordingly. States need not infer one's integration, but rather rely on gathered evidence through active assessments, or as Goodman (2012) puts it, "through performance and behavior" (p. 665). Policies with high manifest scores thus reflect strategies to incentivize citizenship acquisition among immigrants who can bear the demonstrable costs of membership. Furthermore, as opposed to latent integration criteria, it is easier for immigrants to signal their level of integration as the cost of membership, and easier for the state to observe the type of immigrant seeking that membership.

Manifest integration criteria include linguistic, economic, civic, legal, and familial costs of citizenship. Linguistic cost captures the degree of linguistic integration required for naturalization, based primarily on the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages. Economic cost measures the financial prerequisites for naturalization, such as dependence on public welfare. Civic cost measures the extent of country or civic knowledge required for naturalization, as well as mandatory oath and ceremony requirements. Legal cost represents whether or not authorities must consider an immigrant's behavior or criminal past in the naturalization process. Finally, a familial cost captures whether the state confers citizenship automatically on spouses, or requires spouses to demonstrate their integration through the fulfillment of naturalization requirements

Table 4.1: The Integration Cost of Citizenship Coding Rules

TOTAL CITIZENSHIP POLICY								
LATENT CRITERIA DIMENSION				MANIFEST CRITERIA DIMENSION				
SOCIAL COST	**CULTURAL COST**	**LINEAL COST**	**ETHNIC COST**	**LINGUISTIC COST**	**ECONOMIC COST**	**CIVIC COST**	**LEGAL COST**	**FAMILIAL COST**
Years of legal residence	Dual citizenship	*Jus sanguinis* / *jus soli*	Privileged access for ethnic kin	Language requirements	Income or welfare requirements	Integration exams and oaths	Criminal record and character requirements	Integration criteria for spouses
0-2	0-2	0-2	0-2	0-2(+)	0-2	0-2(+)	0-2	0-2
Averaged number of years residence per naturalization track / 10	0 = Full dual citizenship	0 = Full *jus soli*	0 = No privileged access for ethnic kin	0 = No explicit language requirement	0 = No explicit income requirement or restrictions on public assistance	0 = No explicit civic integration requirement (country knowledge, oath)	0 = No explicit character or criminal record requirement for naturalization	0 = Familial acquisition automatic for spouses
2 = 20 or more years, or unstipulated residency duration length	+1 = Partial toleration of dual citizenship	+/-0.5 = *jus soli* after birth via declaration	1=Accommodated or privileged access for ethnic kin	0.5 = Informal or discretionary interview, or A1 exam level	0.5 = Vaguely defined income requirement or discretionary restrictions on public assistance	0.5 = Vaguely defined civic knowledge or integration requirement	0.5 = Vaguely defined character or behavioral requirement for naturalization	0.5 = Facilitated naturalization of spouses by declaration
	+0.5 = Ban on dual citizenship with numerous exemptions and flexible expectations of renunciation	+/-0.5 = Double *jus soli* provisions	0.5 = Privileged access and extension of citizenship to ethnic abroad	1 = Language exam level A2	1 = Explicit Income and/or restrictions on public assistance	1 = Formal integration exam or naturalization exam	1 = Criminal record submission required for naturalization	1+(Years/10) = Facilitated naturalization of spouses with residency requirements
	2 = Enforced or attempted full ban on dual citizenship	+/-0.25 = *Jus soli* or declaration accommodations for certain groups (e.g. Algerians in France, Nordics in Denmark)	2 = Automatic citizenship for ethnic kin	1.5 = Language exam level B1	+/-0.5 = More/less rigorous income level requirements, restrictions on public assistance, or exceptions to such requirements	+0.5 = More explicit civic integration, or more rigorous naturalization exam	+0.25 = Criminal record and restrictions on imprisonment more than twelve months in duration	+0.5 = facilitated naturalization of spouses with demonstrated assimilation
		-0.5 = partial relaxations of full *jus sanguinis*	+/-0.5 = Per additional restriction on previously privileged ethnic kin	2 = Language exam level B2		+0.5 = formal oath or required public ceremony	+0.5 = Criminal record and restrictions on imprisonment more than six months in duration	-0.5 = marriage to a citizen constitutes exemption to assimilation or integration requirements
		2 = *Jus sanguinis* only		+0.5 = Additional language levels			+0.75 = Criminal record and restrictions on imprisonment more than three months in duration	2 = full naturalization requirements (no facilitated access for spouses)

Measurements of qualitative data require difficult choices regarding scoring, and the decisions made in the compilation of this index are no exception.[28] Although these two dimensions were derived theoretically, the configuration of the two dimensions are a methodologically appropriate means of capturing citizenship policy. A principle component analysis of these policy indicators confirms the reliability of this two-dimensional framework. The two-dimensional model accounts for 57 percent of the variance (the first manifest dimension accounting for 32 percent), and respective Cronbach's α scores of 0.80 and 0.64 for the respective manifest and latent dimensions confirm their high degree of internal consistency.[29] Furthermore, the aggregate ICCI scores a high degree of reliability when juxtaposed with other similar indices and measures. As we can see from Table 4.2, the ICCI is highly correlated with other comparable indices in the field, which suggests it is a reliable measure of citizenship policy generally across time and countries. As a measure of external validity, the ICCI also correlates with annual naturalization rates across the country-years under analysis, and much more robustly than any other existing index given the differences in the number of observations in the respective samples. This demonstrates its utility for assessing not only citizenship policies themselves, but also their potential effects.

[28] See Michalowski and van Oers (2012), Goodman (2012b), and Helbling et al. (2013) for a discussion of these coding and measurement issues.

[29] Compared to the only other principle component analysis of citizenship policy configurations performed by Vink and Baubock (2013), these scores are highly confirmatory of the underlying structure of the data.

Table 4.2: Pearson's Correlations with the ICCI

	ICCI	CPI	ICRI	BNI	Total Cross-Index Correlation	Annual Naturalization Rate
ICCI	1.00 (0.000) 720	-0.5838 (0.0005) 32	-0.7681 (0.000) 36	0.6436 (0.000) 54	0.3247 (0.0004) 116	-0.3235 (0.000) 617
CPI	-0.5838 (0.0005) 32	1.00 (0.000) 30	0.8349 (0.0001) 16	-0.3510 (0.2396) 13	0.3152 (0.0169) 57	0.5185 (0.004) 29
ICRI	-0.7681 (0.000) 36	0.8349 (0.0001) 16	1.00 (0.000) 36	-0.6391 (0.0003) 27	0.3993 (0.0003) 79	0.6443 (0.000) 36
BNI	0.6436 (0.000) 54	-0.3510 (0.2396) 13	-0.6391 (0.0003) 27	1.00 (0.000) 52	0.2391 (0.0232) 90	-0.2653 (0.0748) 46

Corresponding p-values are given in parentheses, after which is also included the number of observations. The Total Cross-Index Correlation is based on taking the inverse of the ICRI and CPI indices so that all indices were similarly oriented in terms of restrictiveness. Naturalization rates derive from data from national statistical offices and Eurostat's 'Foreign-Born Population (migr_pop3ctb) and 'Acquisition of Citizenship' (migr_acq) statistics, calculated as the reported number of citizenship acquisitions per reported foreign-born population for the sixteen countries in the dataset from 1970 to 2014. Because of missing data for certain years, the following country-years are restricted as follows: Germany (1973-2014), Greece (1980-2014), Ireland (2000-2013), Italy (1985-2014), Norway (1977-2014), Portugal (1996-2014), and Spain (1980-2014).

Assessing the Trends

Using these ICCI scores, we can now undertake a more nuanced and systematic evaluation of various hypotheses regarding citizenship policy trends. I begin with policy convergence. If states are converging in the content of their citizenship policies, we should observe that the cross-national variation in the integration costs of citizenship decrease over time. To test this, Figure 4.1 plots the ICCI's total and dimensional standard deviations in each year from 1970 through 2014. As we can see, the total standard deviation generally decreases in the early 1980s until the turn of the millennium, at which point it increases rapidly from 1.82 in 1997 to 3.13 in 2009. This period of convergence seems on the surface consistent

with previous findings by others such as Koopmans et al (2012), who find convergence in naturalization rights until the turn of the millennium, followed by subsequent divergence.

However, looking at the two dimensional trends, we see a slightly different story unfold. While the total standard deviation spikes at the turn of the millennium, it has been driven entirely by the increased variation on the manifest dimension from a low point of 0.86 in 1994 to its peak of 2.34 in 2011. The standard deviation for the latent dimension has instead charted a rather consistent decline, from 1.90 in 1985 to 1.33 today. These opposite trends suggest that, on the one hand, countries have been slowly and consistently converging in an absolute sense on similar latent cost criteria to confer membership: dual citizenship, *jus soli/sanguinis* orientation, residence requirements, spousal acquisition, and ethnic exceptions. This continues unabated today. On the other hand, the recent flurry of citizenship policy making has introduced a panoply of new manifest costs that had hitherto remained relatively untouched. However, this new civic turn appears exceptionally heterogeneous, signifying little commonality across policies to date. Nonetheless, there are clear signs that convergence on this dimension has even occurred since 2012.

Figure 4.1: ICCI Standard Deviations, 1970-2014



Figure 4.2: ICCI Average Scores, 1970-2014



Figure 4.3: Average Citizenship Cost, Latent Dimension



Figure 4.4: Average Citizenship Cost, Manifest Dimension



To test the *liberal* aspects of the convergence hypothesis, I have plotted the average ICCI scores across the same time period in Figure 4.2. We would expect integration costs to decrease with the liberalization of policy. Overall, the total average cost of citizenship across Europe remained fairly constant from the early 1970s until 1992, after which it began increasing to its high of 8.49 in 2013. Looking at the sub-dimensions, however, we see a secular liberalization among the latent cost components since 1982, reaching a historic low of 2.89 in 2014. Glimpsing within this latent dimension (Figure 4.3), we observe that every component but ethnic cost has markedly decreased over the period. The average cultural cost (dual citizenship) score has decreased most drastically, from 1.47 in 1970 to 0.54 today. Therefore, lower average costs alongside less variation suggest strong *liberal convergence* on this latent dimension since the early 1980s. Conversely, as Figure 4.4 portrays, manifest integration costs of citizenship have increased consistently since 1982, and more precipitously since the early 1990s. They have even surpassed the latent integration requirements in terms of overall share of the total average cost. The most dramatic increases have come in the form of familial costs, i.e. requiring spouses to demonstrate their integration. Overall, higher costs alongside higher variation thus signify *restrictive divergence* on this dimension. These opposing trends thus imply more European states no longer ascribe eligibility for membership on the basis of latent integration criteria, and have clearly begun evaluating eligibility for membership on the basis of manifest integration criteria. In other words, while the aggregate scores reveal that citizenship has become more costly to acquire in general, many states seem to be replacing traditional strategies

that employed high latent costs with strategies that incentivize demonstrable integration prior to citizenship.

But are a handful of already more liberal, inclusive, and multicultural countries simply driving this liberal convergence? If liberal convergence is occurring, we should observe change in a lower-cost direction across most countries over the period of analysis. However, this liberalization should be especially pronounced in traditionally more restrictive countries: it would be rather misleading if previously liberalized countries were simply becoming more so. To investigate this, I graph the latent integration cost scores in 1970 and 2014, seen in Figure 4.5.[30] Looking at the graph, the Western European average was 4.18 in 1970, with ten countries to the left of the mean possessing more costly membership strategies on this dimension and six countries to the right with less costly strategies. But from 1970 until 2014, the restrictive ten posted an average decrease of 2.13, nine of which reduced the costliness of citizenship over the period, while three of the six most liberal countries actually *increased* the costliness of citizenship by an average of 0.09 across the period. Even among the most restrictive quartile in 1970– Germany, Greece, Denmark, and Austria – the average cost decrease was 2.04, while the least restrictive quartile in 1970 – Portugal, Ireland, Great Britain, and France – *increased* by an average of 0.25 points.

[30] I focus on this dimension because liberal convergence is only occurring along this dimension. To diminish idiosyncrasies might arise with a starting point of 1970, I perform similar calculations using five-year averaged scores as well as 1975 scores. The conclusions drawn are robust to these alternative specifications.

Figure 4.5: Liberalization of Latent Integration Costs, 1970 and 2014



	GER	GRE	DEN	AUS	ESP	BEL	LUX	SWE	FIN	NOR	AVE	ITA	NET	POR	IRE	GBR	FRA
1970	8.00	5.80	5.75	5.50	5.10	5.00	5.00	4.98	4.75	4.70	4.18	4.00	3.00	2.30	1.40	0.90	0.75
2014	3.70	3.50	5.05	4.65	4.10	1.00	1.70	2.32	2.30	4.96	2.89	3.57	3.00	2.10	1.90	1.50	0.85

The most restrictive quartile will decrease further in the near future when Denmark's reform permitting dual citizenship goes into effect. Overall, the correlation between the 1970 latent score and magnitude of change is negative and significant (Pearson's r= -0.73, p= 0.0007). Strikingly, then, the most traditionally restrictive countries have enacted the most pronounced liberalization over the period, while the most traditionally liberal countries were actually those levying the greatest cost increases on this dimension. Liberal convergence, in other words, is not simply a product of liberal countries becoming more liberal.

Finally, how stable have citizenship policies remained over time? That is, do policies reflect and reinforce long-established national models of citizenship and incorporation, or have new policies evolved over time and replaced traditional orientations? Testing hypotheses regarding the evolution of national models is not straightforward, given the multitude of theoretical conceptions and the difficulty of ascertaining their attributes and parameters.[31] However, the two dimensions of the ICCI provide a systematic means of identifying four general state strategies for incorporating new members into the national club, represented in Figure 4.6. We can also begin to test hypothesis H.CP3 from Chapter 3. Countries with high latent costs correspond broadly with two forms of ethnic, particularistic, and often assimilationist approaches to citizenship. In the lower right quadrant, country policies with high latent costs and low manifest costs incentivize membership along unobserved, assumed, and often relational lines. Individuals with weak homeland

[31] For example, compare the definitions and distinctions of different models of Brubaker (1992), Favell (2001), Castles and Miller (2003), and Koopmans et al. (2005). For a discussion of the problems with identifying national models, see Bertossi (2011) and Bertossi and Duyvendak (2012).

ties, coethnics abroad, relatives, and descendants of nationals may access citizenship relatively easily because latent costs actually incentivize membership instead of screening it as for other foreign nationals. These policies thus entail a state strategy of awarding 'citizenship through latent integration'. Countries with high latent *and* manifest costs are even more demanding because they require both latent qualifications and observable verification of integration. The cost of membership in these countries is highest on both dimensions, denoting complete assimilation – in other words, both latent and manifest adaptation – into society is sequentially prior to membership. These countries may thus be pursuing a 'citizenship through assimilation' strategy. Countries with low latent cost scores fall into two general ideal-types as well. Those with low latent but high manifest cost are similar to the previous two strategies in that they confer citizenship as a reward for integration. However, this 'citizenship through manifest integration' approach awards citizenship according to demonstrated integration rather than assumed integration by virtue of heritage, ties, or relations. This is a more conditional (Goodman 2010a) strategy that exchanges membership for visible integration. Finally, policies with both low latent and low manifest costs reverse the sequence of the previous three strategies. Such a strategy provides relatively easy access to citizenship and thus incentivizes mass acquisition among immigrants regardless of heritage or civic orientation. Rather than latent or manifest integration serving as a condition for membership, membership in these states is a condition for integration. This 'integration through citizenship' strategy may therefore correspond to a

Figure 4.6: A Typology of Citizenship Strategies



multicultural (Kymlicka 1995; Entzinger 2003) or 'enabling' model of citizenship (Goodman 2010a).

If continuity and path-dependent accounts are correct, we should first observe that these strategies remain relatively consistent with their respective national origins. That is, the position of different country policies should remain relatively fixed within their respective quadrants over time. Wide deviations from a policy's point of origin, or complete movement into another quadrant, would suggest a replacement of strategy. To test this hypothesis, I plot the trajectory of each country policy based on the coordinates of its latent and manifest scores from

1970 to the present.[32] Each country-year is thus located within one of the four strategies above, designated by axes set at the midpoints of the two dimensions. Figure 4.7 displays these trajectories. As we can see, the starting points of eleven of the sixteen countries cluster within the lower-right 'citizenship through latent integration' quadrant in 1970, with variation between Greece, Italy, and Germany at the extremes. While the location of many of these countries is not altogether surprising, many of the subsequent trajectories are illuminating. Austria and Denmark both moved solidly into the upper-right quadrant over the last 45 years, fueled by profound movement on the manifest dimension. Because of little shift along the latent dimension, this suggests *reinforcement* of an already closed policy rather than complete replacement of a previous strategy. While Greece moved into the assimilationist quadrant in 2004, it has clearly since *replaced* this orientation with a new law in 2009. Finland and Sweden both shifted to the lower-left quadrant, demonstrating complete replacement of the traditional ethnic model in the opposite direction. Belgium and Italy likewise shifted to the multicultural quadrant in the 1980s and 1990s, before finally shifting to the 'citizenship through manifest integration' model in 2013 and 2009 respectively. Finally, Germany and Luxembourg, two historical archetypes of the ethnocultural model, both abandoned this strategy in favor of a more liberal and individualistic one in 2000 and 2009, respectively. Only two countries, Norway and Spain, remain within this low-right quadrant in 2014, while Spain's trajectory appears to be shifting from it.

[32] For clarity I plot strategies at fifteen-year intervals (1970, 1985, 2000, and 2014), although plotting every year would not change the trajectories significantly.

The remaining five countries all have their initial orientations in the lower-left 'integration through citizenship' quadrant. Given that the approaches of France and Britain, and often the Netherlands, have been contrasted for their dissimilar historic orientations, it is notable that they begin in such proximity to one another. Britain and France both begin the 1970s with an exceptionally similar approach, at least formally, granting membership with relatively few integration requirements attached. But by 2005 and 2006 respectively, both had *replaced* these lenient strategies, increasingly demanding evidence of integration prior to membership. The Netherlands also fully replaced its multicultural-oriented policy in 2003. Only Ireland and Portugal remained within the lower-left multicultural quadrant by 2014.

Overall, then, it appears that at least ten of these sixteen countries had replaced their initial strategies of incorporation by 2014. Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Luxembourg all fully replaced initial policies that prioritized latent integration requirements with policies weak on latent integration and overwhelmingly emphasizing manifest integration requirements. Finland and Sweden replaced similarly prohibitive policies with those that attached relatively few latent or manifest conditions to membership. France, Great Britain and the Netherlands all replaced policies meant to enable integration after membership with policies that demand integration as a condition for it. Only six seemed to reinforce their initial approaches, either changing little to date (Norway, Ireland, Portugal, Spain), or doubling down on already costly policies with additional costly requirements (Austria and Denmark). In general then, the hypothesis about relative

Figure 4.7: Evolution of Country Citizenship Strategies



Figure 4.8: Evolution of European Citizenship Strategies



citizenship policy stasis over time as a product of path dependence seems to find little support from this evidence.

Figure 4.8 charts these same dynamics, but at the aggregate level. With each country-year assigned to one of the four policy strategies, I tabulate the annual frequency of these four different models and plot the corresponding percentages over time. As we can see, the 'citizenship through latent integration' strategy was the predominant approach to citizenship until the mid-1980s, accounting for nearly 70 percent of all policy approaches at its height, while the 'integration through citizenship' accounted for the remainder. Yet we witness the ascendance of this latter strategy beginning in the early 1980s, a period that empirically corresponds

to the observed rise of multicultural policies across Europe (Kymlicka 1995). Strikingly, the fully assimilationist and manifest integration models were mostly absent from Western Europe until the late 1990s; in other words, it was rare to imposing high manifest integration costs on immigrants before this time as a prerequisite for citizenship. By the late 1990s, however, these models had begun to challenge both of the previous two. Today, while the 'citizenship through manifest integration' strategy has become predominant in Europe, the other three have all decreased in prevalence. The traditionally prevailing latent model accounts for roughly ten percent of policy approaches in Western Europe today, and the strong multicultural advance of the 1980s has since retreated to below levels last seen in the 1970s. From this aggregate perspective, we can conclude that the citizenship policy landscape in Europe today hardly reflects initial strategies of incorporation. In fact, the evidence here strongly suggests that four distinct European models have emerged in Western Europe from two initial approaches to incorporation. In addition, as the manifest integration strategy ascends in dominance, it may be increasingly appropriate to conclude that countries are converging on a common incorporation strategy, if not on specific policy requirements.

How well do these four difference country strategies explain citizenship acquisition in Europe? Figure 4.9 plots the mean predicted value of the naturalization rate for each country in the analysis from 1980 until 2014 according to these four strategies.[33] Using the 'citizenship through assimilation' strategy as the baseline, we can see that the strategies closely conform to what we would expect.

[33] These were calculated by OLS regression with panel-corrected standard errors, controlling for logged foreign population and excluding Ireland, for whom naturalization data is largely absent.

Figure 4.9: Mean Predicted Naturalization Rate by Citizenship Strategy



The 'citizenship through latent integration' strategy is only slightly higher than the fully assimilationist model, and though the effect is not significantly different, this is not surprising since the latter is largely a reinforcement of the former, rather than a fully different strategy. However, the predicted effect of the other two strategies is precisely as we would expect: the 'citizenship through manifest integration' strategy provides a strikingly higher degree of access to citizenship, and the 'integration through citizenship' provides the least restrictive level of access. This lends additional support to the coding of the ICCI as well as the strategy typology that it

yields. Chapter 6 will explore the relationship between the ICCI and naturalization in more detail.

Conclusion

The debate over integration and citizenship in Europe continues apace, as do efforts to redress the policies that govern these domains. In the midst of these changes, a theoretically straightforward and temporally expansive understanding of the comparative origins and evolution of these policies is of utmost importance for drawing subsequent conclusions about their causes and their future implications for citizenship in Europe. To this end, this chapter had two objectives. First, it advanced a new conceptualization of citizenship policy that casts its requirements in terms of integration cost to immigrants. I argued that citizenship policy both reflects formal state strategies of incorporation and structures the incentives of immigrants seeking to acquire it. On the one hand, states use citizenship policies to define membership in the polity, and establish the criteria by which such membership is granted. These criteria naturally varies across time and place, with some states seeking to screen immigrants according to defined latent or manifest criteria, while others impose few preconditions at all. On the other hand, these criteria, or integration costs as I have defined them, likewise provide the institutional parameters governing which immigrants acquire citizenship and under what conditions. While some criteria incentivize relational-based acquisition, others prioritize acquisition according to demonstrable individual achievement.

Second, the chapter introduced a new quantification of citizenship policies to reflect this theoretical link between integration and citizenship. Using the ICCI, I

offered one of the most detailed quantitative assessments of the simultaneous processes of convergence and divergence in European citizenship policy to date. I found states have overwhelmingly jettisoned traditional strategies that rely on unobservable latent integration requirements, often in favor of more measurable manifest integration requirements as criteria for membership. While the most traditionally exclusive countries have driven this converging movement away from latent-based criteria for membership, there is clearly strong divergence in terms of the criteria adopted to replace them, reflecting what Goodman (2014) termed 'a reality teeming with variation underneath a superficial veneer of convergence' (p. 63). Wide variation in the number of manifest integration requirements seems to be the defining feature of the last decade, even if some minor convergence has occurred in recent years. In this evolving context, the findings here suggest little continuity between past and present approaches. While institutional and electoral variables may still define the specific national trajectories I observed, there seems to be only the weakest resilience of traditional national models of incorporation across Western Europe over time. Yet it would be premature to conclude this trend represents a new convergence upon a shared set of robust integration criteria or a singular European incorporation strategy. Instead, the picture that emerges, at least for the moment, is one of diverse strategic adaptation.

Although the ICCI seems to be a methodologically reliable tool with which to answer these questions, it is not an exhaustive measurement of the supply-side of integration and citizenship processes in Europe today. It purposefully omits informal procedures and variation in the sequencing of requirements levied across

phases of residence and legal status, each of which clearly structure the immigrant integration process but have little to do with membership cost. Addressing and including these variables on the supply-side could be promising extensions as well. Nonetheless, the conceptualization and quantification of citizenship policy provided here should improve our ability to draw inferences about policy changes, their proximate and long-term causes, and their immediate effects on integration and naturalization outcomes in Europe.

With this conceptualization and measurement of citizenship policy, we may now test a number of additional hypotheses and broader causal questions specified in Chapter 3 regarding the making of citizenship policy and its effects on immigrants acquiring citizenship. It is to the empirical testing of these hypotheses and questions that we now turn in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation.

Chapter 5: Parties, Competition, and Citizenship Policy

Citizenship policy formally define the integration-related membership criteria that structure the lines of inclusion and exclusion in a polity. In some countries, policymakers adopt a stringent 'citizenship through latent integration' or 'citizenship through assimilation' strategy that demands immigrants exhibit high levels of integration in many domains of life in order to acquire citizenship, while in other countries policymakers may adopt an accessible 'integration through citizenship' strategy that offers citizenship as a means to integration. In either case, these policies determine who belongs, who does not, and the criteria used to adjudicate between the two. The naturalization process is thus the nexus between the regulation of citizenship supply and the terms of citizenship acquisition. In this chapter, I examine and test how citizenship policymaking occurs in Europe.

Citizenship Policy and Electoral Politics

As first articulated in Chapter 3, I situate citizenship policy change within a context of electoral politics that motivates policy makers to extend access to citizenship, or restrict access to it. From an ideological perspective, leftist, and especially social democratic and communist, parties generally favor more open citizenship policies because of social egalitarianism, solidarity with the working class, and the correspondence of their policy agenda and the interests of immigrants generally (Messina 2007). More accessible citizenship also grants immigrants access to political, economic, or social structures of a country in efforts to stimulate their integration (Joppke 2003a, 430-31; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010, 774; Bird et al. 2011). Conversely, conservative and right-of-center parties are more likely to favor

more restrictive citizenship policies, whether due to concerns about welfare dependence, crime and terrorism, or national identity (Bale 2003; Ireland 2004). Conservative parties also tend to advance the neoliberal prospect that citizenship should serve as a reward for successful integration and thus should be restricted to those most able and willing to assimilate (Schuck 1998). Electorally, conservative parties often have an interest in playing on nativist sentiments that the median voter tends to hold in advanced democracies (Cornelius et al. 2004; Lahav 2004; Ivarsflaten 2005). By this traditional logic, citizenship policy should liberalize when leftist parties are in power, and become more restrictive when conservative parties are in power.

However, this is not necessarily the case, especially in the more fluid parliamentary systems of multiparty European politics. With the rise of the far right in recent years (Givens 2005; Mudde 2007), conservative parties that would otherwise avoid the issue of citizenship entirely may have a greater incentive to adopt a more extreme position. Similarly, a left-of-center government may find it necessary to adopt a more restrictive position on citizenship and immigration because their otherwise pro-immigrant positions may cost them the votes of the native-born working class who find far right parties more attractive on the issue (Givens and Luedtke 2005; Howard 2009; Bale et al. 2010; Alonso and Fonseca 2012). Thus the 'contagion from the right' means that neither mainstream conservative nor leftist parties would favor policy liberalization and policies may in fact become more restrictive.

In addition, the presence of other left and far left parties, such as the Greens in recent years with clearly pro-immigrant agenda, might have similar effects for policy liberalization. On immigration issues generally, left parties are threatened electorally not only by conservative and far-right demands for restriction, but also by Green and far-left advocacy of more liberal, egalitarian, and multicultural polices. as the experience of the Dutch Labour party (PvdA), the Austrian Social Democrats (SPÖ), and Danish Social Democrats (*Socialdemokratiet*) have revealed (Bale et al. 2010).

Therefore, unlike previous work by scholars that focuses on the particular ideological orientation of the government, or the strength of the radical right in particular, I argue that concerns about electoral competition on both sides of the spectrum drive citizenship policymaking. On the right of the political spectrum, all right-of-center parties may be tempted to politicize the immigration issue if it strengthens their electoral position vis-à-vis other right-of-center political parties. In an electoral atmosphere dominated by heightened electoral competition on the right, for example from a radical right party or from another conservative party, I would expect right-of-center governments to be most likely to enact policies that restrict access to citizenship and increase the requirements to acquire it. Where far right parties join the government, citizenship policy is highly likely to be restricted.

At the opposite end of the political spectrum, I expect electoral competition on the left to incentivize left-oriented governments to liberalize citizenship policy. This is because immigrant voters function as an important constituency for traditional socialist and labor/working-class political parties, and other new parties

on the left may be increasingly adopting pro-immigrant and multicultural positions on the issue as well. In these contexts with multiple left parties or where new left parties like the Greens emerge to challenge traditional left-of-center parties, left-oriented governments and governments with far left party participation should be more likely to liberalize citizenship policy in an attempt to curry favor with left-libertarians and potential immigrant voters. Because parties of the far left do not usually threaten to steal votes from traditional right-of-center parties, left party competition should have little effect on right-of-center governments.

Empirically, then, this logic leads us to conclude that respective policy changes should be most likely to occur under governments that emerge from the side of the spectrum where competition is strongest. Recall our initial hypothesis from Chapter 3:

> ***H.CP1:*** *Policy change should be most likely to occur under governments that emerge from the side of the spectrum where competition is strongest.*

This suggests the following testable hypotheses:

> ***H.CP1a:*** *Right-of-center governments in party systems with greater right party competition should be more likely to restrict their citizenship policies.*
>
> ***H.CP1b:*** *Left-of-center governments in party systems with greater left party competition should be more likely to liberalize their citizenship policies.*

A rival explanation to the one just discussed stems from a path dependency perspective (Goodman 2012a; Mouritsen 2013). This explanation for citizenship policy maintains that domestic politics interacts with the inclusive or exclusive policy legacies inherited from the past. Left- and right-oriented governments may

articulate preferences on citizenship and belonging, but previous policy decisions set the parameters within which they debate and enact policy change. As Goodman (2014) argues, "[c]itizenship orientations not only reflect state priorities for inclusion or exclusion through formal rules, but also implicit understandings of nationhood and other scripts of belonging" inherited from past institutional legacies (78). In this way, government orientations are constrained by the national understandings of membership, where traditionally exclusive citizenship legacies set the parameters of acceptable policy that leftist governments may pursue and enact, and vice versa with conservative parties in inclusive policy environments (Goodman 2014). Thus the earlier starting point of citizenship policy largely explains the future development of it.

However, this proposed mechanism by which this policy context actually impinges on the preferences and actions of elected officials seems undertheorized. Why would leftist parties limit their support for dual citizenship, for example, based on what policies were handed down to them from governments of decades prior? Why would conservative governments accept a highly accessible citizenship policy formulated decades ago? If path dependence is the explanation, then it at least needs a mechanism by which it occurs. I argue that one such mechanism the size and influence of the naturalized immigrant population. Because vote-maximizing elected officials have every incentive to cater to vocal and well-organized constituents at the expense of the restrictionist but generally unorganized mass public, well-organized groups of voters with immigration backgrounds may have leverage in moving policy in a more liberalized direction (Freeman 1995). Thus countries that initially had

relatively open immigration and citizenship regimes in the post-war period, such as the United Kingdom or France, developed sizable and increasingly organized immigrant electorates in the subsequent decades that may have helped encourage pro-immigrant policies and sustain them over time. Conversely, countries like Germany, Denmark, or Greece did not, and hence have lacked the electoral pressure from voters with immigrant backgrounds to legislate pro-immigrant policies in later periods. Instead, larger immigrant populations in early restrictive countries of the postwar period might spark a backlash against such a large non-naturalized immigrant population, driving them to retain if not formulate even more restrictive policies. This leads to my second hypothesis, restated from Chapter 3:

> ***H.CP2:*** *Larger immigrant populations in countries with generally liberal citizenship policies in the post-war years will help sustain accessible, liberalized policies in subsequent decades, while larger immigrant populations in countries with generally restrictive citizenship policies in the post-war years will be unable to forestall pressures for restrictive policies in subsequent decades.*

Also recall the path-dependent hypothesis as an alternative explanation for citizenship policy stasis from Chapter 3:

> ***H.CP3:*** *Citizenship policies will remain largely similar in their degree of accessibility or restrictiveness to citizenship policies of the postwar period.*

Testing the Electoral Politics Model of Citizenship

To test the theory presented above, I employ the Integration Cost of Citizenship Index (ICCI) which quantifies the citizenship policies of sixteen Western European countries from 1970 to 2014 on the basis nine relative integration costs

immigrants must bear in order to acquire citizenship.[34] In the following analysis, I will analyze the magnitude of the change in ICCI score from one year to the next. The dependent variable in each case is the summed magnitude of the policy liberalization or restriction under a given government, with reductions in cost given negative values and increased costliness given positive values.[35]

Because I am interested in the electoral motivations of policy change, most of my explanatory variables derive from electoral data aggregated in the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2015). Capturing the relevant data for my theory – relative vote shares, the degree of left and right party competition in the electoral system, and the orientation of individual cabinets in a given year – could be achieved in a number of ways and required a series of methodological choices. First, the decision to focus on a bifurcated left-right competition scale obviously simplifies the nature of party ideologies and party competition in Europe. Nonetheless, in

[34] To remind the reader, the countries of analysis include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Great Britain. The nine domains include linguistic, economic, civic, legal, social, cultural, lineal, familial, and ethnic costs of citizenship, which correspond with specific requirements to be fulfilled within that domain.

[35] There are multiple ways one could calculate this change variable. Because the policy requirement scores may not be directly comparable across different components, it may be the case that assigning these values based on aggregate changes in the ICCI is inappropriate. Because changes in policy often entail changes across multiple components in a given year, often in contrasting directions, one alternative coding procedure may be to sum the number of liberalizations and restrictions across the domains and score overall changes according to net number of changes. In other words, each observation would be coded dichotomously as a Policy Restriction or a Liberalization based on whether the number of individual restrictions/liberalizations exceeded the other. However, this results in a loss of information about the magnitude of the changes, and is methodologically difficult to justify because the number of changes might not actually reflect the nature of the change. For example, four small changes may be less substantive than a single large shift in policy. Because the scores are comparable for each component across countries, even if they are not directly comparable across each component, the method employed in the analysis seems to be the most methodologically reasonable.

addition to being central to my theory, this decision was also based on previous literature showing that the right-left scale remains the most salient dimension of party competition in Europe up to the present day (Budge et al. 2001). Second, I had to classify the universe of different parties according to this basic Left-Right orientation. To do this, I largely adopted the recognized party family names from the ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2015),[36] which classified Conservative or Christian Democratic parties on the right, and Labour, Social Democratic, and Socialist parties on the left. Communist, Green, and other 'new' leftist parties on the far left and populist parties of the far right were designated as Radical Left or Radical Right accordingly (March and Mudde 2005; Mudde 2007). Liberal and other centrist parties not conforming to a clear right-left orientation were largely excluded from subsequent calculations primarily because I am interested in competition on strictly the right and left of the political spectrum. For example, a party like the Finnish Centre Party (KESK) was founded and coded as an Agrarian Party in the ParlGov database, and its politics continually reflects a centrist political position. It was therefore excluded from my right/left party calculations for Finland.[37]

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[36] Party families and descriptions were corroborated by data from the *European Election Database* made available by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) (2015). NSD is not responsible for the analyses/interpretation of the data presented here. I also cross-checked data against the Parties and Elections in Europe database (Nordsieck 2015).

[37] Nonetheless, a left-right scale poses problems in a number of party cases. For example, despite policy positions that are often to the right of many other conservative parties, Denmark's Liberal Party (V) and the Dutch People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) were both founded and consequently coded as members of the classical liberal party family. They were likewise omitted from these right/left calculations but included in liberal party calculations. Other parties, such as the Austrian Party of Freedom (FPÖ), may have been founded as liberal parties, but have shifted in recent years away from their founding liberal principles in order to adopt more virulent radical right

Lastly, because elections are held at different times in different countries, and cabinets form and fall sporadically throughout the year, I had to rely on coding rules that aligned election and coalition data with the appropriate government-year. Here I assigned a government-year at time *t* in which an election was held prior to August in year *t* with those election results, while I assigned a government-year in which a late-year (post-August) election was held with results from *t*-1, and those election results were lagged until the following year at time *t*+1. Similarly, a new cabinet was coded upon any change of parties with cabinet membership or any change of prime minister.[38] I assigned cabinets formed and prime ministers in office before August to that year, while I lagged them for those assuming office after August, unless the coalition dissolved early in that subsequent year, in which case that cabinet is largely excluded from the analysis. Generally, cabinets of less than three months were not included. Caretaker cabinets lasting a majority of months in a given year were assigned as centrist coalitions for that year.

With this data, I then created measures of electoral competition within a party system. My first variable of interest reflects the respective electoral competition or threat faced by the dominant parties on either side of the political spectrum. I first identified the traditional/dominant right-of-center or left-of-center party in each country that emerged in the post-war period, and tabulated the vote

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positions. Thus the FPÖ was coded as a liberal party until the late 1980s, after which it was coded as a radical right party.

[38] For sake of comparability, data for France reflects the electoral results, prime ministers, and cabinet composition of the National Assembly. Except for three periods of cohabitation between a President and Prime Minister of another party (1986-88, 1993-95, and 1997-2002), the right-left orientations of the parliaments and cabinets reflect the right-left orientation of the President.

share of that dominant right party (*DRPVS*) or left party (*DLPVS*) with respect to the total share of votes for all right or left parties. Thus the *DRPVS* for a dominant right party facing no right-of-center competition in an election would be coded a 100, while one facing stiff competition on the right – potentially from radical right parties – would receive a score between less than 100 but greater than 1. Then, in order to capture the changing magnitude of electoral gain or loss experienced by the dominant party over a series of election contests, I calculated the averaged difference in vote share from the current election against the previous two elections, thus $DRPVS_t$ -0.5($DRPVS_{t-1}$+$DRPVS_{t-2}$). I expect that as the dominant right party loses vote share from one election to the next (DRPVS decreases), ICCI scores should be expected to increase, signaling a policy restriction. Similarly, as the dominant left party loses vote share from election to the next (DLPVS decreases), the ICCI score should decrease. I calculated similar averaged difference measures for Radical Right (RRPVS) and Radical Left (RLPVS) parties in each election cycle, and for all other left (OLPVS) or right parties (ORPVS), but their effects on the ICCI score should be opposite of the dominant party variables. The second measure of right and left party competition is a variation of the effective number of parties measure by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), arguably the most straightforward and widely used measure in comparative research that represents the number of parties in competition. Here, I adapt the standard formula ($1/\Sigma Vote_i^2$) to calculate an effective number of right parties (*ENRP*) and an effective number of left parties (*ENLP*) where $Vote_i$ refers to the vote share of each right or left party in a particular election, respectively. As *ENRP* (*ENLP*) increases, I would expect more electoral competition on the right (left)

side of the political spectrum, and thus an associated increase (decrease) in the ICCI score. An adjusted *ENRP* (*ENLP*) variable was also created to capture the balance of right-left electoral competition dichotomously: *Right Competition* was coded 1 if *ENRP-ENLP* was positive (ENRP>ENLP), suggesting more right parties than left parties in a given election, and 0 otherwise; *Left Competition* was coded 1 if *ENRP-ENLP* was negative (ENLP>ENRP), suggesting more left parties in competition than right parties.

I coded three variables to capture the ideological orientation of a government. *LRScore3* reflects the relative right/left political orientation of the governing coalition in each year on a three-point trichotomous scale. A government comprised of any combination of left, extreme left, and centrist parties was coded as Leftist (1), any combination of liberal, centrist, left and conservative parties, or a grand coalition, as Centrist (2), and any combination of right-of-center, conservative, radical right, and centrist parties as Rightist (3). The variable *Leftist Government* collapses *LRScore* into a dichotomous variable scored 1 if *LRScore* was Leftist and 0 otherwise; similarly, *Rightist Government* was scored 1 if *LRScore* was Rightist and 0 otherwise. Finally, *LRScore5* creates two additional categories from *LRScore*: Left is separated into mainstream left governments and left governments with a radical left party, and Right is separated into mainstream right governments and right governments with a radical right party.

To test whether electoral variables other than party competition and government ideology predict citizenship policy change, I also performed straightforward calculations of *Vote Share*, *Seat Share*, and changes in them across

electoral cycles for Right, Radical Right, Left, Radical Left, and Liberal parties. I also coded *GreenGov, RRGov,* and *RLGov* as dichotomous variables, scored one if a Green, Radical Right, or Radical Left party is in the governing coalition, respectively, and zero otherwise.[39]

Finally, I include a number of control variables that might also affect citizenship policymaking. I first include a control variable for foreign born stock as a percentage of the total population drawn from national statistical offices (see Appendix A), Eurostat (2015f), the OECD (2015c), and the United Nations (2009, 2013b), since the size of the foreign population would more than likely cause policymakers to consider adjustments to citizenship policy. Because the flows of migrants across national borders might also spur citizenship policymaking, I include a control for the annual adjusted net migration rate, lagged by one year (Eurostat 2015d). To capture economic conditions in the country that might affect the propensity of policymakers to adjust citizenship policy, I include a variable for annual *GDP Growth* (World Bank 2016a). Because the countries of interest vary by how urban or rural they are, and because highly urban populations may be more politically and socially progressive, *Percent Urban* captures how much of the national population lives in cities (World Bank 2016b). Finally, a control variable reflecting the 1965 ICCI strategy identified for each country in Chapter 4 is intended to reflect the historical starting point of each country, which according to path dependence accounts may affect how subsequent policies are changed.

[39] Unless noted in the analysis below, none of *Vote Share, Seat Share*, or *Gov* variables attained statistical significance in any of the models tested.

In this series of models I present here, I have annual government policy outputs nested within countries, election cycles, and governments. Given the nested structure of my data, straightforward statistical procedures such as OLS regression are inappropriate for the analysis because of correlations within countries' election cycles and within respective countries. This would lead to biased and inefficient parameter estimates. Instead, I take two different precautions to deal with these potential problems. To reflect the nested structure of the data, I use a subset of the data that corresponds to individual governments clustered within election cycles. Although there are a number of singletons (governments corresponding with single election cycles), most elections in Europe include more than one government within a single election cycle.[40] Furthermore, using national elections as my second level also accounts country correlations as well, which is fortunate because the sample size is insufficient to include three levels in the models. Thus each unit of analysis is a single government nested within an election cycle. I use multilevel mixed-effects that provide a flexible and general approach to distinguish between levels of analysis at the individual government level and at the election cycle level. Thus I distinguish between Level I fixed-effects (variables related to the Government-year), and Level II random-effects (the specific Election). To account for correlations within election cycles, I employ heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered by Election (number of clusters = 216).[41]

[40] For a statistical justification for including a large number of small clusters, even with a moderate number of singletons, see Snijders (2005) and Bell et al. (2010).

[41] As a robustness check, I did run the same mixed models with Level II random effects by the individual Country, with corresponding robust standard errors clustered by Country. These alternative specifications did not alter the interpretation or significance of the results substantively.

Analysis and Results: Party Competition

Let us turn to the results from the first set of models, analyzing total change in citizenship policy since 1965, found in Table 5.1. Beginning with Model 1, we analyze the effects of our first set of electoral competition variables. Let us consider first the effects from the left side of the political spectrum. In Model 1, we find that the *DLPVSL* variable attains statistical significance. A one unit increase (decrease) in the average change in the dominant left party's vote share is associated with a 0.014 unit increase (decrease) in the total ICCI score. In other words, a one standard deviation decrease in the dominant left party vote share (almost 6 percentage points) is associated with a 0.06 unit liberalization of citizenship policy. As the dominant left party's vote share increases in comparison to the previous year, the degree of citizenship liberalization thus appears to diminish. This may appear counterintuitive but it actually reflects the theoretical expectation: because a stronger left party faces less competition overall from other left parties, it has less incentive to liberalize policy in such electoral circumstances, and may thus be associated with a higher ICCI score than if it were facing reduced vote share.

The effects of *OLPVS* and *RLPVS* variables are also significant and signed as expected in Model 2 and Model 3. Here, as the average change in vote share for Other Left parties and for Radical Left parties increases, we observe associated decreases, or liberalizations, in citizenship policy. The magnitude of the effect of the latter, reflecting the electoral gains and losses of Radical Left parties in particular, is even stronger than for all Other Left parties. As these variables increase in magnitude, this implies more electoral competition on the left. Because immigrant-friendly policies fall within the domain of left and especially extreme left party

Table 5.1: Estimated Effects of Party Competition on Citizenship Policy Change

DV: Total Change in ICCI Score	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
ForBornPercent (Log)	0.069*	0.088**	0.089**	0.089**	0.067*	0.025	0.074*	0.069*	0.079**	0.068*	0.081**
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.039)
Migration Rate (Lag)	-0.0042	-0.0066	-0.0065	-0.0051	-0.0036	-0.0043	-0.0043	-0.0046	-0.0058	-0.0037	-0.0055
	(0.0045)	(0.0046)	(0.0047)	(0.0043)	(0.0047)	(0.0044)	(0.0044)	(0.0049)	(0.0048)	(0.0052)	(0.0047)
Percent Urban	-0.0017	-0.0018	-0.0018	-0.0014	-0.0022	-0.0016	-0.0021	-0.0026	-0.0029	-0.0024	-0.0035
	(0.0039)	(0.0037)	(0.0038)	(0.0038)	(0.0045)	(0.0040)	(0.0037)	(0.0032)	(0.0032)	(0.0032)	(0.0032)
GDP Growth	-0.0036	-0.0053	-0.0038	0.00021	-0.0045	0.00030	-0.0029	0.00081	-0.0041	-0.0022	-0.0039
	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.0100)	(0.0097)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
ICCI Start	0.11	0.090	0.093	0.10	0.083	0.13	0.10				
	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.093)	(0.092)	(0.10)	(0.092)	(0.094)				
DLPVSL, Average Change		0.014**									
		(0.0073)									
DRPVSR, Average Change		0.0045									
		(0.0039)									
OLPVSA, Average Change			-0.037**								
			(0.017)								
ORPVSA, Average Change			-0.0058								
			(0.0092)								
RRPVS, Average Change				-0.0060							
				(0.016)							
RLPVS, Average Change				-0.051***							
				(0.018)							
Right Seat Share					-0.00007						
					(0.0044)						
Left Seat Share					-0.0037						
					(0.0053)						
Radical Right Seat Share						0.011*					
						(0.0058)					
Radical Left Seat Share						-0.0051					
						(0.0041)					

Table 5.1 (continued)

ENRP							0.072 (0.058)	0.19 (0.13)			
ENLP							-0.025 (0.088)			0.18 (0.14)	
LRScore = 1								0.33 (0.26)		0.88** (0.36)	
LRScore = 3								0.21 (0.24)		0.35 (0.30)	
LRScore = 1 x ENRP								-0.23 (0.14)			
LRScore = 3 x ENRP								-0.073 (0.14)			
Rightist Gov't									0.16* (0.096)		
Right Competition									0.15* (0.089)		
Right Competition x Rightist Gov't									0.26** (0.12)		
LRScore = 1 x ENLP										-0.56** (0.22)	
LRScore = 3 x ENLP										-0.14 (0.16)	
Leftist Gov't											-0.085 (0.098)
Left Competition											-0.11 (0.088)
Left Competition x Leftist Gov't											-0.31** (0.14)
Constant	0.085 (0.29)	0.089 (0.28)	0.084 (0.28)	0.035 (0.27)	0.30 (0.62)	0.15 (0.31)	0.028 (0.32)	-0.16 (0.37)	0.087 (0.25)	-0.18 (0.33)	0.35 (0.22)
Observations (n)	331	331	331	331	331	331	331	331	331	331	331
Degrees of Freedom	5	7	7	7	7	7	7	9	7	9	7
Chi²	7.10	10.2	10.8	16.6	10.3	15.8	10.6	20.1	13.4	18.1	13.6
p	0.21	0.18	0.15	0.021	0.17	0.027	0.16	0.017	0.064	0.034	0.059

Standard errors in parentheses; *
$p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

positions, citizenship policy can be expected to liberalize when more left-oriented parties are competing electorally, facilitating much greater access to citizenship among immigrants in turn. By means of comparison, Models 4 and 5 show the effects of all Left Party strength in parliament and the seat share of the Radical Left in parliament. In neither model do the variables attain statistical significance, even though they are signed correctly. This suggests that it is not simply the electoral strength, or parliamentary strength, of left parties or radical left parties on citizenship policy liberalization, but the competition between them that accounts for citizenship policy shifts.

In Models 6, 9 and 10, I test the effect of my second competition variable, the effective number of left parties (*ENLP*). In Model 6, *ENLP* by itself is insignificant. However, my initial hypothesis was that left-of-center governments in party systems with greater left party competition should be more likely to liberalize their citizenship policies, suggesting an interaction between competition and leftist governments. These interactions are displayed in Models 9 and 10. In Model 9, left-oriented governments have the expected robust association with policy liberalization, but more importantly for the theory, the interaction between *LRScore(1)* and *ENLP* is also significant and signed correctly. This implies that under left-oriented governments, a one unit increase in the *ENLP* score is associated with a 0.56 unit liberalization of citizenship policy. The interaction between left-oriented governments and leftist electoral competition in Model 10 further confirms the competition hypothesis: during election cycles with more left party competition than right party completion (*Left Competition* =1), the presence of a Leftist

government is associated with a 0.31 greater liberalization in citizenship policy than under non-Leftist Governments. In these models, at least on the left side of the political spectrum, electoral competition seems robustly linked to citizenship policy liberalization.

Given the increased attention on Radical Right parties in recent years, it is somewhat surprising that several of the right-oriented competition variables have relatively weak associations across the initial models in Table 5.1. Indeed, neither the average change in dominant right party vote share (*DRPVS,* Model 1), nor the average change in Other Right (*ORPVSA*, Model 2) and Radical Right (*RRPVS*, Model 3) vote share had any statistically significant effect on citizenship policy change. The only statistically significant association in this changing vote share models is that between the share of Radical Right party seats in parliament (Model 5) and citizenship policy restriction, but the magnitude of the effect is quite weak. These results, at least as captured by my vote share variables, undermines the expectation about relative right party competition driving policy change. However, the second set of competition variables provide evidence of the hypothesized mechanism. While the *ENRP* score and the interaction of *ENRP* and *LRScore* also fail to achieve statistical significance in Models 6 and 7, *Right Competition* and *Rightist Government* as well as the interaction of the two does reach statistical significance in Model 8. Hence under conditions of greater electoral competition among right-of-center parties (ENRP>ENLP), a government comprised of right, center, and even radical right parties may be more likely to restrict policy according to the hypothesized mechanism above. Thus the expectation about party competition finds some limited

statistical support in Model 8, although not in any other model for right party competition found in Table 5.1.

Given the extensive amount of previous research conducted on the influence of the radical right on immigration politics in Europe, the comparative significance of left parties and left party competition on citizenship policy is surprising. Why would electoral competition with the radical right have such a weak effect on policy restrictions in Europe? One answer to this question may be that its influence is exacted on different sub-dimensions of citizenship policy. To investigate this relationship further, I analyze the same set of models in Table 5.2, but with the dependent variable first set to Latent Change. Before we discuss the right party effects, let us first analyze look at the effects of various left party influence. In Model 1, 2, and 3, the average changes in the dominant left party vote share, other left parties' vote share, and radical left party vote share from one election to the next have a significant estimated effect on latent change, and are signed correctly. In other words, if the dominant left party gains one percent more in terms of votes from one election to the next, it is under less electoral pressure and is thus associated with marginally a higher (+0.008) latent policy change during that cycle. Conversely, as other left parties and radical left parties gain one unit of electoral strength, latent policy can be expected to liberalize by 0.02 and 0.025 units respectively. While these magnitudes appear small, remember that the latent index runs from 0 to 8 at policy increments of approximately 0.25 per policy change. Thus a strong increase in other left party support in an election could easily account for a reasonable liberalization in policy. In Model 9 and Model 10, furthermore, the

interaction terms on the left party variables are associated with statistically significant policy liberalizations. For instance, in Model 10, under conditions of greater left party competition (ENLP>ENRP), a Leftist government can be expected to have a 0.11 unit effect on policy liberalization compared to non-Leftist governments. Again, this offers strong evidence of party competition as a factor structuring latent citizenship policy change.

In terms of right party competition, the variables are less robustly associated with citizenship policy restrictions than those for left party competition. Growth in radical right party vote share in an election cycle (Model 3) as well as an additional percent in radical right seat share are associated with small restrictive changes. Furthermore, the *ENRP* variable in Model 6 achieves significance here where it did not previously, as does the interaction term between a *Right Competition* (ENRP>ENLP) and *Rightist Government* in Model 7 similarly to Table 5.1. Hence under conditions of greater electoral competition among right-of-center parties (ENRP>ENLP), a government comprised of right, center, and even radical right parties may be more likely to restrict policy. Finally, note that in Model 10, governments that include a radical right party appear to have an effect on citizenship policy restriction according to *LRScore5*, but no other types of governments did. Taken together, it seems that right party competition actually is evident in explaining citizenship policy change along this latent dimension.

Looking at Table 5.3, which presents the same models for the manifest dimension, we actually see very little effect of party competition on either side of the political spectrum. The only variable that has the expected estimated effect is in

Model 10, again where the presence of a radical right party in government has a large significant estimated effect (+0.36) on citizenship policy restrictions compared to centrist governments. The left party variables across most of the models are all signed as we would expect under our hypotheses, but they fail to achieve statistical significance. The dominant right party's change in vote share in Model 1 is significant, but if the competition hypothesis were correct, we would see a negative effect, not a positive one. This is likewise the case for average change in radical right vote share in Model 3, where a unit increase is associated with more liberalized policy, contrary to expectation.

Thus while we can be fairly confident that the left and right party competition variables generally explain overall citizenship policy change, and certainly contribute to latent dimension change, we find in this last table that party competition does not seem to be driving changes on the manifest dimension in either direction. Why might this be the case? One possibility is that there is little bidirectional movement on the manifest dimension: indeed, as we have seen in Chapter 4, the manifest dimension has charted a secular shift toward greater restrictiveness over the last several decades. Thus the variation to be explained on this dimension is fairly weak, and thus the variables of interest here are only weakly related to policy change on this dimension. Instead, what matters here seems to be simply the presence of radical right parties, and especially their presence in government. Although the radical right has been growing in strength over the last decade, perhaps their influence is not so much through competition with other parties as much as through electoral rhetoric and niche influence on government

policymaking. It may also be the case that their influence is felt across the party spectrum, rather than confined to one political corner or the other. Indeed, governments of all political stripes in Europe have introduced changes on the manifest dimension of policy, not simply conservative ones. And in contrast, radical leftist parties such as the Greens appear to have less inflammatory rhetoric with which to pull policy in the other direction, regardless of their electoral threat or potential to compete with mainstream left parties. In other words, there may in fact be electoral threats of competition from the radical right influencing all parties in a single direction on manifest policy.

One final result to note from a comparison of the three tables above centers on the differential effects of the foreign population. Although included here more as a control variable than a variable of interest, it is nonetheless revealing for our hypothesis about demographic change (H.CP2). In Table 5.1, the logged percent of the foreign born population is negatively signed and highly significant across all but one of the models, suggesting that as the size of the foreign born population increases, associated policy changes move in a restrictive direction. When the ICCI is disaggregated into its two dimensions, however, a more nuanced relationship seems to emerge. In Table 5.2, the logged percent of the foreign born population is negatively signed, suggesting a larger foreign born population is associated with more liberal changes. While the coefficient is only significant in one model, this is revealing in contrast to Table 5.3, where again the size of the foreign born population has an estimated, and highly significant, restrictive effect on citizenship policy. These combined dynamics thus suggest that demographic change by means

Table 5.2: Estimated Effects of Party Competition on Latent Policy Change

DV: Change in Latent Score	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ForBornPercent (Log)	-0.019	-0.017	-0.027	-0.067*	-0.023	-0.0064	-0.0050	-0.024	-0.0030	-0.0042
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.040)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.031)
Migration Rate (Lag)	-0.0028	-0.0030	-0.0019	-0.0025	-0.0023	-0.0035	-0.0044	-0.0027	-0.0040	-0.0040
	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0044)	(0.0045)	(0.0046)	(0.0046)	(0.0045)
Percent Urban	-0.0018	-0.0017	-0.0013	-0.0018	-0.0023	-0.0041*	-0.0039*	-0.0032	-0.0043*	-0.0042*
	(0.0023)	(0.0023)	(0.0023)	(0.0023)	(0.0024)	(0.0023)	(0.0024)	(0.0021)	(0.0022)	(0.0023)
GDP Growth	0.0041	0.0047	0.0074	0.0068	0.0044	0.0057	0.0029	0.0031	0.0031	0.0047
	(0.0049)	(0.0050)	(0.0049)	(0.0047)	(0.0047)	(0.0050)	(0.0048)	(0.0049)	(0.0047)	(0.0048)
ICCI Start	0.12***	0.13***	0.14***	0.14***	0.12***					
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.046)					
DLPVSL, Average Change	0.008*									
	(0.0040)									
DRPVSR, Average Change	-0.0021									
	(0.0018)									
OLPVSA, Average Change		-0.022**								
		(0.0092)								
ORPVSA, Average Change		0.0049								
		(0.0038)								
RRPVS, Average Change			0.019**							
			(0.0089)							
RLPVS, Average Change			-0.025**							
			(0.011)							
Radical Right Seat Share				0.0093**						
				(0.0038)						
Radical Left Seat Share				-0.0060*						
				(0.0032)						
ENRP					0.083***	0.097**				
					(0.031)	(0.042)				
ENLP					-0.068			0.016		
					(0.048)			(0.063)		
LRScore = 1						0.11		0.53***		
						(0.13)		(0.20)		
LRScore = 3						-0.0080		-0.14		
						(0.17)		(0.17)		

Table 5.2 (Continued)

LRScore = 1 x ENRP						-0.078 (0.055)				
LRScore = 3 x ENRP						0.0057 (0.071)				
Rightist Gov't							0.055 (0.084)			
Right Competition							0.16*** (0.055)			
Right Competition x Rightist Gov't							0.14** (0.060)			
LRScore = 1 x ENLP								-0.34** (0.14)		
LRScore = 3 x ENLP								0.083 (0.083)		
Leftist Gov't									0.015 (0.039)	
Left Competition									-0.11** (0.051)	
Left Competition x Leftist Gov't									-0.23** (0.094)	
LRScore5 = Radical Leftist										-0.088 (0.11)
LRScore5 = Leftist										-0.013 (0.059)
LRScore5 = Rightist										-0.0071 (0.060)
LRScore5 = Radical Rightist										0.095* (0.058)
Constant	0.038 (0.16)	0.027 (0.16)	-0.010 (0.16)	0.14 (0.17)	0.050 (0.18)	0.055 (0.19)	0.14 (0.17)	0.16 (0.21)	0.32* (0.17)	0.23 (0.17)
Observations (n)	331	331	331	331	331	331	331	331	331	331
Degrees of Freedom	7	7	7	7	7	9	7	9	7	8
Chi²	11.0	11.9	12.9	12.8	14.9	11.5	10.7	14.8	12.6	8.28
p	0.14	0.10	0.075	0.078	0.038	0.24	0.15	0.097	0.082	0.41

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.3: Estimated Effects of Party Competition on Manifest Policy Change

DV: Change in Manifest Score	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ForBornPercent (Log)	0.11***	0.11***	0.12***	0.093**	0.10***	0.078**	0.087**	0.093**	0.087**	0.080**
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.036)
Migration Rate (Lag)	-0.0050	-0.0046	-0.0043	-0.0029	-0.0029	-0.0019	-0.0020	-0.0015	-0.0020	-0.0027
	(0.0053)	(0.0054)	(0.0051)	(0.0051)	(0.0052)	(0.0054)	(0.0053)	(0.0055)	(0.0054)	(0.0052)
Percent Urban	-0.00055	-0.00066	-0.00065	-0.00036	-0.00043	0.00098	0.00043	0.00053	0.00029	0.00020
	(0.0035)	(0.0035)	(0.0035)	(0.0037)	(0.0035)	(0.0030)	(0.0030)	(0.0030)	(0.0030)	(0.0029)
GDP Growth	-0.010	-0.0093	-0.0081	-0.0072	-0.0079	-0.0056	-0.0079	-0.0058	-0.0075	-0.0040
	(0.0095)	(0.0094)	(0.0089)	(0.0099)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.0099)	(0.0091)
ICCI Start	-0.041	-0.040	-0.039	-0.011	-0.029					
	(0.081)	(0.082)	(0.080)	(0.084)	(0.084)					
DLPVSL, Average Change	0.0069									
	(0.0064)									
DRPVSR, Average Change	0.0067*									
	(0.0037)									
OLPVSA, Average Change		-0.017								
		(0.015)								
ORPVSA, Average Change		-0.011								
		(0.0082)								
RRPVS, Average Change			-0.024*							
			(0.014)							
RLPVS, Average Change			-0.027							
			(0.017)							
Radical Right Seat Share				0.0027						
				(0.0046)						
Radical Left Seat Share				0.00024						
				(0.0032)						
ENRP					-0.0043	0.11				
					(0.053)	(0.11)				
ENLP					0.034			0.16		
					(0.071)			(0.12)		
LRScore = 1						0.24		0.35		
						(0.23)		(0.33)		
LRScore = 3						0.24		0.46*		
						(0.24)		(0.25)		

Table 5.3 (Continued)

LRScore = 1 x ENRP						-0.16 (0.13)				
LRScore = 3 x ENRP						-0.092 (0.14)				
Rightist Gov't							0.093 (0.086)			
Right Competition							0.0019 (0.079)			
Right Competition x Rightist Gov't							0.12 (0.11)			
LRScore = 1 x ENLP								-0.22 (0.20)		
LRScore = 3 x ENLP								-0.21 (0.13)		
Leftist Gov't									-0.10 (0.096)	
Left Competition									-0.016 (0.082)	
Left Competition x Leftist Gov't									-0.091 (0.12)	
LRScore5 = Radical Leftist										0.015 (0.21)
LRScore5 = Leftist										-0.053 (0.076)
LRScore5 = Rightist										0.028 (0.069)
LRScore5 = Radical Rightist										0.36* (0.21)
Constant	0.089 (0.25)	0.091 (0.25)	0.078 (0.24)	0.060 (0.28)	0.017 (0.28)	-0.20 (0.34)	-0.017 (0.22)	-0.31 (0.29)	0.070 (0.20)	0.029 (0.21)
Observations (n)	331	331	331	331	331	331	331	331	331	331
Degrees of Freedom	7	7	7	7	7	9	7	9	7	8
Chi²	12.1	10.7	13.0	10.2	9.55	14.4	11.4	13.4	10.1	12.2
p	0.098	0.15	0.073	0.18	0.22	0.11	0.12	0.14	0.18	0.14

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

of greater immigrant populations does influence policy, compelling liberalization on the latent dimension and restrictions on the manifest dimension. Such a finding offers modest support to hypothesis H.CP2, although the hypothesized dynamics are examined in more detail below.

Analysis and Results: Path Dependence

We now turn to the empirical test of broad citizenship regimes and path dependence formulated in H.CP2 and H.CP3 largely as theoretical alternatives to the political competition framework I just investigated. First I analyze the influence of a country's total ICCI score in 1970 (*ICCI Total 1970*) as well as the size of its foreign born population in 1970 (*ForBornPercentStart*) on its total scores in subsequent decades, each modeled by decade in Table 5.4 below.[42] However, I bifurcate the analyses according to one of two general citizenship strategies that each country had adopted in the postwar period as identified in Chapter 4.[43] This enables us to compare the potentially different dynamics operating among these two groups and test the validity of H.CP2. Let us first compare the path dependent dynamics in the models on total ICCI score. Several variables are worth noting. First, a country's citizenship policy in 1970 is strongly associated with policy in subsequent decades across both groups. For every unit more restrictive in 1970, the citizenship policy is on average between one and two units more restrictive today. Interestingly,

[42] The variable *ForBornPercentStart* is a crude measure of the naturalized (and thus enfranchised) foreign born population in 1970. A better measure would be the size of the naturalized population in 1970, but such data is unfortunately unavailable.

[43] The group designated Citizenship through Latent Integration includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. The group designated Integration through Citizenship includes France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.

however, the strength and significance of the estimated effect seems to diminish over time for the more restrictive group of countries on the left (Citizenship through Latent Integration), while it increases for the latter more liberal group (Integration through Citizenship). This suggests that for those countries that were traditionally more restrictive, their initial starting point is overall less consequential for their current policy, while the opposite appears true for the latter group: these countries are becoming more restrictive. While this is consistent with the findings in Chapter 4 documenting how countries have largely deviated from their starting points, it is hardly grounds to fully reject hypothesis H.CP3. Furthermore, on the basis of this table, we might also find reason to question H.CP2 regarding the role of the foreign born population in 1970. In fact, the variable *ForBornPercentStart* is only significant in more recent decades for the traditionally more liberal countries, but is signed in an unexpected direction. Having a larger foreign born population early in the postwar period is a significant predictor not of sustained liberalization, but of restrictions decades later. While this finding does not automatically contradict the theory, it may be an indication that the large initial immigrant populations in these more liberal countries have not been able to sustain pro-immigrant citizenship policies over time, and in fact their long-rooted presence is a contributor to more restrictive citizenship policies in the long run rather than a guarantee against it.

One relevant constituency that has seemingly sustained more restrictive policies over time are radical right parties. As we can see, the role of the radical right in sustaining and pressing for restrictive policies is evident among the already restrictive countries throughout the decades. This is certainly consistent with the

theoretical expectation of H.CP2: among restrictive countries, no sizable enfranchised population exists and radical right parties emerge as a backlash against future liberalization. Of course, the influence of the radical right finally emerges in the last half decade in the more liberal countries as well, as evidenced in the last column of the table. Finally, although outside the scope of the theoretical framework, it is worth noting that the economy may affect the contours of citizenship policy: negative GDP growth is associated with higher total ICCI scores in the latter two models. This would make intuitive sense, as economic woes might incentivize policy makers to render citizenship less accessible in an attempt to restrict immigrant access to economic opportunities that would rival those of natives.

Because the ICCI is coded along two dimensions – a Latent and Manifest dimension – I now run the same analysis of the hypothesized effects on these two dimensions in order to better understand the underlying dynamics of how these starting points might influence subsequent policy. Table 5.5 examines path-dependent effects on the latent dimension. Viewing the *ICCI Latent 1970* score in Table 5.5, we see that a country's 1970 latent dimension is rather weakly and positively associated with subsequent decades. For every unit a country was more restrictive in 1970, they are slightly more restrictive today. Among the more restrictive countries in the left columns, this estimated effect of the 1970 latent score loses its significance after the 1990s, suggesting little correspondence across decades and little path dependence after the 1990s. For the countries with more historically accessible policies, the 1970 latent score has a significant but small

Table 5.4: Influence of Path-Dependent Effects on Aggregate Citizenship Policy

DV: Total ICCI Score	Citizenship through Latent Integration				Integration through Citizenship			
	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
ICCI Total 1970	1.21***	1.02***	1.01***	0.35	0.87***	0.32	1.66***	1.34***
	(0.074)	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.37)	(0.092)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.18)
ForBornPercentStart	-0.0063	-0.049	-0.12	0.15	0.019	-0.28	0.41***	0.37***
	(0.027)	(0.047)	(0.084)	(0.13)	(0.054)	(0.29)	(0.12)	(0.069)
Migration Rate	0.0040	0.0094	-0.030	-0.061	0.0055	0.063	0.042**	0.0087
	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.038)	(0.059)	(0.008)	(0.065)	(0.017)	(0.11)
GDP Growth	0.023	0.0059	-0.023	-0.16*	0.0063	0.021	-0.09***	0.11
	(0.027)	(0.005)	(0.026)	(0.087)	(0.018)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.12)
RRPVS	0.079***	0.057*	0.11*	0.12**	0.021	0.12	-0.028	0.098***
	(0.018)	(0.035)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.024)	(0.18)	(0.045)	(0.029)
RLPVS	0.041***	0.066	0.021	0.060	0.028*	0.061	-0.061	-0.13***
	(0.016)	(0.045)	(0.056)	(0.042)	(0.016)	(0.071)	(0.049)	(0.051)
ForBornPercent (Log)			0.15	-0.87			-1.20**	0.36
			(0.33)	(1.46)			(0.50)	(1.24)
Constant	-2.04***	-1.01	0.11	6.17	0.81	3.77**	1.96	0.85
	(0.69)	(1.88)	(2.38)	(4.09)	(0.55)	(1.92)	(1.74)	(2.33)
Observations	110	110	110	55	50	50	50	25
Number of Clusters	39	40	36	23	22	15	16	9
Degrees of Freedom	6	6	7	7	6	6	7	7
Chi²	448.5	62.7	38.0	13.6	350.0	37.7	125.5	36927.1
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

Standard errors are clustered by Election and are given in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.5: Influence of Path-Dependent Effects on Latent Citizenship Policy

DV: Latent ICCI Score	Citizenship through Latent Integration				Integration through Citizenship			
	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
ICCI Latent 1970	1.03***	0.40***	0.25	0.27	0.61***	-0.11	0.37***	0.77***
	(0.058)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.097)	(0.15)	(0.093)	(0.053)
ForBornPercentStart	-0.04***	-0.016	-0.14***	-0.15**	-0.12***	-0.30***	-0.10***	-0.07***
	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.071)	(0.022)	(0.11)	(0.034)	(0.014)
Migration Rate	0.0042	0.0058	-0.043	-0.0051	0.0087	0.012	0.013	0.028**
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.036)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.017)	(0.010)	(0.013)
GDP Growth	-0.018	-0.0030	0.048*	-0.011	-0.022	-0.012	-0.019*	-0.0036
	(0.020)	(0.007)	(0.026)	(0.031)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(0.005)
RRPVS	-0.015	-0.0029	0.059***	0.085***	-0.0036	0.034	-0.012*	-0.001
	(0.013)	(0.030)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.007)	(0.070)	(0.007)	(0.006)
RLPVS	-0.019*	-0.018	-0.012	-0.021	-0.0043	0.028	0.0024	-0.0093
	(0.011)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.005)	(0.026)	(0.007)	(0.007)
ForBornPercent (Log)			0.46	0.38			-0.24	1.03***
			(0.42)	(0.58)			(0.20)	(0.093)
Constant	-0.035	2.51**	1.84*	0.94	1.32***	2.78***	2.15***	-1.54***
	(0.46)	(1.18)	(0.97)	(1.68)	(0.31)	(0.64)	(0.53)	(0.24)
Observations	110	110	110	55	50	50	50	25
Number of Clusters	39	40	36	23	22	15	16	9
Degrees of Freedom	6	6	7	7	6	6	7	7
Chi²	740.5	35.7	33.3	28.8	1317.1	162.2	535.3	4675.3
p	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Standard errors are clustered by Election and are given in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5.6: Influence of Path-Dependent Effects on Manifest Citizenship Policy

DV: Manifest ICCI Score	Citizenship through Latent Integration				Integration through Citizenship			
	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s	1980s	1990s	2000s	2010s
ICCI Manifest 1970	0.84***	0.043	0.53+	-0.64+	1.42***	1.52***	3.84***	2.67***
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.30)	(0.38)	(0.23)	(0.48)	(0.36)	(0.59)
ForBornPercentStart	0.019	-0.048	0.038	0.29***	0.12***	0.049	0.40***	0.45***
	(0.029)	(0.041)	(0.084)	(0.082)	(0.038)	(0.13)	(0.072)	(0.074)
Migration Rate	0.014	0.010	-0.0032	-0.055	-0.0064	0.062	0.042***	-0.053
	(0.021)	(0.012)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.020)	(0.051)	(0.016)	(0.11)
GDP Growth	0.037	0.0095	-0.073**	-0.15**	0.031	0.0048	-0.10***	0.11
	(0.031)	(0.007)	(0.031)	(0.064)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.025)	(0.11)
RRPVS	0.073***	0.064**	0.050	0.11**	0.030*	0.0054	-0.036	0.083***
	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.017)	(0.090)	(0.032)	(0.025)
RLPVS	0.025*	-0.06***	0.00026	0.10**	0.038***	0.093**	0.0043	-0.080**
	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.009)	(0.042)	(0.031)	(0.034)
ForBornPercent (Log)			-0.095	-0.78			-0.94**	-0.58
			(0.49)	(1.06)			(0.37)	(1.16)
Constant	0.12	3.48***	3.18***	5.38**	-1.03**	-0.88	-2.29**	0.15
	(0.40)	(0.36)	(0.98)	(2.69)	(0.49)	(1.39)	(1.12)	(1.63)
Observations	110	110	110	55	50	50	50	25
Number of Clusters	39	40	36	23	22	15	16	9
Degrees of Freedom	6	6	7	7	6	6	7	7
Chi²	62.0	22.2	26.4	63.4	226.6	66.3	671.0	7737.1
p	0.00	0.001	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Standard errors are clustered by Election and are given in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

+ Designates statistical significance but the effect may not be different from zero based on its confidence interval.

estimated effect on subsequent policy outputs: a country that is one additional unit more restrictive (liberal) in its policy in 1970 is associated with a 0.77 more restrictive (liberal) in the most recent decade. Overall then, these results lend some rather weak support to the path dependence hypothesis among these countries.

Also, the hypothesized mechanism by which such path dependence occurs – the size of the foreign born population in 1970 – finds strong support on this sub-dimension across both groups. A larger foreign born population in 1970 is associated with more liberalized citizenship requirements – such as dual citizenship, years to naturalization, jus soli, and ethnic criteria - in subsequent decades. Although we anticipated this relationship to hold among the traditionally more liberal countries, that it holds across all countries does not disconfirm our theoretical expectation: a greater foreign born population naturalizing in previous decades and supporting and voting for parties in subsequent decades might make citizenship more accessible over the long-run. This is also consistent with the findings from Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. It is also notable that the influence of the radical right remains significant among the traditionally more restrictive countries, but is less robust on this dimension, both compared to the previously early foreign born population as well as its influence on the total ICCI total score. Hence the radical right still matters for traditionally more restrictive countries on this dimension, but a larger initial foreign born population may help counteract moves to restriction and may even help incentivize citizenship policy liberalization. The combination of these foreign born and radical right dynamics lend support to our hypothesized mechanism above.

Finally, in Table 5.6, we observe that among the traditionally more restrictive countries with more manifest requirements in 1970, this dimension is hardly associated with manifest requirements adopted after the 1980s. Among the traditionally more liberal countries who included few if any manifest requirements, however, the association is much more robust. For every unit more restrictive in 1970, these countries are on average adopting restrictions twice and thrice the size of those restrictions in 1970. The distinction between the two groups is statistically clear: the traditionally more restrictive countries have adopted manifest policies since the 1980s that deviate from their starting points, while the traditionally less restrictive countries have adopted manifest policies that also deviate from their traditionally accessible policy origins. However, the initial foreign born population does not seem to have the anticipated level or kind of influence on subsequent policies, and in fact policies in countries with larger initial foreign born populations are associated with additional restrictions on this dimension in subsequent decades. Furthermore, the radical right remains significant, at least among the traditionally more restrictive countries. Similar to the results in Table 5.3, this may be an indication that large initial immigrant populations operate as a long-term contributor to radical policy responses from the right and more restrictive manifest requirements rather than a guarantee against them, especially if this settled population demonstrates difficulty integrating over time.

Discussion and Conclusion

In this chapter I have tested and analyzed the hypotheses about citizenship policymaking in Europe that I first proposed in Chapter 3. I argued that while

electoral competition to the right of the political spectrum may compel some conservative parties to push for restrictions on citizenship, electoral competition to the left of the political spectrum may likewise compel some leftist parties to advocate for and liberalize citizenship policy. This is due to the electoral incentives parties face with respect to their voting constituencies. In the presence of competition from radical right parties, neither mainstream conservative nor leftist parties may favor policy liberalization, and policies may in fact become more restrictive because both stand to lose constituents to these more extreme parties if they do so. Similarly, in a party system with increasing numbers of left parties and stiffer electoral competition among them, these parties may find themselves competing with one another over the immigrants whose votes benefit them electorally. The liberalization of citizenship policy may be one mechanism to win present and future immigrant votes in light of this competition.

The empirical analysis found in in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 above offered general confirmation of the aforementioned hypotheses. On the one hand, there seems to be a strong correlation between the left-of-center electoral competition and my measure of citizenship policy across time and across countries. Each of the competition variables – from changes in relative left party vote share to the effective number of left parties and interactions between these variables and respective governments – had a statistically meaningful and confirmatory predicted effect on citizenship policy change, at least in terms of the overall ICCI score and the latent dimension. To my knowledge, the role of the left and radical left on citizenship policymaking has not been examined to date, and thus this contribution to the

immigration and citizenship literature is novel. On the other hand, the electoral competition variables on the right side of the political spectrum also were estimated to have a significant effect on the overall score, and also especially on the latent dimension. While almost no electoral dynamics were observed to have an effect on the manifest dimension, this does not wholly undermine the theory, for reasons already discussed. On the manifest dimension, all parties across the spectrum have in fact introduced language, civic, economic, and legal requirements for citizenship, likely under direct threat or competition from the radical right. Thus on the manifest dimension, it may not be the absolute electoral strength of other right parties in general, or the strength of radical right competition, that incentivize restrictions, but rather their vociferous presence.

The findings certainly call into question a traditional understanding of radical parties' influence on citizenship policy. While the magnitude of the radical right's influence was observed in the statistical analyses of path dependence by examining its absolute vote share, in line with the findings of Howard (2010) and Koopmans et al. (2012), the comprehensive analysis of citizenship policy suggests that the share of seats won by radical right parties is not a very robust explanation for citizenship policy change, except for perhaps the manifest dimension. Thus we may need to rethink how that influence is considered for citizenship policy change. Altogether, the statistical findings suggest that citizenship policy making in Europe operates not simply due to the absolute vote share of radical parties, but according to some combination of electoral competition on both sides of the spectrum: strong

electoral competition on the left and right for changes in citizenship policy, with weaker competitive dynamics on the manifest dimension.

The statistical findings do find confirmation across a number of cases of liberalization in recent years in which we witness in the time period prior to the time of policy liberalization both a generally declining vote share for the predominant left party (signifying new parties on the left seizing growing shares of the respective vote), as well as a general lack of electoral competition from the far right. The case of Germany exemplifies the theory well. In the two decades prior to its liberalized Nationality Act in 2000, the Social Democrats (SPD) had lost nearly twenty percent of their vote share to new left parties, including the Greens and the PDS/Left, while the Christian Democratic Union faced no electoral threat from the far right. During this period, the *ENLP* score rose from 1.02 to 1.66, and the Greens spent the greater part of a decade advocating for policy liberalization. By 1999, the left-oriented Social Democratic and Green coalition that assumed power the year before had formulated and passed a significant liberalization of several components of Germany's hitherto exclusive citizenship regime. In Finland prior to its liberalizing Nationality Act in 2003, the Social Democratic party was consistently receiving only sixty percent of the left-party vote share while the right-of-center National Coalition Party was experiencing little to no far right party competition, representing strongly left-of-center electoral competition. In the decade before the passage of the 2001 Swedish Citizenship Act, which liberalized citizenship significantly, the hegemonic Social Democrats saw general declines in vote share vis-à-vis other left parties like the Greens while the right-of-center Moderate party

experienced an increase in its respective vote share. Increased politicization of the citizenship issue on the left may have compelled this liberalization. With robust left party competition in each of these cases, these dynamics exemplify the theorized electoral conditions for policy liberalization.

In the Netherlands, Dutch citizenship policy began to shift during debates on integration, multiculturalism, and citizenship during the late 1980s and 1990s that culminated in the 1997 policy change. During this time, the Dutch Labour party (PvdA) was losing sizable shares of votes to the Green Left and Socialists, without any noticeable rise in far right support until the end of the decade. After the 2002 elections resulted in a massive shift in the vote from the mainstream parties of both left and right to the far right, the 2003 Netherlands Nationality Act took the Netherlands in a far more restrictive direction.

Austria and Denmark both experienced strong restrictive changes around the turn of the century following what appears to be a combination of declining predominant right party support (and an associated rise in far right support) and of steady or gradually declining left party electoral support. In Austria, while the Social Democrats were under pressure from the Green party and the Liberal Party to liberalize policy during the 1990s, the rise of the far right Freedom Party (FPÖ) ultimately raised the rhetorical heat of the debate and compelled a restrictive Austrian Citizenship Act in 1999. As we see in Denmark, general stability on the left of the political spectrum was trumped by increased competition on the right due to the rising Danish People's Party prior to the 2001-02 naturalization restrictions. In both cases what is most obvious is the degree of far right vote strength during this

period at the expense of the mainstream parties. Nonetheless, despite its intermittent history with Social Democratic governments in the past, a Danish Social Democratic government was able to take office in 2012 office facing a historically high ENLP score of 2.22, serving as a fertile context in which the government could pass Denmark's first liberal citizenship policy in its postwar history.

The cases of the UK and France might also support the alternative mechanism by which competition and threat on the right operate on citizenship policymaking. In the UK, we see a generally stable level of left party and right party vote share, with rather consistent ENLP and ENRP scores, and yet a low but potent share increasingly going to the far right British National Party and UK Independence Party beginning in the early 2000s. This may have provided an impetus for Labour to pass the more restrictive Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act in 2002, as well as for subsequent restrictions in 2009 and 2013. UKIP received 1.5 percent of the vote in 2000, 2.2 percent of the vote in 2005, and 3.1 percent of the vote in 2010 but won no seats in any of these elections. However, despite its lack of electoral competition and non-existent representation in Parliament, it may well exercise its influence on the citizenship policymaking of the mainstream right through its rhetorical and political threats from the radical right, as it has done to set the terms of the debate on citizenship in Britain for much of the last decade. Likewise in France, the effects of the far right Front National have clearly contributed a restrictive tone to citizenship policy debates during the 1980s and 1990s when the dominant parties seemed to lose large numbers of votes, but throughout much of its

history served as the primary form of competition on the mainstream Socialist or mainstream Gaullist party.

Finally, the alternative path-dependence hypothesis to my political competition theory find relatively little support in the data analyzed here, while my proposed mechanism of demographic change finds mixed support in the evidence. Although the analysis of the total ICCI score suggested path dependence from citizenship starting point to the present might be a significant factor in explaining the general contours of citizenship policy over a few subsequent decades, the analyses of the two sub-dimensions largely cast this in doubt. Citizenship starting points do not provide much leverage in understanding where citizenship policy is going today. Thus the findings undermine the path dependence identified by Koopmans et al. (2012) and Goodman (2014). While the former authors find also evidence that a population of immigrant origin in earlier periods helps sustain and compel liberal citizenship policies over time, my crude measure of a similar dynamic only found support for the latent dimension of policy. Larger initial populations compel subsequent liberalizations in latent policies, but actually compel restrictions in manifest policy in later decades. Thus larger immigrant populations in earlier decades are unable to forestall restrictive change in later decades, especially as the radical right develops into a significant force. This does not settle the debate of this explanation for long-term citizenship policy change, but rather raises the question for scholars to examine more intricately in the future. Combined with the evidence presented in Chapter 4, however, this study reveals little support for the path dependence argument with regard to citizenship policy.

While the results presented in this chapter are generally confirmatory of the theorized dynamics of citizenship policymaking in Europe over the last several decades, additional quantitative as well as qualitative work could uncover precisely how these two electoral mechanisms operate. Nonetheless, if the theory advanced in this project is correct, it suggests that the far right is not the only driving force behind the rather volatile trends in citizenship policy sweeping Europe in the last two decades. Instead, we may need to consider the broader electoral realignments taking place within European political systems and the changing electoral incentives and interests of all parties across the spectrum if we are to understand how, when, with what requirements, and in what direction citizenship policy changes.

Chapter 6: The Cross-National Variation in Naturalization in Europe

As I first discussed in Chapter 2 (recall Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3), naturalization rates since the 1970s exhibit remarkable variation across time for most countries of Europe. Some countries, such as Germany, Italy, and Luxembourg, have had consistently lower naturalization rates over time, while others, such as Great Britain, Sweden, and Portugal, exhibit much higher naturalization rates on average. Even countries with similar post-war histories, immigration policies, and even cultures often have divergent naturalization rates: those in Austria dwarf those in Germany, and those in Great Britain consistently exceed those in France, for most of post-war history. Beyond general country comparisons, year-to-year changes within countries have also been quite striking in many cases. The naturalization rate in Belgium, for example, spiked dramatically from 8.7 in 1984 to 93.02 in 1985, a tenfold increase across a single year. In Denmark, the naturalization rate in 2000 nearly doubled over the year prior, from 48.7 to 74.5 naturalizations per 1,000 immigrants. There have been drastic reductions as well. In Austria, the average naturalization rate in the first five years of the new millennium was 48.8; that same average was 7.22 in the last five years. The 1990s were heady days for naturalization in the Netherlands, with an average rate of 76.58 acquisitions per 1,000 immigrants; that same figure now stands at 39.54 in the last decade. What accounts for this variation in citizenship acquisition across countries and across time?

Understanding Citizenship Acquisition

Answers to this question have come from three general approaches. One approach draws on theories of political participation (Verba and Nie 1972) and focuses on the individual-level characteristics and motivations of immigrants. A number of political, civic, economic, and social rights and privileges accrue to citizens that are often denied permanent residents, and a number of financial and procedural costs must also be born in order to naturalize. From this perspective, as successful economic, social, and cultural integration within the receiving country increases, the benefits of acquiring political membership in the receiving country increasingly outweigh the costs of severing former country ties or applying for citizenship. Looking strictly at economic incentives, immigrants may also perceive a 'premium' that derives from citizenship, as citizens often earn more, have greater access to certain types of employment or educational opportunities reserved for citizens, or experience less potential job discrimination based on citizenship status. It may serve as a device that naturalized immigrants may use to signal a level of integration, investment in a country, and reliability to employers who may otherwise question an applicant's commitment to long-term residence (DeVoretz 2008; OECD 2011, 17-18). For this reason, empirical analyses show that immigrants with higher socioeconomic status, higher levels of education and language proficiency, and longer periods of residence are more likely to acquire citizenship (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990; Jasso and 1986; Portes and Curtis 1987; Yang 1994; Jones-Correa 1998; Bevelander and Veenman 2006; Chiswick and Miller 2008; OECD 2011; Dronkers and Vink 2012).

Yet while individual-level characteristics and immigrants' personal incentives certainly shape immigrants propensity to naturalize, we must also puzzle over the factors that shape these characteristics and the sources of these incentives. It may be that institutional and contextual factors set the terms for political, economic, social, and cultural participation within countries of settlement, facilitating the naturalization of some immigrants while restricting or discouraging others. As Jones-Correa (2001a) argues, scholars should "pay significantly more attention to the institutional and social context in which immigrants make decisions about participation" (Jones-Correa 2001a, 54). And indeed, a number of scholars have studied citizenship acquisition from this perspective. One variant of this approach, discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 2, focuses on contextual variables in the countries of settlement or origin that serve to either 'push' or 'pull' immigrants toward citizenship. These variables may include cultural, political, or linguistic differences between countries of origin and settlement (Liang 1994; Bueker 2005; Chiswick and Miller 2008), social settlement patterns among immigrant groups (Logan et al. 2012), or economic context (Dronkers and Vink 2012; Vink et al. 2013). A second variant surveys the institutional context of citizenship acquisition. This perspective stems largely from earlier theoretical work on national models of incorporation and citizenship (Brubaker 1992; see also Favell 1998; Castles and Miller 2003; Koopmans et al. 2005; Schain 2008), and has developed a growing body of empirical analysis in recent years. Not surprisingly, most empirical studies within this approach focus on the citizenship policies of states themselves. The incentivizing role of dual citizenship has attracted the most

attention (Jones-Correa 1998, 2001b; Bloemraad 2004; Faist 2007; Chiswick and Miller 2008; Mazzolari 2009; Vink et al. 2013), although the provision of birthright (*jus soli*) citizenship has now been tested as well (Dronkers and Vink 2012).

Unfortunately, there are a number of limitations to the current empirical investigations of these contextual variables, and especially institutional factors. While non-comparative, American-focused studies obviously run into single-case limitations, much of the empirical work focused on Europe has also been either country case studies (Diehl and Blohm 2003; Schönwälder and Triadafilopoulos 2012; Euwals et al. 2010) or cross-national investigations based on survey data limited to a few years (Dronkers and Vink 2012; Vink et al. 2013). The latter are particularly problematic for drawing inferences about the policy context of naturalization. For example, (Dronkers and Vink 2012; Vink et al. 2013) use pooled hierarchical models of select waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) to assess the effects of institutional variation across countries on the citizenship status of non-native respondents. Unfortunately, reliance on these survey instruments have inherent problems that may be ill-suited for scrutinizing citizenship acquisition. First, the ESS, like most surveys, does not tell us when the respondents acquired citizenship, or how they acquired it, meaning that we cannot assess the specific institutional context that actually facilitated their acquisition with any degree of precision. This means that most studies thus assume single-year scores for citizenship policy, such as from MIPEX, or dichotomous variables for dual citizenship and *jus soli*, will be a reasonable reflection of the fluid institutional context of naturalization across numerous years. Yet as I have demonstrated, policy

has changed quite frequently in recent years, rendering this assumption potentially invalid: the context for naturalizing Austrian respondents in the 1980s is indeed radically different from those acquiring citizenship in the 1990s and in 2014.

Second, reliance on extant survey data also cannot cast light on the changing circumstances of citizenship acquisition: whether policy adjustments or the introduction of new requirements affected the citizenship acquisition of respondents, for example. The longitudinal limitations of most survey instruments thus prevent us from comparing the effects of policy across time. Finally, as the authors recognize, using the ESS (or any other survey instrument) to examine citizenship acquisition may lead to inaccurate inferences because of selection bias: only well-integrated immigrants are likely to be included in the sample. This makes it difficult for us to accurately gauge the effects of integration-related requirements on naturalization if our sample is restricted to well-integrated immigrants only.

Janoski's (2010) analysis of naturalization rates across 14 European countries from 1970 to 2006 is the most comprehensive to date on the subject. In it he employs his Barriers to Nationality Index (BNI) to estimate the effects of citizenship policy across a number of statistical models of naturalization rates. Yet the BNI is only coded for four years within that period (1970, 1980, 1990, and 2002). As pointed out in Chapter 2 in my discussion of existing policy indices, such decades-wide longitudinal gaps between policy measurements are problematic if we are interested in proximate effects of citizenship policy on annual acquisitions within those decades. Over the last decade, citizenship policies have changed on a nearly annual basis in many European countries. Taking measures of policy at the

bookends of each decade as Janoski does means that the BNI functions largely as a control variable in the analysis, and we thus miss these intra-decadal dynamics that often have immediate and observable impact on naturalizations in any given year.

The other limitation is a lack of theoretical attention to different policy requirements and subcomponents. The BNI quantifies citizenship policies across 12 different components, many of which overlap with the ICCI presented in this project, yet it includes several items that have ambiguous theoretical effect on naturalization. For example, Janoski (2010) claims the inclusion of "the discretion on the part of the state… may deter immigrants from pursuing [citizenship]" (38). However, state discretion may also be used to *increase and facilitate* naturalizations in many contexts, regardless of the formal rules on the books. This, then, becomes an empirical question to be investigated rather than assumed. But, relatedly, his study he only employs the aggregated BNI scores to assess the effects of policy on naturalization. It is therefore unclear what effects each of his components have on naturalization. A more insightful analysis of naturalization should arguably also disaggregate citizenship policies into component requirements so that scholars may isolate those requirements that influence citizenship acquisition from those that have little to no influence.

As diverse and extensive as this institutional and context-focused literature has become, a number of questions remain, the answers to which would greatly enhance our understanding of citizenship acquisition. The first set of questions regards the effects of policy. How exactly does policy matter for naturalization outcomes? Which specific citizenship requirements affect immigrants' incentives to

naturalize, and which do not? How do annual policies changes affect acquisitions over time? The second set of questions regards the effects of *integration context* in the country of settlement and the various factors that shift immigrant demand for citizenship and political supply of citizenship first postulated in Chapter 3. How might the *integration context* in which immigrants find themselves incentivize or disincentivize their citizenship acquisition? Can politics affect citizenship acquisition beyond policy? The study conducted in this chapter and the next resolves some of these aforementioned shortcomings in the existing literature in two ways. First, because the ICCI is coded on an annual basis, we can better account for year-to-year variation in citizenship policies that provide the institutional structure of naturalization strategies. And since we can also control for annual changes more precisely, this should permit a more precise estimation of other supply and demand variables that may have an observed effect. Second, by examining naturalization trends with recourse to the various dimensions and components of the ICCI, I will reveal which requirements shape naturalization strategies and which exert little influence. As I demonstrate below, not all citizenship requirements are equally influential.

Furthermore, the following analysis tests the overall theoretical framework advanced in Chapter 3 and specifically examines the effects of the *political supply of citizenship* and *immigrant demand for citizenship* on naturalization across European countries. We recall there were four factors theorized to shift immigrant demand: socioeconomic context, future value of citizenship, current and future value of non-citizenship, and the attractiveness of a country's culture. The hypotheses for the

demand for citizenship that I test here are thus based on how immigrants respond to these factors deriving from their integration context:

> ***H.D1:*** *The strength of the socioeconomic context of a country should be positively associated with the immigrant demand for citizenship, which should increase commensurate naturalization rates.*
>
> ***H.D2:*** *As the perceived future economic or political value of citizenship status in the country increases, or as the expected future cost of citizenship increases, immigrant demand for citizenship in the current year should increase, reflected in increased naturalization rates.*
>
> ***H.D3:*** *As the relative value of non-citizenship decreases, immigrant demand for citizenship – and consequently naturalization rates – should increase.*

Similarly, I theorized how the political supply of citizenship would manifest itself indirectly through the determinants of citizenship policy as well as directly through the motivations and incentives of policy makers in exploiting ambiguities in given policies. My hypotheses for the political supply of citizenship were thus based on how politicians' motivations become manifest through policy and through political influence on policy implementation:

> ***H.S1:*** *As the costliness of citizenship supplied increases, the commensurate naturalization rates should decrease.*
>
> ***H.S2:*** *As the result of political influence beyond formal citizenship policy, left-oriented governments should be positively associated and right-oriented governments negatively associated with naturalization rates.*

H.S3 *As the degree of legal discretion over the implementation of citizenship policy decreases, naturalization rates should decrease under left-oriented governments and increase under right-oriented governments.*

H.S4: *Left party competition should be positively associated with naturalization rates and right party competition should be negatively associated with naturalization rates.*

I summarize my expectations first enumerated in Chapter 3 in Table 6.1 below.

Table 6.1: Determinants of Demand for and Supply of Citizenship

Aggregate Variable	Contextual Variable	Value	Effect on Citizenship Acquisition
Immigrant Demand for Citizenship	Socioeconomic Context	Strong	Increase
		Weak	Decrease
	Future Value of Citizenship	Increase	Increase
		Decrease	Decrease
	Relative Value of Non-Citizenship Status	Increase	Decrease
		Decrease	Increase
	Identification with Host Country Culture	High	Increase
		Low	Decrease
Political Supply of Citizenship	Policy-Defined Cost	Increase	Decrease
		Decrease	Increase
	Political Ideology	Leftist	Increase
		Conservative	Decrease
	Electoral Politics	Left Competition	Increase
		Radical Right	Decrease
	Decreased Discretion	Under Leftist Governments	Decrease
		Under Rightist Governments	Increase

Testing the Supply and Demand of Citizenship

In the remaining pages of this chapter, I will test these hypotheses systematically, both relying on naturalization and immigration statistics gathered from the countries under investigation and on qualitative evidence gathered through interviews in several European countries. I begin with an empirical analysis

of the fundamental components of the theoretical framework, captured by hypotheses H.D1, H.S1, H.S2, and H.S3. Subsequently, I conduct a detailed analysis of H.D2 and H.D3 using the case of the Euro crisis to exemplify how changing the value of citizenship may motivate naturalization in Europe. In the following chapter, I illustrate the local context of immigrant demand and political supply through a subnational investigation of naturalization within Germany and Austria, where federalism enables us to glean additional insights from the theory.

Now I begin with a cross-national analysis of naturalization rates as a product of the political supply and immigrant demand for citizenship across Europe. My dependent variable is the annual naturalization rate (*NatRate*) for country-years spanning 1980 through 2014, calculated as the number of total citizenship acquisitions per the immigrant population, and multiplied by one thousand.[44] Data for the number of naturalizations, immigrant populations, and lagged annual migration rate (*MigRateLag*) were collected over the last two years from the websites of and emailed correspondence from the main statistical offices in each country (see Appendix A). Unfortunately, many countries collect and/or retain inconsistent or sparse data on these subjects, and for this reason all national data collected was cross-validated and missing data corrected with data from Eurostat

[44] Note that the rate includes total acquisitions, which implies the inclusion of *jus soli* acquisitions. While no country to my knowledge collects or publishes such figures, I performed a *jus soli* adjustment of my own for those countries that have or had *jus soli* as a means of acquiring citizenship in the present or in the past, including France (1970-1997), the United Kingdom (1970-present), Belgium (2000-present), and Germany (2000-present). I followed the formula employed by Janoski (2010, 31), which involves calculating the size of the foreign population weighted by the birth rate in the population. In the case of Germany, children known as *Optionskinder,* those born to foreign parents who qualify for partial *jus soli* under the option model, have been recorded according to the German Federal Statistical Office (2012).

(2015a, 2015e, 2016), the OECD (2015a, 2015b, 2015c), and the United Nations (2009, 2013b).[45]

To operationalize the conditions in the country that constitute the economic context of immigrant demand, I include variables for annual *GDP Growth* (World Bank 2016a) and annual *Unemployment* (World Bank 2016d). In some models include a variable for *Recession* indicating if that country experienced a negative growth rate that year, as well as a factor variable for the *EuroCrisis* for the years 2009 to 2013. I also control for *GDP per capita* (World Bank 2016c) in some models. For my political variables, I use most of the same variables from Chapter 5, derived from the electoral ParlGov database (Döring and Manow 2015). Finally, I again employ the Integration Cost of Citizenship Index (ICCI), but most directly as a control rather than an explicit test of H.S1.

Because there is no clear hierarchical structure to the panel data, the analysis is conducted using pooled OLS regression. However, partial correlograms reveal that the *NatRate* variable is an AR(1) process for all countries in the panel with autocorrelation between the *NatRate* and *NatRate* lagged by a single year. Furthermore, there appear be different error variances across the different cross-sections in the panel, meaning that such heteroskedasticity will render the straightforward OLS standard errors inconsistent. Therefore, to deal with the AR(1) autocorrelation as well as panel-level heteroskedasticity in the errors, the models

[45] Because of missing data limitations, I exclude Ireland from the analysis because I was unable to locate any of the aforementioned data for the country prior to 2000. Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, all new countries of immigration, had data missing for select years for the sample period, but not extensive enough to be of concern methodologically. They are withheld from the analysis only where noted.

presented here use linear OLS regression with lagged dependent variables (one year) and panel-corrected standard errors advocated by Beck and Katz (1995) which are commonly used with time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data.

To get an initial sense of how different components of policy operate on naturalization rates, I first present Figure 6.1, which plots the average marginal effects of different levels of the various cost components of the citizenship index.

Figure 6.1: Mean Predicted Naturalization Rate, by Cost Component



As we see, all of the components generally conform to expectations, even if some of the categories of the components were not significant.[46] Thus we have a strong sense already that increased restrictiveness along most of citizenship's associated integration costs affect the naturalization rate, consistent with hypothesis H.S1.

Table 6.2 contains a series of 8 regression models that test the economic motivations of naturalization in various permutations of economic variables, with Model 1 serving as the empirical baseline. As we can see, the ICCI index performs as expected in the baseline and in all subsequent models, already lending support to H.S1. Higher scores are associated with fewer naturalizations. In terms of economic variables, the coefficient on *Unemployment* is consistently negative across all models and statistically significant. In the isolated Model 2, a one-point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with nearly a one point decrease in the naturalization rate, holding all other variables constant. As we include other economic variables in Models 3-6, it retains its statistical significance, even if its predicted effect on naturalization is understandably diminished. Interestingly, *GDP per capita* is positively associated with naturalization rates across all models. Although the magnitude of the effect appears small against the size of the variable, it is not negligible. For example, the GDP per capita of the UK increased from $40,199 to $40,967 from 2013 to 2014, which translates into an estimated effect of roughly 0.08 on naturalization rates in that year. While not entirely as strong as

[46] The category numbers are not the actual scores on these various components, but rather reflect categories of scores grouped according to prominent breaks in the score distributions. Each marginal effect was estimated using panel-corrected standard errors, controlling for logged foreign born percent and lagged naturalization rate with country fixed effects. Those categories that do not attain significance include Civic (category 3), Economic (all categories), Ethnic (category 2), Legal (all categories), and Social (categories 2 and 3).

unemployment, it may lend credence to hypotheses H.D1 and H.D2. Wealthier countries of course attract more immigrants, and have more to offer immigrants, and thus have higher naturalization rates on average than poorer countries. This may also suggest that economically stronger countries may be more comparatively dynamic than poorer countries. If wealthy countries indicate that immigrants can better afford the commensurate costs of political and cultural integration required to naturalize, or offer the economically integrated immigrant more optimistic socioeconomic, political, or cultural prospects in the future, then they may find that the context in wealthier countries is conducive to citizenship acquisition rather than remain an immigrant or return to his or her country of origin. Thus this statistic is consistent with H.D2.[47]

Unfortunately *GDP Growth* does not reach significance in this or any other test I conducted, which does not bolster the previous findings. Finally, the dummy year variable for *Recession* was significant and positively associated with annual naturalization rates. This is surprising, since it seems to directly challenge H.D1. However, upon closer investigation, this partial correlation could be due to the inclusion of Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, who are outliers in terms of unemployment, GDP growth, and other economic variables, particularly during the recent years of the Euro crisis. To account for this possibility, I tested for the Euro crisis in Model 6 and found it was not significantly associated with naturalization rates in these strictly economic models.

[47] I also conducted the same models using logged *Unemployment* and logged *GDP per capita*, but these had little significant effect on the interpretation of the results.

Table 6.2: The Economic Determinants of Immigrant Demand for Citizenship

DV: Nat Rate	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(Sub1)	(Sub2)
NatRate (Lag)			0.76***	0.78***	0.76***	0.76***		0.73***
			(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.038)		(0.045)
Foreign Born Percent (Log)	-4.05	-1.59	-0.86	-0.69	-1.01	-1.07	-7.28***	-1.63
	(3.31)	(2.13)	(0.76)	(0.76)	(0.76)	(0.87)	(2.32)	(0.99)
MigRate (Lag)	-0.39*	-0.82***	-0.40***	-0.35***	-0.41***	-0.40***	-0.47	-0.69**
	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.36)	(0.30)
ICCI (Total)	-2.16***	-2.11***	-1.03***	-1.01***	-1.13***	-1.06***	-2.41***	-1.33***
	(0.65)	(0.58)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.64)	(0.27)
Unemp.		-0.92***	-0.23**		-0.26**	-0.25**	-2.16***	-0.71***
		(0.24)	(0.10)		(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.51)	(0.26)
GDPpc			0.0001***	0.0002***	0.0002***	0.0001**		0.0002**
			(0.00005)	(0.00005)	(0.00005)	(0.00005)		(0.0001)
GDP Growth				-0.016				
				(0.21)				
Recession = 1					3.04**			0.80
					(1.39)			(2.00)
EuroCrisis = 1						0.85		
						(1.87)		
Constant	45.1***	54.5***	14.2***	10.2***	14.6***	14.3***	83.8***	21.4***
	(6.20)	(6.22)	(3.31)	(2.51)	(3.33)	(3.52)	(7.77)	(5.16)
Observations	525	507	504	521	504	504	368	368
R^2	0.19	0.29	0.84	0.83	0.83	0.84	0.41	0.81
Number of Clusters	15	15	15	15	15	15	11	11
Degrees of Freedom	3	4	6	6	7	7	4	7
Chi²	13.0	35.4	945.7	980.9	954.9	956.5	39.5	592.0
p	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.00	0.00

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6.3: The Political Determinants of the Supply of Citizenship

DV: Nat Rate	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
NatRate (Lag)	0.77***	0.78***	0.78***	0.76***	0.78***		
	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)		
Foreign Born Percent (Log)	-1.32*	-1.27*	-1.09	-0.88	-1.28*	-8.95***	-8.65***
	(0.77)	(0.74)	(0.81)	(0.80)	(0.73)	(2.57)	(2.50)
ICCI (Total)	-0.98***	-1.03***	-1.02***	-1.09***	-0.98***	-2.94***	-2.80***
	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.53)	(0.54)
Unemployment	-0.19*	-0.18	-0.20*	-0.15	-0.18*	-0.22	-0.26
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.30)	(0.28)
GDPpc	0.00013**	0.00014***	0.00012**	0.00012**	0.00014**	0.00083***	0.00080***
	(0.00005)	(0.00005)	(0.00005)	(0.00005)	(0.00006)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
LRScore3=Leftist	3.02*						
	(1.59)						
LRScore3=Rightist	-0.137						
	(1.52)						
Left Seat Percent		0.057					
		(0.057)					
Radical Left Seat Percent			0.085				
			(0.088)				
Right Seat Percent				-0.13***			
				(0.046)			
Radical Right Seat Percent					-0.032		
					(0.11)		
Leftist						3.41	
						(2.10)	
Left Competition						1.54	
						(2.23)	
Leftist x Left Competition						1.03	
						(2.74)	
Rightist							-0.23
							(1.74)
Right Competition							-0.64
							(2.35)
Rightist x Right Competition							-1.73
							(2.59)
Constant	13.8***	11.6**	14.3***	20.2***	14.2***	41.5***	44.0***
	(3.60)	(5.01)	(3.60)	(4.28)	(3.73)	(9.34)	(9.04)
Observations	504	504	504	504	504	507	507
R^2	0.84	0.84	0.83	0.84	0.83	0.39	0.33
Number of Clusters	15	15	15	15	15	15	15
Degrees of Freedom	7	6	6	6	6	7	7
Chi²	983.1	994.3	919.0	978.2	980.7	50.4	45.4
p	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Because of the possibility that these statistical country outliers could be driving the results of the other models, I ran two additional models, Sub1 and Sub2, which are subsets of the original models without any of these states (henceforth, with Ireland, GIIPS). Omitting them from the analysis and rerunning the models again, the predicted effect of *Recession* disappears. Notably, however, the magnitude of the effect of *Unemployment* on naturalization rates is strengthened in both subsetted models. From this analysis, I thus have evidence that the economic context – captured at least by the unemployment rate in a given year – is a statistically significant predictor of naturalization.

As with the economic context of immigrant demand, Table 6.3 presents a series of models testing principal hypotheses regarding the political supply of citizenship. Let us begin with Model 1, where I first test whether the political orientation of a government (*LRScore*) affects naturalization (H.S2). As hypothesized, left-oriented governments are positively and significantly associated with increases in the naturalization rate across these countries and these decades. Holding all other variables constant, moving from a centrist government to a leftist government is associated with a 3.02 unit increase in the naturalization rate in a given country-year. That is quite sizable considering the reference category is centrist coalitions, which usually contain at least one leftist party. This is even more reaffirming considering citizenship policy (ICCI Total) is also included in the model, and while the inclusion of the political variable reduces the magnitude of the policy's effect from a baseline model without it (not shown), it by no means renders it insignificant. In Model 1, *Rightist* governments do not appear to have a statistically

significant effect on naturalization rates, although the sign of the coefficient is negative as hypothesized. These findings are consistent with the theory, and thus we can interpret this as evidence that leftist politics *does* influence naturalization rates. In Models 2 through 5, I test for the effects of cumulative left party strength in parliament, radical left party strength in parliament, cumulative right party strength in parliament, and radical right party strength in parliament that have been proposed as explanations for citizenship acquisition in previous research (Janoski 2010). While the associations are in the correct direction – leftist seats are associated with higher naturalization rates and rightist seats are negatively associated with naturalization rates - unfortunately, very few attain statistical significance.[48] Only cumulative right party seat share in a parliament appears to have a statistically significant negative effect on naturalization, although it appears to be a much weaker one than that of leftist governments. Nonetheless, that a one point increase in right party seat percentage in parliament might have the expected effect of reducing a country's naturalization rate by one tenth in a given year is not minor. Clearly, however, government power matters more. And these two findings together and their comparative strengths make intuitive sense, for governing power should enable leftist policymakers to influence the supply of citizenship much more directly and effectively than simply having a sizable share of seats in parliament.

[48] I also conducted similar tests using my other variables from Chapter 5, including party vote shares rather than seat shares, changes and averaged changes in party vote share, and combinations thereof, but likewise found no significant effects for these variables even though many were signed in the correct direction. Given the clustered nature of these variables, this may suggest that better model specification may be able to account for these differences, and thus this constitutes one important direction for my future research.

Models 6 and 7 test for the effects of party competition on naturalization. The variables are all signed correctly: a leftist government facing stronger left-oriented competition is associated with higher rates of acquisition (Model 6), while the converse is true of right-oriented governments facing stronger right-oriented competition. However, none of the coefficients on the interaction terms are significant in the models presented here. When I removed the ICCI variable from the analysis (not shown), the coefficients remained signed correctly and the interaction terms did become significant for right party competition. This suggests that party competition is relevant for citizenship acquisition, but its relevance is likely through citizenship policy outputs that structure the supply of citizenship, rather than through political discretion or influence. Thus while I found various modes of party competition seem to influence citizenship *policy*, I find little similar statistically significant evidence that party competition influences citizenship *acquisition*.

Based on the previous table, we observe that governments – and leftist governments in particular – seem to exert an influence on naturalization rates, even holding citizenship policy constant. How do we know that the influence may be a result of political discretion, or the ability to influence policy implementation, as hypothesized? To investigate this, I make use of the citizenship policy index itself. Recall from Chapter 4 that the manifest dimension is composed of fundamentally descriptive elements: rather than ascribe to immigrants certain characteristics that may render them more or less qualified for citizenship, states use the components of manifest integration policy to observe and measure integration directly. In other words, states need not estimate immigrant integration, but may rather rely on

concrete evidence through active assessments. The coding rules in Table 4.1 highlight this descriptive and evidentiary basis of the manifest dimension, but also underscore how policy change on the manifest dimension is often in the direction of circumscribing and regulating this descriptive and evidentiary basis of citizenship acquisition. In other words, low scores on components such as linguistic proficiency, civics knowledge, or legal/behavioral standing are often assessed on vague evaluations of the bureaucracy, who may have instructions or guidelines circulated by the government of the day. Thus we should observe the political influence on naturalization likewise decrease as the discretionary aspects of policy decrease over time or across countries. Specifically, we should expect that only those shown to have political influence (in our case, *Leftist* coalitions) experience statistically significant reductions in their association with acquisition rates as policy discretion diminishes.[49]

To test this hypothesized relationship (H.S3), I analyze another series of statistical models in Table 6.4 in which I interact the different governing coalition scores (*Leftist* and *LRScore3*) with the scores from the manifest dimension and from the total ICCI index. In Models 1 and 3, we see again that *Leftist* governments have a significant main effect on naturalization rates, but a negative effect when interacted with the ICCI manifest dimension. Substantively, Model 1 indicates that compared to rightist governments, leftist governments have a positive estimated effect on naturalization rates, but a negative one as the manifest policy score increases in

[49] This is because, although H.S3 predicts the opposite relationship with conservative parties, the lack of significant association between such parties and citizenship acquisition in the preceding models suggests that we should not expect a statistically significant effect in these subsequent models.

magnitude. Similarly in Model 3, compared to centrist governments, leftist governments have a positive estimated effect on naturalization rates, but that effect is moderated in a negative direction as the manifest dimension becomes more restrictive. The conditional effect even holds in Model 6 when interacted with the total citizenship score. By contrast, in Model 2 and Model 3, *Rightist* governments have neither a significant main effect nor a significant interaction effect on policy, which is consistent with the initial findings from Table 6.3, where they had no observed political effect on naturalization rates. Furthermore, we would not expect to find this conditional relationship on the latent dimension, where there is little ability to influence the interpretation or implementation of policy and Models 4 and 5 confirm that this relationship does not hold when applied to the latent dimension of citizenship policy. Thus by means of comparison, we see that the influence of *Leftist* coalitions is precisely on the dimension where we would expect it, and not on the other dimension where we would not. Likewise, the influence of *Rightist* governments is also insignificant along both dimensions, as we would predict. Figure 6.1 illustrate this relationship by showing the conditional marginal effects of *Leftist* and *Rightist* governments on naturalization rates plotted by increasing ICCI manifest cost scores. The figure shows the discrete change in *Leftist* and *Rightist* governments' effect on naturalization rates from the base level (*Centrist*) at each value of *ICCI Manifest*. As we see in the upper left panel, the effect of *Leftist* depends on the level of the manifest score, and is significant where we would expect it to be – at the lower levels of manifest policy where high levels of discretion are present – while it loses its significance for explaining naturalization rates as the manifest

Table 6.4: Political Interactions with Citizenship Policy

DV: Nat Rate	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Foreign Born Percent (Log)	-1.33 (3.12)	-2.23 (3.30)	-1.03 (3.17)	-10.0*** (3.35)	-10.1*** (3.35)	-4.11 (3.41)
Migration Rate (Lag)	-0.28 (0.24)	-0.38* (0.23)	-0.28 (0.24)	-0.30 (0.22)	-0.24 (0.22)	-0.23 (0.23)
Leftist	10.8*** (3.53)			5.59* (2.99)		
Rightist		-4.16 (3.04)				
ICCI Manifest	-0.29 (0.79)	-0.92 (0.92)	0.0080 (1.03)			
Leftist x ICCI Manifest	-1.86** (0.88)					
Rightist x ICCI Manifest		0.67 (0.72)				
LRScore3 = Leftist			13.4*** (5.01)		11.5** (5.62)	17.2** (7.81)
LRScore3 = Rightist			3.68 (4.48)		8.42 (5.77)	5.00 (6.85)
LRScore3 = Leftist x ICCI Manifest			-2.27** (1.12)			
LRScore3 = Rightist x ICCI Manifest			-0.59 (0.92)			
ICCI Latent				-5.19*** (1.03)	-4.64*** (1.34)	
Leftist=1 x ICCI Latent				-0.51 (0.75)		
LRScore3 = Leftist x ICCI Latent					-1.62 (1.41)	
LRScore3 = Rightist x ICCI Latent					-1.61 (1.46)	
ICCI Total						-1.56* (0.82)
LRScore3 = Leftist x ICCI Total						-1.66* (0.98)
LRScore3 = Rightist x ICCI Total						-0.37 (0.81)
Constant	34.6*** (7.06)	39.4*** (6.83)	32.2*** (7.78)	65.8*** (8.88)	62.7*** (9.37)	47.0*** (9.93)
Observations	525	525	525	525	525	525
R^2	0.29	0.19	0.29	0.36	0.40	0.31
Number of clusters	15	15	15	15	15	15
Degrees Freedom	5	5	7	5	7	7
Chi²	15.3	15.3	15.4	43.4	50.2	25.8
p	0.009	0.009	0.031	0.000	0.000	0.001

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure 6.2: Conditional Marginal Effects of Governments on Naturalization Rates



score moves beyond 5, where most manifest policy scores have sufficiently circumscribed policy discretion. In the upper right panel, we also see that the *Leftist* influence filters into the Total ICCI score up through a score of 8, likely by means of the Manifest dimension, before losing its significant effect. In contrast, the two lower panels reveal that *Rightist* governments apparently have little significant influence on either the Manifest dimension or Total ICCI score. This is not to claim that Rightist governments do not attempt to affect naturalization, but only that from the statistical evidence presented in the previous analyses does it appear that the influence of *Leftist* governments beyond formal policy is most discernible from the data gathered.

Before moving on to the next section of the analysis of naturalization rates in Europe, I will summarize the evidence uncovered and the status of the hypotheses thus far. Harkening back to the Jones-Correa's (2001a, 54) call to scholars to pay more attention to the context which structure immigrant decisions about citizenship, the evidence presented here suggests the economic and political context does in fact matter. In terms of economic context, contrary to the findings of Janoski (2010), Dronkers and Vink (2012) and Vink, Prokic-Breuer, and Dronkers (2013), my analysis suggests GDP per capita in the receiving country does matter for structuring naturalization at the aggregate level, and likewise finds evidence that the employment context does also. Immigrant demand for citizenship appears to be higher in countries that are economically stronger (GDP per capita) and have lower comparative rates of unemployment. Thus hypothesis H.D1 finds relatively strong support in the statistical evidence presented here. Likewise, the political context

also matters. Like Janoski (2010), I find that politics does exert an influence on the political supply of citizenship (and thus naturalization rates) independent of citizenship policy. But unlike Janoski (2010), I find no evidence that left party power in parliament affects citizenship acquisition. Right party power does, but with the opposite effect. However, rather than left party power in parliaments, it is instead left party government control that appears to be the decisive element. Furthermore, this influence is discernible by means of the manifest cost dimension of the ICCI, where administrative and bureaucratic discretion is most directly applicable to the conduct of citizenship acquisition and conferral. As I demonstrated, left party influence seems to exert its strongest influence at the lower range of the manifest dimension where discretionary space is the widest, while it diminishes rapidly and becomes insignificant once such discretionary space has been regulated away. Although we reject H.S4 on the basis of a lack of statistically significant evidence, hypotheses H.S1, H.S2, and H.S3 are all accepted based on the evidence presented here.

Now that I have evaluated the building blocks of the theoretical framework, I turn now to the case of the Euro crisis, where I explore hypotheses H.D2 and H.D3.

Immigrant Demand for Citizenship in the Shadow of the Euro Crisis

The Euro crisis profoundly altered the European political and economic landscape. Austerity, slow growth, and persistently high unemployment plague countries such as Spain, Greece, and Italy and have upended governments in many of them. Many Eurozone countries still cannot escape the Brussels-inspired spending cuts that continue to weigh heavily on their economies. Fears of Grexits, a

greater Eurozone demise, and even exaggerated predictions of the collapse of the European Union (EU) continue to bring political and economic uncertainty to citizens and governments across the continent. Trust in national governments and EU institutions has bottomed out in many EU countries, especially in those hardest hit by the recession. On its face, the European sovereign debt crisis, or the Euro crisis, might seem like an unlikely context in which to assess the supply and demand of citizenship in Europe. But as I demonstrate below, the economic and subsequent political crisis that began in Greece at the end of 2009 and soon spread throughout the continent is in many ways an important case in which to test how changing dynamics of demand for citizenship operate.

The introduction of formal European Union citizenship in 1992 and the incorporation of the Schengen *acquis* into the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 is one unique institutional context that has challenged the traditional understanding of citizenship in Europe and altered the context for the acquisition of citizenship among intra-EU migrants (Hansen and Weil 2001). EU citizenship has always been conceived as a means to foster popular support and allegiance to the EU as well as a sense of European identity beyond the nation-state. The Commission on Citizenship of the Union (2001) described it as "both a source of legitimation of the process of European integration, by reinforcing the participation of citizens, and a fundamental factor in the creation among citizens of a sense of belonging to the European Union and of having a genuine European identity." In its report on the Year of the Citizen in 2013, the Commission (2013b) proclaimed that its citizens "are and must be at the heart of European integration" still proceeding rapidly beyond a reformed

Economic and Monetary Union toward eventual political union. Many scholars and policymakers initially greeted, and continue to treat, European citizenship with a degree of skepticism, considering it as purely symbolic and more representative of the EU's market-oriented character than a viable alternative to national citizenship (Everson 1995; Downes 2001). Others have viewed it as an ideological and political effort to address the democratic deficit or simply inspire stronger identification with Europe (Jessurun d'Oliveira 1995; O'Leary 1996, 1999; Vink 2005). Weiler (1996, 57) boldly dismissed it as "a cynical exercise in public relations" in that it conferred no new rights to intra-EU migrants. Hansen (2009) has likewise maintained that as "a derivative status that creates no new rights, EU citizenship in no way challenges national citizenship" and is rather devoid of "empirical content and theoretical importance" (6). Yet other scholars have countered that EU citizenship has matured over the years both in terms of legal status (Kostakopoulou 2001, 2008, 2012; Joppke 2010) and as embodiment of post-national citizenship (Soysal 1994; Jacobson and Kilic 2003; Bosniak 2006). The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been instrumental to this evolution. Through a series of court decisions, the ECJ has endowed European nationals with an ever-widening scope of economic and social rights that may be exercised beyond national borders within the wider EU polity. The 2004 Citizenship Directive (2004/58/EC), the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2006, and the establishment of an EU Fundamental Rights Agency to monitor those rights have all formalized this development. These accessory rights have furthermore developed alongside and beyond its secondary status to national citizenship, being transformed from a

derivative status into a source of rights in itself. As Joppke (2010) argues, EU citizenship is "reinforcing the lightening of citizenship that is happening independently at member state level… the future of citizenship is bound to be light, and lighter still with the help of 'Europe'" (22).

If, as Yang (1994) maintains, demand for citizenship is premised on the tangible benefits it confers to those acquiring it, then many of the conventional benefits of naturalization have disappeared for intra-EU migrants. Alongside the freedom of movement and facilitated right to permanent residence, EU citizens are entitled to a number of other benefits in other EU states, from non-discrimination protections to varied forms of social assistance to voting for and standing in local municipal elections. By this reasoning, European nationals today can move to and settle in another member state and enjoy a range of benefits in that member state by virtue of their EU citizenship. Even though a growing number of member states offer relaxed, or facilitated, naturalization requirements for other EU nationals, acquiring citizenship would be a relatively costly behavior with relatively inconsequential benefits for most intra-EU migrants. This logic seems to hold empirically as well. For example, Dronkers and Vink (2012) hypothesize that acquiring citizenship in another EU member state "would provide relatively little in terms of substantive benefits of citizenship" (395) and they indeed find that European citizens "are clearly less motivated to acquire another European citizenship" in their country of residence (409). Naturalization rates also tend to decrease among intra-EU migrants whose countries join the EU (Eurostat 2015a, own calculations).

How might the Euro crisis affect the citizenship acquisition dynamics in Europe? I contend that the Euro crisis has in fact altered this incentive structure among European citizens and has renewed the demand for national citizenship in another member state. First, according to the logic of H.D2, the perceived future economic and political value of citizenship in the country has increased. In the aftermath of the crisis, Europeans are ever more uncertain and distrustful of national-level and EU-level political elites and institutions. As Figure 6.2 shows, distrust in EU institutions across all populations began reaching historic highs in 2010, immediately corresponding with the eruption of the Greek debt crisis. On a nearly daily basis, Europeans have heard countless reports about the precarious future of the Eurozone, speculations about a possible "Grexit" or other club departures, and even exaggerated fears "that the euro crisis may end up destroying the European Union."[50] Anti-immigrant policies and xenophobic public sentiment, much of it directed toward intra-EU migrants, is also on the rise in a number of European countries. In the context of mounting political uncertainty and distrust of institutions back home, which countries may or may not belong in the future, and the status and acceptance of EU migrants living abroad, holding EU citizenship may provide little comfort. If the EU benefits deriving from their own national passport may soon be curtailed or dissipate entirely, intra-EU migrants have every incentive to acquire the citizenship of their country of residence.

[50] George Soros, "How to Save the EU from the Euro Crisis," *The Guardian*, 9 April 2013. Examples of less exaggerated speculations include *The Economist*, "Is Grexit good for the euro?" Jun 16th 2012, and Ralph Atkins, "Trichet warns on dangers of Greek eurozone exit," *Financial Times*, 24 February 2015.

As we see in Figure 6.3, furthermore, these changing political sentiments vary in magnitude between pre-crisis and post-crisis years among different European subpopulations. Whereas average pre-crisis distrust differs only moderately among all EU nationals from post-crisis distrust, it more than doubled among populations in Europe's periphery – Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain (henceforth the GIIPS) – and nearly so in the A-12 countries. In fact, before the crisis, only two countries – Sweden and the United Kingdom – had average distrust levels that exceeded 50 percent, whereas thirteen countries, including all the GIIPS countries, have exceeded this level in the post-crisis years. This variation clearly suggests that increasing distrust is a political sentiment strongly associated with the temporal onset and geographic severity of the crisis in the EU.[51] By this logic, sharply rising uncertainty and distrust in those countries of origin hit hardest by the crisis may most strongly incentivize naturalization abroad. For example, it may be that a Greek citizen would acquire citizenship abroad to safeguard against the potential loss of the rights and privileges of EU citizenship among persistent fears of a Grexit from the Euro zone, or to escape the political and economic uncertainty rampant in Greece in recent years. Naturalization may also then be a form of political and economic insurance should the hitherto advantages of EU citizenship diminish or disappear. In this context, holding a new national passport may be more

[51] This is not to claim that manifest distrust of the EU as a phenomenon is only associated with the Euro crisis in any one country. Indeed, persistent and deep-seated Euroskepticism has long existed to varying degrees across many countries, and uncertainty and distrust may certainly be caused by longer-term factors that may precede or extend beyond the crisis. While existing data do not permit one to fully disentangle these deeper forms of distrust from crisis-induced distrust, distrust of the EU nonetheless seems to be a proximate and short-term phenomenon and one direct and observable consequence of the Euro crisis. Thus its use as a proxy variable for the crisis and its effects on naturalization seem conceptually appropriate.

valuable for some intra-EU migrants than relying on the rights and privileges of EU citizenship derived from one's old passport.

Second, the relative value of retaining citizenship in the country of origin (non-citizenship in the country of settlement) has decreased. The acute effects of the Euro crisis may have increased the economic benefits of naturalization for many immigrants within the EU. Although migration flows are also often closely tied to the business cycle and migrants are among the most vulnerable during recessions like the Euro crisis (Orrenius and Zavodny 2009, 1-2) many intra-EU migrants may be less inclined to return home.

Figure 6.3: Distrust of the EU, by Select Region



Source: European Commission. 1995-2014. *Standard Eurobarometer*, Nos. 54-57, 59-82. Brussels; European Commission. 2001-2004. *Candidate countries Eurobarometer (CCEB),* Nos. 2001, 2002, 2003.2, 2003.3, 2004.1. Brussels.

Figure 6.4: Average Pre- and Post-Crisis Distrust and Unemployment Rates, by Region



Source: Distrust levels from Standard Eurobarometer and Candidate Countries Eurobarometer, European Commission (1995-2014) and European Commission (2001-2004); Unemployment rates from Eurostat (2015g). Pre-crisis averages reflect years 2000-2009, post-crisis years reflect years 2010-2014.

Figure 6.5: Unemployment Rate, by Select Region



Source: Eurostat (2015g).

Because many European countries continue to suffer under the yoke of austerity, anemic growth, and high unemployment, the return migration that often occurs during times of recession may be an undesirable option, as the economies of many countries of origin may be even worse off than those in the country of residence (Papademetriou and Terrazas 2009; Papademetriou et al. 2010). Indeed, as Figure 6.4 and 6.5 reveal, the unemployment rate in many EU migrants' region of origin makes the prospect of returning home relatively unappealing in the post-crisis years. Furthermore, in terms of access to welfare assistance, EU migrants may also qualify for more social benefits by naturalizing in their country of residence than remaining bound to precarious welfare systems back home. As formulated in hypothesis H.D2, rather than return to dismal economic prospects at home, many EU migrants with established lives in another member state may rationally opt for new citizenship, perceiving little value in the rights afforded them by their national passport or EU citizenship abroad. If there is a 'citizenship premium' in the host country that non-citizens do not receive – citizens are perceived to earn more, achieve higher status, or are more upwardly mobile in a competitive labor market than non-citizens – the economically motivated migrant may opt for naturalization to earn this potential premium (DeVoretz 2008; OECD 2011, 17-18). The rights and privileges of EU national abroad may not be enough during a time when post-crisis competition for stable and upwardly mobile employment is fierce.

Because it punctuated recent European history so dramatically and had such continental economic and political effects, the Euro crisis serves as a unique critical juncture within which to evaluate the theoretical framework of this dissertation.

First, I expect that as uncertainty and distrust of political institutions in one's country of origin increases,[52] especially in response to the Euro crisis, migrants should be less inclined to remain politically attached to these institutions. I thus expect increased demand for citizenship among EU migrants in their respective countries of residence. However, distrust in the country of residence should be associated with fewer acquisitions, since this may indicate depressed confidence in the political stability or status of that country and its passport within the EU. Thus the two should have opposite effects. If political distrust of the EU is positively associated with demand for citizenship abroad where distrust of national-level institutions is not, this would suggest that the perceived value of EU citizenship itself has declined and not simply one's national citizenship. Confirmation of this hypotheses would offer some support to the idea that the crisis has changed the perceived value of citizenship and altered aggregate for it.

Second, the crisis has yielded economic recession and distressingly high levels of unemployment in migrants' countries of origin compared to the years before it, which should likewise incentivize citizenship acquisition among intra-EU migrants. Specifically, the economic context in the country of origin should be inversely related to citizenship acquisition. Economically stronger countries of origin should be associated with fewer naturalizations, not only because in these contexts there is less economic and political incentive to be gained from

[52] Of course, the crisis has unleashed and exacerbated many political sentiments in addition to uncertainty and political distrust, and uncertainty and distrust may also be caused by factors other than the crisis. However, from the evidence presented above, measuring political distrust as one sentiment to capture the political consequences of the Euro crisis in home and destination member states seems conceptually justifiable and highly relevant to the years under analysis.

naturalization, but also because the prospects of returning home to such an economy are not as discouraging. As the economy of origin becomes worse, however, migrants should have greater incentive to naturalize because the perceived gains from naturalizing abroad increase over the benefits of remaining a national tied first and foremost to their economy of origin. Reversing the logic, as the economy of one's country of residence worsens, return migration may be a more viable strategy for intra-EU migrants than putting down roots in an economically unstable country. Confirmation of these hypotheses would also lend credence to the broader theory that the economic benefits of acquiring another national citizenship trump the current value of EU citizenship.

Finally, I hypothesize that the effects of the crisis should be highly contingent on the countries of origin and destination during the crisis. This means first and foremost that the effects of the crisis should vary across different groups of intra-EU migrants, with the strongest effects associated with migrants from the most crisis-stricken parts of Europe, and no effect for those from less affected regions. In destination countries, I expect that aggregate acquisitions among intra-EU migrants should increase in the years following the crisis in countries that have weathered the crisis most successfully. However, in the GIIPS countries – those most severely affected countries of the European periphery – we should observe overall relatively fewer acquisitions during the crisis years. This is because the crisis has left a level of economic and political uncertainty in its wake that largely negates any economic or political advantage of acquiring new national citizenship. Other strategies like return migration or migration to more stable countries should be most beneficial

than citizenship acquisition in an economically and politically precarious country context.

Assessing the Effects of the Euro Crisis on Naturalization

To compare how naturalization trends have changed as a consequence of the Euro crisis, I collected data on migration flows, stocks of foreign population, and citizenship acquisitions in fourteen Western European countries between 2000 and 2013.[53] Most of this demographic data comes from a combination of national statistical offices (Appendix A), Eurostat (Eurostat 2015a, 2015d, 2015e), and the OECD's *International Migration Database* (OECD 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). While some sources were more or less incomplete for certain selected countries, for the most part the significant comparability among them corroborated the reliability of the data gathered. Unfortunately, for a few country-years in the sample, notably France and the United Kingdom, there were higher levels of missing data in the population statistics whose omission might bias the estimates in the following analysis. Rather than omit these two important European countries and lose observations in an already small sample, I used the Amelia II program by Honaker et al. (2009; Honaker and King 2010) appropriate for time series cross-sectional analyses to multiply impute the missing values (m=15). With the completed datasets, I conducted a series of pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions in these countries

[53] I exclude Greece and Ireland from the analysis because of the lack of data regarding these subpopulations. Thus the countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. While Norway is admittedly not a member of the European Union, it is a member of the Schengen area and EU and Norwegian nationals may travel passport-free across their shared border. For this reason its inclusion in this analysis is not theoretically problematic.

over the period in question. To deal with potential heteroskedasticity across country-years, I employ robust standard errors.[54] Below I describe how I operationalize the variables in my analysis.

I gathered data for three groups of immigrants: all EU migrants, GIIPS nationals, and A-12 nationals. Assessing citizenship acquisition among these subgroups of intra-EU migrants enables an important test of the potentially disparate effects of the Euro crisis on different migrants. If the benefits of EU citizenship have largely eliminated the incentive to acquire the citizenship of another EU state, we should observe few significant effects among the explanatory variables in all-EU migrant models. Because post-crisis political and economic trajectories of the GIIPS and A-12 countries have differed before and after the crisis, and have been observably worse among the former, we might reasonably expect that the theorized dynamics of the Euro crisis to be more observable among the former and less so among the latter.

Unlike previously, I use the number of citizenship acquisitions in a given country-year rather than the naturalization rate as my dependent variable, with size of the respective immigration population included as a control variable.[55] My

[54] In addition to using robust standard errors, I re-run the same analyses on the smaller, non-imputed dataset using panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) advocated by Beck and Katz (1995). Although not shown, the conclusions from this alternative specification are broadly similar to the findings using the presented models unless otherwise noted.

[55] The choice to rely on the number of acquisitions per country-year rather than naturalization rates per country-year (total number of citizenship acquisition/intra-EU migrant population) may seem questionable, in that it could bias the analysis due to differences in relative sizes of intra-EU migrant populations. Unfortunately, due to the relatively small magnitude of the naturalization rates among these subpopulations, the dependent variable is not very sensitive to changes in the dependent variables included here. Rather than including population size as a control in the denominator of the dependent variable, I therefore include it as an independent control variable, which should address concerns about bias.

primary independent variables represent measures of specific economic and political correlates of the crisis that best approximate its nature. Variables for distrust of the EU, distrust of national parliaments, national unemployment rates, foreign unemployment rates, and change in GDP per capita in each country-year for the country of settlement seem to be reasonable indicators of the Euro crisis generally. The distrust variables are drawn from annual Eurobarometer surveys conducted by the European Commission (1995-2014) and are percentages of the national population expressing distrust of the EU in a given year.[56] Economic variables were drawn from Eurostat (Eurostat 2015b, 2015c, 2015g). From these I calculate a series of weighted distrust, unemployment, and GDP change measures for the EU, GIIPS, and A-12 regions that adjust these figures according to the size and composition of the immigrant population in that country-year.[57] Aggregate levels of distrust and unemployment in the region of origin (country of residence)

[56] The survey question reads, "I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: The European Union?" Because Eurobarometer did not conduct its surveys in Norway, the distrust scores were included as either imputed values or as averages of the other Scandinavian countries in the sample. Neither specification changed the results. A-12 trust levels were drawn from the separate Candidate Countries Eurobarometer surveys from 2001 to 2003 (European Commission 2001-2004) and from Standard Eurobarometer surveys (European Commission 1995-2014) for the remaining years.

[57] For example, the weighted GIIPS distrust value for Germany in a given year is the average of the distrust levels in Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain weighted by the relative size of each population of nationals living in Germany in that year. In this way, we capture a respective distrust level perceived by that population of GIIPS nationals in their region of origin. This makes no assumption that naturalizing GIIPS migrants share this same degree of distrust as co-nationals at home, but rather that the reported levels of distrust at home are at least perceptible to these migrant abroad and sufficient enough to inspire some of them to acquire citizenship acquisition abroad. For country-years for which data was unavailable, the relative weights were interpolated based on relative population figures and projections in available adjacent years. Although interpolation results in more imprecise country-year weights, there is no reason to expect that the loss of precision in a given country-year introduces bias into the relative weighting of the variables.

should be positively (negatively) associated with acquisitions abroad, while annual GDP change in the region of origin should be inversely related. In one model I include a *Crisis* categorical variable with three levels: 0 for all country-years from 2000 to 2008, 1 for non-GIIPS country-years from 2009 to 2013, and 2 for GIIPS country-years from 2009 to 2013. If the theory is correct, we should observe a positive effect in non-GIIPS post-crisis country-years as migrant demand for citizenship increases, and a negative effect for GIIPS post-crisis country-years where migrant demand falls, compared to the baseline country-years before the crisis. To capture any independent effects of the GIIPS countries on citizenship acquisition, I include a *GIIPS* dummy variable for the Spain, Italy, and Portugal observations in several models.

I include the ICCI index as a control for institutional context. I also control for the size of the corresponding immigrant population, given very disparate population sizes across countries, as well as the migrant inflow in each country-year where appropriate.[58] I include *logged GDP per capita* for the country of residence as an economic control as well. For the all-EU and A-12 models, a final dummy variable represents the two recent rounds of Enlargement during which demand for citizenship may have changed more idiosyncratically, coded for the years 2004/2005 and 2007/2008 respectively.

[58] Immigrant inflows are highly correlated with and are often predicted by other explanatory variables in the models, especially immigrant population size, which introduces multicollinearity into the many of the models. This variable is therefore omitted in models where this is the case.

Analysis and Results

The distrust models for all immigrants, GIIPS nationals, and A-12 nationals are summarized in Tables 6.5 and 6.6 below. Model 0 in both tables represents the baseline model for each group without any of the main explanatory variables included, while subsequent models add the explanatory variables of interest to test the various hypotheses generated by the theory. Model 1 for each group captures broadly the average aggregate differences in acquisitions across various country-years after the Euro crisis compared to the pre-crisis country-years. For the most part these differences are significant across the different EU national populations. Acquisitions in non-GIIPS countries during crisis years are significantly higher for all EU migrants and GIIPS nationals compared to pre-crisis years, while among all intra-EU, GIIPS, and A-12 nationals in Spain, Portugal, and Italy, there are significantly fewer acquisitions compared to pre-crisis years. The years after the Euro crisis are thus associated with more acquisitions on average in the northern European countries, and fewer in the more troubled periphery. These two findings together suggest that the intervention of the Euro crisis has made the acquisition of citizenship in the country of residence more attractive intra-EU migrants, despite their status as EU citizens. While the difference in A-12 acquisitions in GIIPS post-crisis country-years is on average lower than before the Euro crisis, it is neither positive nor significant. Instead, the crisis years seem to shift the number of acquisitions downward, regardless of destination. This result is unsurprising, given that many A-12 migrants were recent post-enlargement arrivals and thus not yet eligible for citizenship. Also, since the crisis has not been as devastating for many A-12 countries as it has for the GIIPS countries, many A-12 nationals simply

Table 6.5: Estimated Effects of Distrust on Intra-EU Migrant Citizenship Acquisition

DV: Citizenship Acquisitions Among:	All EU Migrants						
	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5, FE)	(6, FE)
Migrant Population	0.0046*** (0.0006)	0.0047*** (0.0005)	0.0048*** (0.0005)	0.0049*** (0.0006)	0.0042*** (0.0006)	0.0033*** (0.00095)	0.0030*** (0.00095)
Citizenship Policy	-299.3*** (65.2)	-339.1*** (60.2)	-354.9*** (53.8)	-336.3*** (56.9)	-426.4*** (76.3)	-31.3 (141.1)	-217.5 (159.9)
Country GDPpc (Log)	1567.6*** (405.3)	181.6 (415.5)	-1460.7** (660.6)	-1115.2 (695.5)	-2293.9*** (808.4)		
Enlargement	241.8 (512.2)		564.4 (483.9)	300.6 (518.7)	411.8 (478.5)	557.9* (304.2)	155.4 (306.8)
GIIPS			-4446.9*** (1094.1)	-4072.4*** (1036.5)	-4808.0*** (1060.3)		
Crisis (Non-GIIPS)		1528.0*** (456.0)					
Crisis (GIIPS)		-3532.0*** (1344.9)					
Distrust of EU, Country of Residence			-48.6 (30.7)			-15.3 (30.2)	
Weighted Distrust of EU, Region of Origin			91.6** (40.0)			77.0* (45.2)	
Trust in EU, Country of Residence				44.4* (25.2)			
Weighted Trust in EU, Region of Origin				-38.9 (43.3)			
Distrust of Parliament, Country of Residence					-29.0† (41.1)		-70.5** (29.4)
Weighted Distrust of Parliament, Origin					105.7*** (40.3)		106.1*** (29.0)
Constant	-13217*** (4173.2)	1284.1 (4360.3)	17699.3** (7149.1)	15331.5** (7132.4)	24361.4*** (8478.7)	-2338.2 (1756.2)	-870.4 (1913.1)
Observations (n)	196	196	196	196	196	196	196
Average R^2	0.51	0.57	0.59	0.58	0.60	0.82	0.83
Adj. Average R^2	0.50	0.56	0.57	0.57	0.58	0.80	0.81
F	29.79 (4, 187.3)	37.15 (5, 187.1)	27.95 (7, 184.5)	26.61 (7, 184.8)	29.41 (7, 184.9)	57.55 (17, 172.1)	63.96 (17, 171.9)

Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ †=Estimated coefficients achieve significance at the p<0.05 level in the equivalent non-imputed model.

Table 6.6: Estimated Effects of Distrust on GIIPS and A12 Migrant Citizenship Acquisition

DV: Citizenship Acquisitions Among:	GIIPS Migrants					A12 Migrants				
	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(0)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migrant Population	0.0055*** (0.00063)	0.0067*** (0.0012)	0.0052*** (0.00061)	0.0055*** (0.00061)	0.0052*** (0.00070)	0.0051*** (0.00086)	0.0029** (0.0011)	0.0065*** (0.00077)	0.0061*** (0.00080)	0.0062*** (0.00086)
Citizenship Policy	-194.4*** (39.7)	-169.3*** (37.9)	-218.6*** (36.8)	-217.9*** (36.7)	-212.1*** (38.4)	37.6 (51.1)	-72.8** (32.9)	-10.3 (39.5)	0.63 (39.2)	-9.20 (47.1)
Country GDPpc (Log)	387.8*** (146.3)	-24.2 (161.0)	-856.2*** (242.4)	-817.5*** (264.5)	-720.8** (314.5)	-109.7 (269.6)	97.4 (248.4)	-2432.2*** (404.9)	-2287.3*** (401.5)	-2549.9*** (503.4)
Enlargement						75.6 (339.6)	-582.1* (296.2)	134.2 (283.7)	193.5 (288.5)	171.0 (319.3)
GIIPS			-1831.5*** (288.7)	-1621.0*** (301.3)	-1168.1*** (305.2)			-3895.8*** (604.2)	-3645.6*** (562.4)	-3779.3*** (541.9)
Crisis (Non-GIIPS)		542.4* (276.6)					-363.7 (260.7)			
Crisis (GIIPS)		-559.3*** (184.8)					-1867.2** (844.6)			
Distrust of EU, Country of Residence			-42.5*** (10.7)					-8.92 (18.5)		
Weighted Distrust of EU, Region of Origin			31.4*** (7.62)					-7.31 (17.3)		
Trust in EU, Country of Residence				53.7*** (9.54)					-14.4 (13.4)	
Weighted Trust in EU, Region of Origin				-30.4*** (8.64)					26.3 (20.2)	

Table 6.6 (Continued)

Distrust of Parliament, Country of Residence					-8.09 (14.2)					-0.37 (16.9)
Weighted Distrust of Parliament, Origin					15.5 (9.91)					4.07 (14.6)
Inflows		-0.034 (0.024)					0.019*** (0.0034)			
Constant	-2516.0* (1489.7)	1578.6 (1638.0)	11696.1*** (2786.7)	9552.2*** (2811.7)	8881.8** (3548.9)	1758.3 (2683.3)	387.6 (2547.8)	27249.7*** (4239.6)	24215.7*** (4391.6)	27637.9*** (5165.4)
Observations (n)	196	196	196	196	196	196	196	196	196	196
Average R^2	0.56	0.62	0.60	0.62	0.58	0.41	0.65	0.58	0.58	0.57
Adj. Average R^2	0.56	0.61	0.59	0.61	0.57	0.39	0.64	0.56	0.56	0.56
F	31.20 (3, 186.8)	12.58 (6, 140.4)	26.67 (6, 180.9)	22.52 (6, 183.2)	22.04 (6, 179.5)	9.23 (4, 189)	33.43 (7, 185.7)	18.53 (7, 186.0)	20.62 (7, 185.9)	18.44 (7, 186.0)

Standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
† Estimated coefficients achieve significance at the p<0.05 level in the equivalent non-imputed model.

considered return migration a better option, regardless of country of residence.

The remaining models in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 report various estimated effects of distrust on citizenship acquisition during the period. The distrust hypotheses find strong confirmation in the results. For both all-EU migrants and GIIPS migrants, increasing levels of distrust in the EU reported in other EU countries and in the GIIPS region are associated with statistically significant increases in citizenship acquisitions, while the opposite association results from increasing levels of distrust in the EU reported in the country of residence (Model 2, both tables). It is especially striking that this phenomenon is statistically significant among all EU migrants, which supports the more general hypothesis that acquiring national citizenship still matters in spite of the legal and political evolution of EU citizenship in recent years. Furthermore, the seemingly small coefficients are not inconsequential. For example, for every additional percentage point increase in weighted aggregate distrust in the GIIPS countries, we should expect 31 more acquisitions among GIIPS nationals abroad in an average country-year, holding all other variables constant. Given that distrust of the EU in the GIIPS countries increased by roughly 33 percentage points from 2008 to 2013, as seen in Figure 6.2, this is in fact a quite sizable number of acquisitions.[59] The estimate for origin region distrust among intra-EU migrants is also significant in the fixed effects model which controls for individual countries (Model 5). However, distrust also seems to have

[59] As a robustness check, I ran the same models (Model 3) with aggregate weighted trust variables instead of distrust and the results are very similar. In addition, to address concerns that measuring distrust in the EU may be a conceptually problematic indicator of the crisis and to disentangle it from preexisting distrust sentiments, I ran these models with a variable measuring the difference between the annual distrust level and the baseline level in 2000. This also had little significant effect on the conclusions drawn from these results.

had little effect on acquisitions among A-12 nationals. This result could likewise be due to the fact that levels of reported distrust remain much lower in the A-12 countries than in the EU or GIIPS countries, as Figure 6.2 demonstrates, or they may constitute large populations in countries like Italy and Spain where distrust of the EU is an even stronger deterrent to naturalization than origin country distrust is an incentive.

How do we know that the culprit is a lack of confidence in the EU as an institution rather than a general lack of confidence in the country of origin? In other words, it may be that these estimated effects on changes in the number of citizenship acquisitions actually result from growing uncertainty about political institutions back home, such as parliaments, rather than specific misgivings about the EU. Unfortunately, these two sentiments are highly correlated, and therefore comparing their relative effects in the same model is not possible. Nonetheless, to provide an indirect comparison, I rerun the same models with similar weighted distrust measures of the national parliaments in the regions of origin, and if this alternative hypothesis were true, we would expect the results to at least approximate the previous results. The results are reported in Models 4 and 6 for all EU migrants in Table 6.5 and Model 4 for the GIIPS and A-12 nationals in Table 6.6.[60] Beginning with all EU migrants, let us first compare Models 2 with 4. The estimated effects of the two pairs of variables are indeed very similar. Holding all else constant, for a one percentage point increase in aggregate weighted distrust of

[60] This variable was drawn from the same Eurobarometer surveys and coded equivalently. The survey question reads, "I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? The [Nationality] Parliament?"

national parliaments we can expect a significant increase of approximately 106 additional acquisitions by intra-EU nationals, which is slightly larger in magnitude than the predicted acquisitions associated with a similar increase in distrust of the EU. Comparing fixed effects Models 5 and 6 reveal similar correlations, although distrust of the parliament in the country of residence is also significant in Model 6. From this we might tentatively conclude that the relationship between general distrust and uncertainty about the political situation at home – regardless of institution – and broad acquisition trends among EU migrants as a consequence of the crisis lends support to H.D3 about the demand for citizenship.

However, comparing Models 2 and 4 for both the GIIPS and A-12 nationals casts some doubt on this alternative hypothesis. Changing levels of distrust of the national parliament in neither the region of origin nor country of residence are associated with a change in citizenship acquisitions among these populations. While this non-finding is expected in the respective A-12 model, it is quite surprising in the model for GIIPS nationals: after all, this is precisely the region of the EU where we would most expect distrust and uncertainty of all forms to be most salient and observable. Rather, it appears that distrust of only the EU has a statistically significant correlation with citizenship acquisitions by GIIPS nationals. We can therefore interpret this as evidence, albeit tentative, that among those hardest hit by the Euro crisis, it is not simply general distrust and uncertainty wrought by the crisis, but specific distrust and uncertainty directed *toward the EU in particular*, that is associated with changes in their citizenship acquisitions.

Turning to Table 6.7 and 6.8, which reports the estimated effects of economic factors on citizenship acquisitions, the economic hypotheses seems to find confirmation as well. From Model 1 across the two tables, we see that the weighted EU and GIIPS unemployment rates are associated with a large and significant increase in citizenship acquisitions among EU nationals. While the weighted unemployment rate in the A-12 region is also signed as expected, the association does not achieve significance. In the country of residence, conversely, there is a significant negative correlation between the unemployment rate and acquisitions for all EU migrants and A-12 nationals, yet not for GIIPS nationals. This further strengthens the notion that high unemployment in the country of residence inspires return migration rather than naturalization, with immigrants exiting difficult economic times rather than weathering them as new citizens. This may especially explain the significant finding for A-12 nationals, the population whose migratory patterns in Western Europe have been so highly responsive to enlargement and the subsequent Euro crisis. However, it may also reflect the fact that many European countries include financial conditions, such as employment, income, and welfare use, in their requirements for citizenship acquisition, and thus many immigrants may be indirectly disqualified by these policies as a side effect of the Euro crisis. Foreign unemployment rates in the country of residence seem to offer a more mixed picture. For A-12 nationals, a higher foreign unemployment rate is still associated with a lower number of naturalizations, suggesting unemployment disincentivizes citizenship acquisition. Yet among all EU nationals, the estimated effect is not significant, and for GIIPS nationals, the foreign unemployment rate is even positive

Table 6.7: Estimated Effects of Economic Factors on Intra-EU Citizenship Acquisitions

DV: Citizenship Acquisitions among:	All EU Migrants					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5, FE)	(6, FE)
Migrant Population	0.0048*** (0.00046)	0.0046*** (0.00049)	0.0045*** (0.00052)	0.0045*** (0.00051)	0.0041*** (0.0011)	0.0031*** (0.00080)
Citizenship Policy	-429.8*** (62.8)	-327.2*** (59.3)	-315.8*** (61.3)	-314.8*** (60.2)	88.1 (130.3)	18.3 (138.1)
Country GDPpc (Log)	-2164.7*** (634.8)	-1256.9 (820.9)	-1082.1 (681.3)	-1205.8* (679.9)		
Enlargement	576.2 (467.5)	259.8 (467.0)	312.0 (480.9)	476.4 (485.8)	118.0 (314.7)	453.4 (284.5)
GIIPS	-2648.4*** (949.2)	-3761.6*** (993.6)	-3751.8*** (987.3)	-3788.1*** (997.4)		
Unemployment, Country of Residence	-334.5*** (106.2)	-201.2* (114.2)				
Weighted Unemployment. Region of Origin	732.9*** (160.6)					324.3** (139.9)
Foreign Unemployment, Country of Residence		-32.1 (59.7)				
Country GDP Change			-18.6 (78.8)			
Origin Weighted GDP Change				-122.7 (98.4)		
Constant	23004.8*** (6700.1)	17486.4* (9142.0)	15232.1** (7162.3)	16682.1** (7170.2)	-445.4 (1569.1)	-3156.8* (1728.7)
Observations (n)	196	196	196	196	196	196
Number of Imputations (m)	15	15	15	15	15	15
Average R-squared	0.64	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.82	0.81
Adjusted Average R-squared	0.63	0.56	0.56	0.57	0.80	0.80
F	33.44 (7, 183.6)	29.76 (6, 184.9)	29.99 (6, 185.7)	30.18 (6, 185.5)	73.82 (16, 174.0)	78.81 (16, 174.1)

Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

Table 6.8: Estimated Effects of Economic Factors on GIIPS and A12 Citizenship Acquisitions

DV: Citizenship Acquisitions among:	GIIPS Migrants				A12 Migrants			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Migrant Population	0.0051*** (0.0006)	0.0050*** (0.0006)	0.0051*** (0.0006)	0.0050*** (0.0006)	0.0072*** (0.0007)	0.0067*** (0.0006)	0.0064*** (0.0007)	0.0063*** (0.0007)
Citizenship Policy	-205.4*** (39.4)	-181.3*** (37.7)	-199.7*** (38.3)	-206.3*** (38.4)	-60.6 (41.8)	-53.7 (39.5)	-0.49 (39.8)	-7.44 (39.3)
Country GDPpc (Log)	-611.5** (259.3)	-247.0 (274.3)	-473.6* (269.7)	-699.7** (273.5)	-2844.8*** (407.5)	-3134.6*** (431.2)	-2511.1*** (375.6)	-2454.6*** (370.7)
Enlargement					178.8 (328.4)	112.2 (297.5)	100.3 (299.6)	22.3 (302.6)
GIIPS	-1234.3*** (279.5)	-1149.9*** (291.5)	-1192.4*** (272.8)	-1313.5*** (280.2)	-3196.5*** (490.6)	-4023.0*** (524.8)	-3707.7*** (515.2)	-3749.9*** (516.3)
Unemployment, Country of Residence	-13.6 (24.8)				-207.9*** (69.0)			
Weighted Unemp., Region of Origin	46.6** (22.0)				65.0 (50.7)			
Foreign Unemployment, Country of Residence		40.2** (18.1)				-94.8*** (32.6)		
Country GDP Change			-28.7 (39.4)				90.7* (49.7)	
Origin Weighted GDP Change				-90.9** (45.3)				61.2 (43.7)
Constant	7867.4*** (2869.4)	3805.5 (3013.5)	6840.1** (2926.0)	9313.2*** (2987.2)	31760.4*** (4573.1)	35477.9*** (4650.0)	27282.2*** (3795.7)	26688.6*** (3759.7)
Observations (n)	196	196	196	196	196	196	196	196
Average R^2	0.58	0.59	0.58	0.59	0.62	0.61	0.58	0.58
Adjusted Average R^2	0.57	0.58	0.57	0.58	0.60	0.59	0.57	0.57
F	18.44 (6, 178.7)	19.51 (5, 181.8)	17.59 (5, 177.5)	20.95 (5, 178.9)	26.60 (7, 186.0)	29.67 (6, 187.0)	21.64 (6, 187.0)	21.49 (6, 187.0)

Standard errors in parentheses;
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

and significant, which runs counter to the theorized direction.

Finally, only annual GDP change in the GIIPS region has a significant effect on acquisition. In this case, for a one percent increase in annual GDP growth in the GIIPS region, there are approximately 90 fewer naturalizations among GIIPS nationals in a country-year, if all other variables are fixed. Conversely, as GDP growth falls – due to the Euro crisis or otherwise – we can expect a corresponding increase in naturalizations among these migrants. Given the sharp negative growth rates in this region after 2008, this result is most expected and offers some confirmation of the hypothesis, even if the effect is not significant among the other two populations. In terms of changes in resident country GDP growth, this factor only achieves significance among A-12 nationals, suggesting stronger economic growth might incentivize citizenship acquisitions. However, this variable's lack of significance among the other populations suggests it is not an important predictor of citizenship acquisition among most Europeans generally.

Discussion and Conclusion

This final section has examined the relationship between the Euro crisis and citizenship acquisition trends across the EU in order to illustrate more uniquely how the theoretical framework might operate, even among a population for whom such incentives to naturalize should be relatively small. The prevailing assumption in the literature has been that Europeans prior to the Euro crisis were much more disinclined to acquire the citizenship of another EU country *because their status as non-citizens – whether due to the freedom of mobility made possible by Schengen or the slow but steady accumulation of rights that derive from EU citizenship – renders*

citizenship in the country of residency largely inconsequential. This disincentivizing effect of EU citizenship on naturalization among intra-EU migrants has not been surprising. However, the statistical analysis in this article reveals that the Euro crisis and its political and economic consequences seem to have re-incentivized citizenship acquisition among EU nationals living in other European countries because the value of their citizenship in their country of origin has changed vis-à-vis that of their country of settlement. Many of the consequences of the crisis – rising levels of political distrust, economic uncertainties about the future of the Eurozone or a country's future in it, continued economic malaise and austerity - have apparently reaffirmed the value of national citizenship acquisition among all intra-EU migrants. However, it seems the effects vary by the population. On the one hand, distrust of the EU in both the region of origin and country of residence has observable and significant effects on most populations under study. On the other hand, poor economic indicators in the regions of origin seem to incentivize citizenship acquisition among most intra-EU migrants, while the same indicators in the country of residence have more ambiguous effects. Compared to the other populations, A-12 nationals appear either less sensitive to potential economic incentives of citizenship acquisition, or simply more prone to return to their country of origin.

In the absence of individual-level data, systematic qualitative evidence from these different migrant populations would be necessary to identify the precise causal mechanisms at work and further substantiate the conclusions drawn here. Given the reliance on aggregate-level data, then, how can we be certain that

individual-level demographic profiles of the intra-EU migrants in question are not driving these trends? This was partly accounted for in the use of three different migrant populations, since migrants from each region of analysis share very similar demographics. However, in the wake of the Euro crisis, might simply young, highly educated migrants be moving to these more stable countries of the European core and naturalizing in higher numbers, thus accounting for the trends observed here? This is plausible, but there are two reasons to doubt this is driving the findings in the analysis. First, by my calculation using existing citizenship laws, the average length of residence required to acquire citizenship in the 14 countries under analysis is between five and six years. Hence, even if a wave of young, educated GIIPS nationals began migrating into these countries in 2009, the earliest they would be eligible for naturalization would be 2014 (notwithstanding some exceptions for familial relations). The same reasoning generally holds for A-12 nationals who first began migrating in large numbers throughout the EU in 2006 and 2007: this wave would first achieve eligibility for citizenship in 2011 or 2012 at the earliest. These dates are generally too late to have any observable effect on acquisitions in the period under analysis. Instead, by this logic, it is ostensibly permanently settled long-term migrants driving these citizenship acquisition patterns rather than highly mobile, short-term migrants.

Second, even if this new post-crisis wave of young, educated economic migrants were driving some component of the findings here, most were inspired to migrate by the crisis itself and its political and economic effects, not by the allure of acquiring new nationality abroad. Thus even if they were eligible for citizenship

after the crisis began, the more relevant variables accounting for their acquiring of citizenship derive from conditions in their country of origin and country of destination rather than their demographic profile per se. Without the political and economic incentives fostered by the crisis, neither their migration nor naturalization would arguably have occurred. It thus seems unlikely that demographic variables correlated with the crisis itself and omitted in the aggregate-level analysis account for the findings here.

One could also question whether it is the changing value of the citizenship rights of intra-EU migrants in the country of settlement, or the growing insecurity of these citizenship rights, that is driving the results. In other words, recent legal limitations on social and economic rights enjoyed by intra-EU migrants in a growing number of EU countries, rather than the renewed value of such rights associated with national citizenship, may be the cause of the naturalization trends observed here.[61] Indeed, a number of countries, such as the UK and Belgium, have attempted in recent years to prevent the full exercise of rights by intra-EU migrants. The European Commission (2013a) has also recognized the need for 'robust safeguards' that ensure intra-EU migrants do not abuse the rights afforded to them and that

[61] The mechanism underlying intra-EU naturalization patterns might also be one based on intra-EU migrants seeking not to gain particular rights but to avoid particular obligations. Specifically, intra-EU migrants may be responding to increased tax obligations in their countries of origin, and naturalization in other EU countries provides a means to avoid such financial obligations. In Greece, for example, governments of various political orientations beginning in 2010 have passed tax increases in attempts to boost government revenues and to qualify for additional bailout funds from EU and International Monetary Fund lenders. Although my empirical analysis is agnostic on the question of rights versus obligations and does not test for this possibility directly, these increases in tax rates themselves can be explained by the economic crisis in countries of origin, and hence my theoretical explanation about the crisis' impact on the changing value of future citizenship status within different contexts only becomes stronger.

protect the member states from 'unreasonable financial burdens' from claims of intra-EU migrants (5), leading some member states to consider restrictions on such benefits. To my knowledge, however, only in late 2013 did the UK government begin to plan and formulate limitations on EU migrant benefits, coinciding with similar policy discussions in other countries around the same time. The UK's bans on in-work benefits for intra-EU migrants would also only apply to arrivals after the law would come into effect. Furthermore, the Court of Justice of the EU (2014) in *Florin Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig* on Germany's right to refuse welfare benefits to economically inactive EU migrants was issued only in November 2014. However, the period of analysis of this paper temporally precedes these national-level discussions and court proceedings on citizenship rights restrictions, as well as any legal implementation that would be applicable for the naturalization trends I assess. Thus such concerns about the limited implementation of EU citizenship rights and growing restrictions on those rights is entirely consistent with the theory and expected to likewise be associated with increased acquisitions as the EU moves forward, but this does not seem to undermine the mechanism stressed here about the shifting value of non-citizenship and naturalization intensified by the crisis.

Finally, the qualitative research I have conducted across several northern European countries supports the general theoretical mechanism advanced here: acquiring the citizenship of the country of settlement may be a strategic form of political and economic insurance as well as a source of socioeconomic advantage in a difficult post-crisis labor market. According to one naturalization official in Berlin, long-time residents from the EU's crisis countries "have often explained that they

don't want to be viewed as those immigrants now coming from those countries… they want to set themselves apart from those now arriving for work. This has meant more applications filed by long-term residents from Greece and Spain, for example."[62] Other interviews conducted among naturalization officials from different cities in the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria confirmed this discernible uptick in naturalization inquiries and applications from individuals from Greece, Italy, and Spain despite often diminishing numbers of applications overall. Several Greek- and Italian-born naturalizing residents of Germany, for example, also affirmed to me that their primary motivation for naturalization was the discouraging prospect of returning to either country of origin in the wake of the Euro crisis.[63] Similar trends, for ostensibly similar strategic reasons, seem to be occurring in the wake of a potential Brexit, as British migrants throughout Europe begin applying for additional passports while intra-EU migrants in Britain have done similarly.

What does this analysis reveal about the economic and political context of naturalization decisions in Europe, especially in the shadow of the Euro crisis? The analysis performed in this final section seems to offer strong evidence to accept both hypotheses H.D2 and H.D3, with clear evidence of certain economic and political factors structuring patterns of citizenship acquisition that have either been overlooked or found to be relatively insignificant in previous analyses. The crisis context has at least moderated the aversion of intra-EU migrants toward acquiring

[62] Anonymous interview #1001 with naturalization officer, Staatsangehörigkeitsbehörde Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg (Berlin, July 5, 2014).
[63] Anonymous semi-structured interviews with naturalizing immigrants were conducted in Germany during the summer of 2013 and 2014.

citizenship in another European country: indeed, acquisition patterns reflect economic and political dynamics in one's country of origin and settlement. By this logic, the economic and political factors captured in the models represent many EU migrants' uncertainty and loss of confidence in their own country, or confidence in their country of settlement. Hence a new citizenship abroad apparently offers more net value than one's previous citizenship status, and remaining a non-citizen in the future, for an intra-EU migrant would only bear the additional hassle of acquiring another EU member state's citizenship if that new status offered a benefit not already guaranteed by the previous nationality and EU citizenship.

Combining this analysis with the analysis of naturalization rates across all fifteen countries earlier in the chapter, we can conclude that the hypotheses that derived from the theory seem to find strong confirmation. Questions of economic context and citizenship status seem to strongly structure the immigrant demand for citizenship, while the national citizenship policy, the political orientation of governments, and the degree of policy discretion structures the political supply of citizenship. Together both intervene in the naturalization process to affect citizenship acquisitions at the national level across countries and across time. In the following and penultimate chapter, I turn my attention to the subnational level where I will examine quantitative and qualitative evidence of the same dynamics in Germany and Austria.

Chapter 7: Assessing the Local Integration Context: A Subnational Examination of Naturalization Rates in Germany and Austria

Up to this point, I have argued that the integration context of naturalization in Europe – specifically the forces undergirding the immigrant demand for citizenship and the political supply of citizenship – structure equilibrium naturalization rates in a given year. In the previous chapter I presented detailed statistical evidence in support of my theoretical framework, showing the effects of both immigrant demand and political supply on naturalization rates using panel data across 15 countries and some 40 years in Europe. However explaining cross-national variation in naturalization provides no definitive answer to these questions, in large part because the countries under study vary in ways that cannot be accounted for in the statistical models presented above. Disentangling naturalization rates among disparately organized and selected immigrant populations as well as isolating the effects of citizenship policy from the institutional jumble of incorporation regimes that vary cross-nationally and subnationally poses problems for comparison. Furthermore, relying on national-level data necessarily requires the analyst to gloss over the more proximate determinants of naturalization that may be significant but are often obscured or indistinguishable in cross-national comparisons, what Rokkan (1970) long ago termed "whole-nation bias." In the case of naturalization, it may only be the context of national policies, practices, and outcomes, but also the local context, that shapes the integration experience and provides the incentives to naturalize in a given country.

Thus in this final empirical chapter takes the empirical analysis beyond the cross-national and to the subnational level. Here I apply my theoretical framework

to a within-case analysis of naturalization at the *Land* (state) level in Germany and Austria. In what follows I first provide a qualitative snapshot of these two country cases under study to motivate the case selection. Then, in several statistical analyses across the sixteen German and nine Austrian *Länder* from 1990 to 2013, I employ many of the same economic and political variables from Chapter 6 used to operationalize immigrant demand and political supply at the cross-national level in order to assess the subnational variation in the context of the *Länder*. After discussing the results, I then supplement the findings with substantive qualitative evidence gleaned from interviews of policymakers and immigrants across the German and Austrian *Länder* conducted in the summers of 2013 and 2014. By combining this qualitative evidence with the statistical data, we find stronger evidence in favor of the theoretical framework that has been discussed throughout this project.

The Case of Germany and Austria

Although there might be other valid cases of study in which to conduct subnational analyses of naturalization in Europe, Germany and Austria are an ideal setting in which to conduct a within-case comparative analysis of these more local correlates of naturalization beyond the methodological considerations. From a theoretical and methodological standpoint, a within-case analysis of naturalization across the German and Austrian *Länder* offers several advantages. The two countries are very similar, not just linguistically, but also culturally, historically, and politically. Although they emerged in modern Europe along different trajectories – Germany through 19th century unification of disparate German-speaking provinces

scattered throughout hundreds of principalities and domains in central Europe, and Austria as the German-speaking remnant of a larger multiethnic and multilingual central European empire – much of their 20th century cultural and political histories are much closer intertwined. Indeed, during the Nazi period from 1938 to 1945, they were unified as a single entity through the *Anschluss*, and even shared the same citizenship policy: after the annexation until after the war, all people holding Austrian citizenship were automatically declared nationals of the German Reich (Stern and Valchars 2013, 7).

After the war, both reestablished their own citizenship policies, but along very similar trajectories. If any countries should typify the theoretical notion of exclusive and ethnocentric national approaches to citizenship (Brubaker 1992), it is Germany and Austria historically. Both have consistently received the label of restrictive, exclusive, prohibitive, and ethnocentric according to their highly circumscribed modes of conferring citizenship. Indeed, this is reflected in their extreme scores on the ICCI and their persistently demanding requirements for naturalization (despite some divergence in the last decade). Citizenship policies in both countries have throughout the last century included two main routes to access citizenship: through discretionary decision (*Ermessensentscheidung*)[64] and through legal entitlement (*Rechtsanspruch*).[65] For both countries, the distinction made has been critical: under the former, immigrants 'can' be naturalized if it is in the interest

[64] Section 8 of Germany's 1999 *Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*, Section 10 of Austria's 1965 *Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz.*

[65] Section 10 of Germany's 1999 *Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*, Section 13 of Austria's 1965 *Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz.*

of the federal state, while in the case of the latter, immigrants 'are to be' naturalized if they fulfill certain legally stipulated criteria.

For most of the 20th century German citizenship was based on the highly restrictive 1913 German Nationality Law (*Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*), which offered a common German nationality for all German nationals hold state-level citizenship and living within the Reich. After World War II, Germany maintained its highly ethnocentric citizenship policy due to political motivations related to the returning waves of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and later due to the need to retain national continuity with fellow Germans living in East Germany (Klusmeyer and Papademetriou 2009). This law enabled very little *Land*-level discretion over federal citizenship. When reforms came in 1990 and 1993, however, *Land*-level discretion over the interpretation of the new rights to naturalization grew (Hailbronner 2012, 4). By the time of Germany's 2000 citizenship law reform, the country's federal structure reserved a significant degree of power to the individual German *Länder* to implement and interpret this policy (Green 2005; Hofhansel 2008; Thränhardt 2008). Consequently, this permitted substantial variation in administering, processing, and deciding applications for citizenship, the outcome of which is portrayed in Figure 7.1. As we see from the figures, naturalization rates are consistently higher in Schleswig-Holstein, Bremen, Hamburg, and Hessen, while they remain quite low in Baden-Württemberg, Bayern, Berlin, and the former Eastern *Länder*. There are some noticeable increases in the former Eastern *Länder*, gradual declines in Niedersachsen, Nordrhein-Westphalen, and Schleswig-Holstein, and steady variability in Hessen, Rhineland-Pfalz, Saarland,

and Hamburg. As Worbs (2008, 21-22) highlights, almost two-thirds of naturalizations in 2007 occurred in Bayern, Baden-Württemberg, Nordrhein-Westfalen, and Hessen, although the highest rates occurred in Bremen, Schleswig-Holstein, Rheinland-Pfalz, and Niedersachsen. Naturalization rates among Turkish immigrants exhibit even greater variability across *Länder* and over time. In response to this federal divergence in implementing citizenship policy among the different federal states, more recent legislation has sought to harmonize the legal criteria for naturalization and circumscribe *Land*-level discretion. As a result of the 2007 Act Implementing EU Directives (*EU-Richtlinienumsetzungsgesetz*) as well as further administrative guidelines, the standardization among the *Länder* is much tighter today than in previous years (Green 2005, 931; Hofhansel 2008, 168, 179; Worbs 2008, 22; Howard 2008, 73; Thränhardt 2008), although the extent of the discretion at the Land-level remains disputed (Hailbronner 2012, 11).

In Austria, the discretionary power to decide immigrant naturalization was strong, and the administrative authorizes in the *Länder* enjoyed even more significant discretion over such decisions historically. In the citizenship law of 1925, Austrian citizenship was even conditional on holding the citizenship of the individual state (*Landesbürgerschaft*) in which one resided (Stern and Valchars 2013, 6). In many cases, the decisions for discretionary naturalization (*Ermessensentscheidung*) did not have to be justified legally by the state. However, as in the German case, the political and administrative discretion of the *Länder* has been slowly circumscribed over the postwar decades.

Figure 7.1: Naturalization Rates across the German and Austrian Länder



Naturalization decisions must now be justified and can be legally challenged in the Administrative Court, and the requirements and justifications for granting citizenship through both tracks are now so similar and harmonized that the distinction has become much more blurred. Nonetheless, the distinction remains, and ambiguities built into the current policies still provide some discretionary leeway. As Stern and Valchars (2013) write, "discretion is general and extends to all requirements; this means, on the one hand, that all requirements have to be met, but citizenship can still be refused; on the other hand, discretion cannot be used to waive certain requirements, with the only exception if the Federal Government declares the naturalization to be in the national interest" (27). While several naturalization officials in Austria told me that the distinction between the two is negligible today, and thus the political discretion of the *Länder* is highly circumscribed, there is still influence through provisions such as the *Land*-level administrative fee regulations *(Landesverwaltungsabgabenverordnungen).* For example, *Land*-level fees for non-discretionary naturalization vary significantly across Austria, from 76€ in Vienna to up to 1,357€ in Steiermark (Stern and Valchars 2013, 32). The variation in citizenship acquisition at the Land level in Austria can also be seen in Figure 7.1.

In addition to similar political developments, both countries share similar migration histories. Until the early 1960s, both Austria and Germany were countries of emigration, with more Austrians and Germans migrating abroad than migrants moving to these countries. However, facing large labor shortages in the 1950s, Germany and Austria were both in desperate need of workers for the industrial jobs

fuelling its postwar reconstruction. Without colonial empires to source these workers, both signed numerous so-called "guest worker" agreements with less developed countries of the European periphery through which it could import cheap and temporary labor. Germany signed such agreements with Italy in 1955, Greece and Spain in 1960, Turkey in 1961, Morocco in 1963, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia in 1965, and finally Yugoslavia in 1968. With Germany's postwar *Wirtschaftswunder*, or "economic miracle," fueled by migrant labor recruited from abroad, its foreign population skyrocketed. According to the German Federal Statistical Office (2015), there were 686,000 foreigners in Germany in 1960; by 1973 there were nearly 4 million foreigners living in the country. The German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2005) reckons that from 1956 until the end of its guest worker program in 1973, roughly 14 million guest workers had been recruited as labor in Germany. Austria similarly signed labor recruitment agreements with Spain (1962), Turkey (1964) and Yugoslavia (1966), leading to a similarly sharp increase in foreigners living in Austria. The size of the foreign worker population drastically grew from 1.6 percent in 1965 to 7.2 percent a decade later (Stern and Valchars 2013). Thus the immigrant populations have been traditionally based on labor recruitment and family reunification, as well as some refugee resettlement from the Balkans and further abroad, meaning that most have to apply for citizenship rather than claim it based on colonial ties. This also means that many of their naturalizing immigrants do not share cultural or linguistic ties, as many immigrants in France, the Netherlands, or the United Kingdom do, a factor that may confound such analyses.

Therefore, because Germany and Austria are so very similar historically, culturally, and politically, a within-case analysis permits me to hold many national- and cultural-level variables constant, such as historical legacy, culture, citizenship policy, and political system, while focusing on local economic and political contexts that vary widely across *Länder*. In other words, this subnational study provides additional methodological leverage in assessing the contexts in which naturalization and integration occurs and permits more valid comparisons of the proximate determinants of naturalization from which to draw inferences (Snyder 2001). Thus we might identify more proximate determinants of naturalization that may be significant subnationally but are often obscured or indistinguishable in large-n cross-national comparisons. This more localized focus distinguishes the following analysis from others in the current literature that focus on the national-level only.

The Statistical Analysis of Naturalization in Germany and Austria

For my statistical analysis, I use data collected from the German Federal Statistical Office (*Statistisches Bundesamt*) for the sixteen German *Länder* since reunification in 1990, and from the Austrian Federal Statistical Office (*Bundesanstalt Statistik Österreich*) for the nine Austrian *Länder.* Because I am primarily interested in assessing the impact of economic and political determinants of demand and supply that vary among the different *Länder* as I did with the cross-national analyses, I set up the models very similarly, relying on OLS regression with panel-correct standard errors. While a multilevel model may arguably have provided the ability to control for both subnational and national levels of analysis, with a relatively small sample size and only two units at the highest level of analysis, none

of the models would converge. However, as I just argued, besides the high degree of similarity between Germany and Austria on the question of immigration and citizenship rendering many of the national-level variables inconsequential for the analysis, the level of analysis of interest here is the subnational rather than the national level. Although this means I omit many national level variables, such as political orientation of the national government that most certainly affects naturalization rates within the individual states, these effects should be generally homogenous across the states. In order to control for national-level policy context, I do include the ICCI policy scores to control for national policy context, and I include a dummy variable for Austria in the analysis to account for any cross-national differences. To account for correlations within the states, I employ heteroskedastic robust standard errors clustered by *Land*.[66]

The dependent variable in the analysis is the naturalization rate. This was calculated as the net number of naturalizations occurring within a state in a given year, divided by the total immigrant population in that state at the end of the previous year, and multiplied by 1000. I also construct an alternative dependent variable for the naturalization rate among Turkish immigrants.[67] This is not only because Turkish immigrants constitute the most significant share of both country's immigrant population and one of the most sizable shares of all naturalizations every

[66] As a robustness check, I did run the same models with fixed effects. While in a few models the standard errors on the coefficients of interest are larger and thus they lose their significance, most are signed similar to the PCSE models. Likewise, several models with Land-level and Country-level mixed effects did converge without error, and the results were once again broadly similar.

[67] Unfortunately neither country had data on the number of Turkish naturalizations dating back to 1990, but only as far back as 2000. Thus the sample size in the Turkish-centric models is smaller than the full Models 1 and 2, but they are comparable in size to Models 3 through 6.

year. In addition, this is methodologically advantageous, because I am able to focus on a single immigrant group that does not generally enjoy special exceptions to standard naturalization regulations (like asylum claims or being an EU citizen). This helps to control for significant variation in attributes across Germany's diverse immigrant population that may affect naturalizations in ways that the model does not capture.

My independent variables represent measures of economic and political context and are very similar to the ones used in the cross-national analysis. For my political variables, I have a number of measures of political orientation for each governing coalition in the *Landtag,* including the vote shares of right, left, radical right and radical left parties as well as seat shares for the respective parties. *LRScore3* calculates the relative left-right position of the governing coalition by whether the coalition is *Leftist*, *Centrist*, or *Rightist*. I also have a categorical variable *RadGov,* coded 1 if the radical left is in the government and coded 2 if the radical right is in the governing coalition. Variables representing political competition, including *ENRP* and *ENLP*, and the relative magnitudes of the dominant right and left parties, were also included in some models, but achieved no statistical significance and are not presented here. For the economic variables, I include *Unemployment* and *GDP per capita* to capture the relative wealth of the individual state. I coded a variable as *Downturn*, which is coded 1 if GDP growth is negative for the year and 0 otherwise, to represent this same economic context. This was also not significant in any model and is not presented. *Campaign*, which I discuss more extensively in the qualitative section below, is coded 1 if the Land has an official

naturalization campaign intended to increase interest in naturalization, and 0 if not. Finally, because the historical evolution of the five East German *Länder* under the communist German Democratic Republic mean that their experience with immigration in the postwar period differed substantially from the Western *Länder*, I include a dummy variable if a state is from the *FormerEast.*

Analysis and Results

The results of the models for the naturalization rates among all immigrants and Turkish immigrants are summarized in Tables 7.1. Models 1 and 2 are the full models for all *Länder*, while Models 3 through 6 and Models 7 through 10 are restricted to the years 2000 through 2013 for the sake of comparability between the overall rate and the Turkish rate over the same period.

In general, the economic basis of immigrant demand for citizenship seems to find confirmation in the results. We see that regardless of the model or sample, Unemployment is consistently negative as expected and statistically significant at least at the $p < 0.05$ level. Across most models, a one unit increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a roughly 0.40 unit decrease in the naturalization rate, all other variables held constant. The magnitude of the effect for Turkish immigrants in Models 7 through 10 is in contrast much higher – actually more than 3.5 times as high - than for all immigrants in Models 3 through 6. Considering Turkish immigrants naturalize at higher rates than the national average and yet are one of the principal groups that Germany has struggled to integrate socioeconomically and politically, this relationship is not only expected but is strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis. A negative economic context clearly seems to

Table 7.1: Estimated Economic and Political Effects on the Naturalization Rates in Germany and Austria

DV:	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	NatRate		NatRate				TurkNatRate			
NatRateLag / TurkNatRateLag	0.77***	0.74***	0.71***	0.71***	0.70***	0.70***	0.64***	0.65***	0.64***	0.63***
	(0.062)	(0.067)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.081)	(0.079)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
LogMigPercent / LogTurkPercent	-0.92	-1.91	-1.88	-1.82	-1.87	-2.43	-1.38	-1.14	-1.26	-1.67
	(1.61)	(1.59)	(1.78)	(1.75)	(1.80)	(1.78)	(3.18)	(3.11)	(3.16)	(3.19)
MigRate	0.62***	0.60***	0.57***	0.60***	0.53**	0.56***	1.47***	1.55***	1.57***	1.43***
	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.58)	(0.53)
GDP per capita	-0.000064	0.000027	-0.0000024	-0.0000038	-0.0000020	0.0000020	-0.00023	-0.00023	-0.00024	-0.00025*
	(0.000086)	(0.000073)	(0.000072)	(0.000070)	(0.000072)	(0.000068)	(0.00015)	(0.00015)	(0.00015)	(0.00014)
Unemployment	-0.40***	-0.31**	-0.35**	-0.38***	-0.39***	-0.41***	-0.85**	-0.90**	-0.83*	-0.99**
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.41)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.44)
Former East	-2.24	-2.78	-3.34	-2.76	-3.47	-3.51	-2.27	-0.52	-2.88	-1.95
	(3.11)	(3.15)	(3.64)	(3.60)	(3.56)	(3.61)	(10.5)	(10.3)	(10.4)	(10.5)
ICCI Total	-2.08***	-2.46***	-2.57***	-2.60***	-2.69***	-2.82***	-5.86***	-5.78***	-5.95***	-6.31***
	(0.46)	(0.41)	(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.48)	(0.49)	(1.94)	(1.94)	(2.00)	(2.06)
LRScore3=Leftist	-1.19*	-0.63			-0.45				-2.66*	
	(0.71)	(0.68)			(0.68)				(1.59)	
LRScore3= Rightist	-1.43**	-1.33**			-1.31**				-1.72	
	(0.63)	(0.62)			(0.55)				(1.87)	
Austria		2.82	3.45	2.92	3.41	4.16*	12.8*	11.0	12.4*	13.9*
		(1.99)	(2.45)	(2.56)	(2.50)	(2.43)	(7.46)	(7.77)	(7.34)	(7.55)
RadGov=Left				1.25*				2.33		
				(0.66)				(1.57)		
RadGov=Right				2.02				5.16		
				(1.37)				(3.68)		
Campaign						3.80***				7.54**
						(1.19)				(3.38)
Constant	32.8***	34.7***	37.0***	37.0***	39.4***	40.8***	77.9***	76.4***	80.5***	83.7***
	(5.94)	(5.68)	(6.71)	(6.45)	(6.77)	(7.06)	(24.0)	(23.8)	(25.2)	(25.6)

Table 7.1 (Continued)

Observations	400	400	332	332	332	332	316	316	316	316
R^2	0.80	0.80	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.83	0.76	0.76	0.76	0.76
Degrees of freedom	9	10	8	10	10	9	8	10	10	9
Chi²	345.8	384.4	378.3	411.2	454.0	371.7	530.1	583.9	547.6	363.2

Standard errors in parentheses;
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01

have a more detrimental impact for those immigrants that have struggled economically. GDP per capita has a consistently negative relationship with naturalization rates, which may result from the general decline in naturalizations across time as GDP per capita generally increases across time. However, because this variable is not significant in any model, it should not be interpreted as confirming evidence of the theory.

Some of the political variables in the table likewise generally confirm the political supply hypotheses as well. Right governments (*LRScore3* in Models 1, 2, 5, and 9) are consistently associated with lower levels of naturalization across all models, and the estimated effect is significant in all but the Turkish model. Although not shown, I ran the same analysis for each country separately, and the Rightist government category had a highly significant estimated effect of -2.69 ($p < 0.001$) in Germany, while the effect was signed correctly in Austria but not significant. Curiously, the Leftist government category was negative and significant in several of the models, which does not align with the theoretical expectation. However, this may be due to the fact that many Leftist governments have traditionally held power in states such as Berlin and Nordrhein-Westfalen that have struggled economically in recent years. The variable also includes all those leftist governments in the former East Germany, which would not make this result altogether surprising since they are electorally strongest in the former East German *Länder* where immigrant populations and naturalization rates are generally lower than they are in the former West German *Länder*. Thus this possibly captures the effects of being a former East German state rather than the effects of their political or electoral interest in

naturalized immigrants. However, Radical Left governments are significantly associated with increased naturalization rates in Model 4, and just barely misses statistical significance in Model 8.

Finally, the naturalization campaigns variable was significant in both models for all immigrants and for Turkish immigrants. Compared with those years that did not run a campaign, those *Länder* that did should have observed a sizable associated increase in the number of naturalizations, especially among Turkish immigrants, as a consequence. As I will highlight in the qualitative section, this evidence suggests another mechanism by which governments can inspire increases in naturalization rates beyond formal policy or political discretion at the level of implementation.

According to the theory of this dissertation and the statistical analysis above, much of the variation across German and Austrian *Länder* since 1990 can be attributed to the economic and political context within which the naturalization process occurs. The economic situation in individual *Länder* seems to have had a significant effect on naturalization rates. Unemployment rates are associated with variation in naturalization rates as predicted, with stronger labor market having a positive effect on naturalization rates in a given *Land*. It is most strongly associated with naturalization rates among Turkish immigrants in those states. Likewise, many of the political variables across most of the models performed as expected. Right-oriented governments are negatively associated with naturalization rates, while governments with a radical left party member seem to have a positive effect on naturalization.

Qualitative Evidence and Discussion

While these quantitative results offer significant support for the theory presented in this paper, the specific mechanism linking economic and political context to naturalization rates in Germany remains untested by the statistical analysis. Exactly how politics plays out in structuring naturalization rates is not captured by the models presented here. However, based on the qualitative evidence I gathered during nearly 60 interviews over the course of two summers traveling through Germany and Austria, some of the causal mechanisms tested in the statistical analysis find additional confirmation.

In terms of the demand for citizenship, nearly every naturalization office I visited in Germany (9 of 10) cited the economic circumstances ("*Wirtschaftliche Verhältnisse*") of the applicants as one of the two most significant reasons why applicants are disqualified from naturalization, and all three offices in Austria mentioned it as the top reason. Because a large proportion of immigrants are former guest workers have been strongly affected by industrial decline in many regions of Germany and Austria, their prospects in the country, including prospects for citizenship, remain bleak. While for many immigrants Germany's Citizenship Law of 2000 had the positive effect of extending *jus soli* to children born in Germany under certain conditions, it introduced a number of prerequisites that rendered naturalization much more difficult, like tests, language ability, and proof of employment. The latter is especially problematic, because even though many immigrants have jobs, many of those jobs are not sufficient to sustain a family without social assistance, or they cannot provide proof of such a job because they

are often self-employed.[68] In other words, it is difficult for many immigrant families to earn enough from work to survive financially, which means they must rely on social assistance, which disqualifies them from naturalization, which only excludes them further.[69] From the perspective of some naturalization officials, this was also apparent. As one noted:

When someone draws from social welfare, it makes it difficult for naturalization. It was the case during the Euro crisis that many people could not naturalize, because they drew from social welfare and the barrier is relatively high, and thus it has not been easy to fulfill the income and social welfare requirement. Through this some have had no possibility to naturalize during the crisis.[70] Some immigrants I interviewed also reflected these realities. One Turkish immigrant who worked at an immigrant advising center in Kreuzberg lamented, 'We can't even get jobs, why worry about getting citizenship?"[71]

Although manifest requirements such as secure livelihood, linguistic proficiency, and criminal background were among the most cited reasons for disqualification, the greatest latent obstacle to naturalization is giving up one's former passport. Naturalization rates would surely increase if this requirement were dropped. Most naturalization officials across both countries reaffirmed this. Asked about the naturalization rate in Germany, one official confidently reported

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[68] Interview #111 with Kenan Kolat, President of the Turkish Community of Germany (*Türkische Gemeinde in Deutschland*), August 6, 2013.
[69] Interview #0108 with Regina Reinke, Integration Representative for the Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg District of Berlin (*Integrationsbeauftragte Bezirk Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg*), July 26, 2013.
[70] Anonymous interview #1001 at the Naturalization Office of the Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg District of Berlin (*Bezirksamt Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg von Berlin Staatsangehörigkeitsbehörde*), June 5, 2014.
[71] Anonymous interview #0110 at the TD-Beratungszentrum in Kreuzberg, Berlin, August 1, 2013.

that "the decisive factor is that the most will not naturalize because they must give up their former citizenship, therefore, when that is changed the naturalization numbers will double, at least."[72] This is at least consistent with the findings from the panel in Figure 6.1 as well, where legal moves to facilitate dual citizenship the 1990s and 2000 correspond with increased rates. However, from the perspective of the German government, permitting dual citizenship would have the effect of naturalizing potentially non-integrated immigrants, which is contrary to the goals of the government. It seeks integrated citizens, not non-integrated citizens, so I was told.[73] In Austria, the perspective seems even stronger, likely due to the influence of the radical right Freedom Party (FPÖ). I consistently heard that "citizenship is the highest good and stands at the end of a successful integration process," and thus dual citizenship would undercut this process.[74] In my interviews with FPÖ officials, this sentiment was decisive:

> "Of highest priority is the general question regarding what dual citizenship among Turks means for their readiness to integrate. The fact is that many Turkish immigrants still live in their ancestral milieu. Parallel societies and the formation of ghettoes is a reality. Integration looks different than this."[75]

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[72] Anonymous interview #1025 with officials in the Naturalization and Citizenship Office in the Regional Authority of Darmstadt (*Einbürgerungs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsreferat in Regierungspräsidium Darmstadt*), July 8, 2014.

[73] Interview #0109 with officials from the Government Representative for Migration, Refugees, and Integration (*Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration*), July 30, 2013.

[74] Quote by Austrian Interior Minister Sebastian Kurz, located front and center of the Ministry of the Interior's naturalization website (http://www.staatsbuergerschaft.gv.at/). This notion of citizenship as the end point of successful integration was reported to me throughout Austria by most naturalization officials and politicians, and by most conservative politicians in Germany as well.

[75] Quote by Manfred Haimbuchner, leader of the Austrian Freedom Party (*Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs*, FPÖ) in Oberösterreich, highlighted during anonymous interview #1033 at the party

The issue of dual citizenship, furthermore, speaks to the question of incentives and the benefits of citizenship versus a non-citizenship status. Giving up one's former citizenship is often linked to the loss of travel freedoms to their country of origin as well as significant inheritance and property rights in their country of origin. While significant material loss is a grounds for potential exception to the ban on dual citizenship, the ambiguity of that threshold likely keeps many immigrants away from the naturalization office. Furthermore, when considering what one gains from naturalization, it seems to relate to the benefits of the new status. According to studies cited by the government, it is safe to say that most immigrants almost always naturalize for practical reasons.[76] These include freedom to travel without restrictions, visa freedoms, better labor market access, and access to public service professions. Voting is another practical benefit but seems little desired. Explaining why immigrants naturalize or do not, one FDP member of the Bundestag reported that "incentives haves a lot to do with integration. What you get from integration and naturalization must be more than what you earn from social benefits. Except for voting rights, if you get everything already, why naturalize?"[77] Another a naturalization official mused in passing that actually "there is little legal advantage to citizenship, aside from voting and travel freedom within the EU. Other than these, those living here and born here already have all they need."[78]

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government offices in Linz, Austria, July 22, 2014. See also www.fpoe.at/doppelstaatsbuergerschaft-integration-auf-tuerkisch.

[76] Interview #0109 with officials from the Government Representative for Migration, Refugees, and Integration (*Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration*), July 30, 2013.

[77] Anonymous interview #0100 with Member of the German Bundestag from the FDP, July 16, 2013.

[78] Interview #0106 at the Naturalization Office of the Neukölln District of Berlin (*Bezirksamt Neukölln von Berlin Staatsangehörigkeitsbehörde*), July 25, 2013.

Similarly, I found a wealth of confirmatory qualitative evidence for the political supply of citizenship that I have theorized in this project. At the local level, I spoke with fourteen naturalization officers across Germany and Austria, and nearly all of them admitted that citizenship law permitted some degree of discretion ("*Spielraum*") for the *Länder.* In Germany, many officials throughout the country reported that some *Länder* governments use as much discretion in favor of more naturalizations, and utilize the upper limits of the citizenship law where possible, while others interpret the law much more strictly, utilizing the lowest legal limits provided. In these terms, Bayern was consistently reported to be the most restrictive in terms of their interpretation of citizenship law, especially by officials and politicians in urban areas outside of the south of Germany such as Berlin, Hamburg, or Nordrhein-Westphalen.[79] This not surprising, since the conservative south differs so starkly from the more leftist north. One official reported that although the differences between the north and south on these questions is not as stark was it was in years past, "it tends to be the case that the more southern the *Land* is, the more restrictive the naturalization criteria."[80] A number of examples of such discretion left to the state-level governments were cited. Many referenced the issue of 'sufficient German knowledge' (*ausreichende Deutschkenntnisse*) stipulated in the 2000 reform was often cited by officials. The law included a language prerequisite for naturalization, but the examinations were administered at the local

[79] Such evidence is found, for example, in anonymous interviews with senior officials of naturalization offices (*Einbürgerungsbehörde*) in Berlin (Interview #1001), Hamburg (#1007), Essen (#1020), Mönchengladbach (Interview #1023), and Darmstadt (#1025), June 2014.

[80] Anonymous interview #1025 with naturalization officials in the Naturalization and Citizenship Office in the Regional Authority of Darmstadt (*Einbürgerungs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsreferat in Regierungspräsidium Darmstadt*), July 8, 2014.

level, resulting in varying degrees of stringency with regard to demonstrated proficiency. As one official remarked, the implementation "developed from North to South completely muddled, in the north where they were totally complaisant and only a little spoken German sufficed, to the south where fully written dictations were standard."[81] In response, the German Constitutional Court in 2005 issued a ruling stipulating harmonized criteria throughout the *Länder*, and in 2007 new preliminary instructions were circulated that stipulated a common B-1 level of proficiency.

Germany formally requires immigrants to renounce their former citizenship when applying for a German passport, except under conditions of 'substantial disadvantage' ('*erhebliche Nachteile'*) to the immigrant, especially in terms of economic or proprietary loss. Precisely what constitutes 'substantial disadvantage' has become legally stipulated and more precisely circumscribed in recent years, but this has not always been the case. Consequently, the incidence of dual citizenship among naturalized immigrants has been over fifty percent annually, and yet has varied significantly across the sixteen German *Länder*. When asked about dual citizenship variation, many cited the example of Kosovar Albanians, who for complicated political reasons associated with Kosovo's disputed sovereignty still hold Serbian passports. Serbia does not permit Kosovar Albanians to give up their citizenship, which means that formally they have great difficulty if not an outright impossibility of naturalizing in Germany where many sought refuge during and after the war. The same general difficulty has also existed in the past for Afghan citizens

[81] *Ibid*.

attempting to be released from Afghani citizenship. In such ambiguous cases, however, some *Länder* such as Nordrhein-Westphalen and Hessen permit Kosovo Albanians to retain their citizenship and naturalize with dual citizenship, while *Länder* such as Bayern refuse to naturalize them under these conditions.[82] One naturalization official in Bayern admitted such a posture: "Bayern is an exception. Almost all others do it differently, and make exceptions for [Kosovar] Serbians."[83] But this seemingly conservative position is entirely context dependent. In this historically conservative Bayern, the granting of dual citizenship has been resisted by politicians in *almost* every circumstance. Yet for the waves of ethnic German *Aussiedler* who have in the postwar period been readily accepted in Germany, as well as for Jewish 'contingent refugees' immigrating the far reaches of the former Soviet Union that swelled Jewish migrant numbers after Germany's 1991 Contingent Refugee Act, Bayern has been exceptionally tolerant of dual citizenship for these groups while other *Länder* have not been so accommodating in contrast. This different application of dual citizenship in Bayern was also confirmed for me by officials in Bayern itself.[84]

Another example includes the meaning of 'age-related' (*altersbedingt*) exceptions to the language requirement: how old, and under what conditions, is an applicant too old to learn the German language? Some states make exceptions for those over 65, while others do not except under extenuating circumstances. A final example is whether students may count their legal habitual residence (*rechtmäßige*

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[82] *Ibid*.
[83] Anonymous interview #1030 at the Naturalization Office of Munich (*Staatsangehörigkeitsbehörde München*), July 16, 2014.
[84] *Ibid*.

gewöhnliche Aufenthalt) as qualification for German citizenship. Some states count student status toward the eight years required for naturalization, whiles others do not.[85] In 2006, Baden-Württemberg even provided its local naturalization offices with guidelines regarding Muslim applicants so that they could be screened more thoroughly (Thränhardt 2008, 25). While these differences may seem miniscule alongside broader questions of dual citizenship or *jus soli*, most assured me that they could account for substantive differences between the *Länder.*

What motivated such postures toward citizenship at the *Land* level? In Germany, most hinted at either the political interests of the parties, while a few mentioned the competition over voters. Every official was adamant that no politicians or bureaucrats engage in any form of extralegal political influence; rather the influence is exerted by means of legal interpretation and means of implementation in areas not regulated by the national government. And it is here where *Land* politics slowly emerge. The political orientation of the *Land* governing coalition clearly matters, for the governments are the ones with the means to interpret and implement. One official described the process candidly:

> "The political orientation of the *Land* government and federal government has a big effect on citizenship acquisition. The law is passed and circulated with instructions for implementation that are oriented by the politics that determine it. Either these are made a bit stricter on naturalization rights, or a bit more open. And here the politics are very important, whether one has a

[85] Anonymous interview #1025 with naturalization officials in the Naturalization and Citizenship Office in the Regional Authority of Darmstadt (*Einbürgerungs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsreferat in Regierungspräsidium Darmstadt*), July 8, 2014.

more naturalization friendly politics or restrictive politics, both at the federal and land levels."[86]

The examples of Bayern and Baden-Württemberg versus Berlin and Hamburg emerged as points of comparison. In Bayern, perhaps the most economically advanced state in Germany with an immigrant population of around 9 percent yet with a significant pastoral and non-urban land area, the Christian Social Union (CSU) has been the hegemonic governing force in Bavarian politics since World War II. Due to the peculiarities of German history, it is the Christian Democratic party in Bayern, while in the rest of the country that role is filled by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). The CSU is much more conservative than its sister party on the question of immigration and citizenship in recent years. Although the ENLP score in Bayern has moved upwards in recent years, neither the neither Social Democratic Party or Green Party on the left have the strength to challenge the CSU, and with a sufficient provincial constituency maintaining its more staunch more of conservatism, it need not concern itself with attracting newly naturalized voters away from other parties. However, I learned that even the CSU has a political interest in the naturalization of *some* immigrants. As one naturalization official remarked:

> "Again here politics plays a role... for each politician, the question is always 'these are my future voters, or my future non-voters'… for example, the Jewish contingent refugees evidently vote CSU, these are their voters, so they

[86] Anonymous interview #1001 at the Naturalization Office of the Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg District of Berlin (*Bezirksamt Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg von Berlin Staatsangehörigkeitsbehörde*), June 5, 2014.

assume. So too are ethnic German repatriates from the Soviet Union *(Spätaussiedler*) similarly packed into the same [CSU] voter container…"[87]

With Berlin and Hamburg, both cities that are themselves *Länder*, the contrast could not be starker. Compared to Germany's south, one word I consistently heard to describe to the north was *einbürgerungsfreundlich* ("naturalization-friendly"). Hamburg, a highly developed, wealthy, and densely populated city-state with a foreign population of nearly 15 percent, consistently pursues what one official termed an *offensive Einbürgerungspolitik* ("offensive naturalization politics").[88] With an ENLP score of 1.94 in 2010 and no competition on the right, the incentive to naturalize new voters and attract them to the party ranks almost seemed to be a given, both among the naturalization officials and among the party elites. This was confirmed for me in interviews with parliamentarians from each of Hamburg's main political parties, including the conservative CDU. Whereas in the German south few (with the exception of the leftist Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens) were as forthcoming about the *Land*-level discretion that existed on the implementation of naturalization, politicians in Hamburg were rather outspoken and almost excited about their willingness to use it in order to *increase* naturalization rates.[89] Hamburg is particularly known for its series of rather successful naturalization campaigns. In its most recent form, Olaf

[87] Anonymous interview #1025 with naturalization officials in the Naturalization and Citizenship Office in the Regional Authority of Darmstadt (*Einbürgerungs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsreferat in Regierungspräsidium Darmstadt*), July 8, 2014.

[88] Interview #1005 with head official for Naturalization Issues for the Senate Interior Administration of (*Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht Referat in der Senatsverwaltung für Inneres*), Berlin, June 5, 2014.

[89] Feliz Demirel of the Grünen (Interview #1008), Kazim Abaci and Ali Simsek of the SPD (Interviews #1011 and #1012), and Nikolas Haufler of the CDU (Interview #1009). Hamburg, June 11-13, 2014.

Scholz, the First Mayor of Hamburg and a member of the SPD, sent a postcard to every immigrant who had been living in Hamburg for eight years letting them know that they may qualify for citizenship and encouraging them to visit Hamburg's updated and streamlined naturalization advising center. The new naturalization advising center is meant to welcome in Hamburg's immigrants, improve their bureaucratic relations with this population, and reform the culture of the naturalization process so that the bureaucracy and the immigrants share the same interest, which is their successful naturalization. Describing the campaign and its relative success almost nonchalantly, a head official at the central naturalization office reported that "this campaign has led to skyrocketing increase in public interest in naturalization, an enormous rise in applications, and naturally at the end of the process a much higher number of naturalizations."[90] When asked about the SPD-led campaign, politicians from the other parties were not so much dismissive of the effort as almost disappointed that they had not had the idea themselves, or jealous that it was Mr. Scholz's name on the postcards – a great advertisement for the SPD.[91] The CDU politician charged with integration issues for its party was especially adamant in informing me that in the fact they had been the party, not the SPD, to launch the first naturalization campaign in Hamburg.

In Berlin, the German capital and another city-state in the northeast, immigrants similarly comprise roughly 15 percent of the total population, yet its economy is much weaker than that of Hamburg. But like Hamburg, its politics are

[90] Anonymous interview #1007 at the Naturalization Department of the Hamburg Residents Central Office (*Hamburg Einwohner-Zentralamt Einbürgerungsabteilung*). Hamburg, June 10, 2014.
[91] Feliz Demirel of the Grünen (Interview #1008), Kazim Abaci and Ali Simsek of the SPD (Interviews #1011 and #1012), and Nikolas Haufler of the CDU (Interview #1009). Hamburg, June 11-13, 2014.

consistently left-oriented, with a high ENLP score of 2.66 during the current election period. As I learned, in this milieu, the conservative CDU is like its counterpart in Hamburg and much more naturalization-friendly than the CDU elsewhere. The CDU member of the Berlin Senate charged with integration issues, Burkhard Dregger, argued that there was little difference between the CDU and SPD on citizenship issues in Berlin, and that as a member of the governing coalition the party was working to utilize all *Spielraum* necessary – specifically with regard to *Ermessenseinbürgerung* ("discretionary naturalization") – to achieve higher naturalization figures. The Senator also spoke frankly about the enormous *Wahlpotenzial* ("electoral potential") of voters with a migration background that all parties in Berlin had recognized. A growing priority of the CDU, at least in Berlin, was to convince naturalized immigrants to vote for the CDU, not the SPD: "we need them to be a part of society, part of the community, part of our [CDU] Volkspartei," the Senator claimed.[92] In discussions with Berlin's naturalization officials, this *einbürgerungsfreundlich* orientation was reaffirmed. According to one Berlin official, "The difference [between Bayern and Hamburg or Berlin] is a question of political culture, not of extralegal influence on the law or the process… Here there is no difference between the CDU and SPD in terms of the naturalization process."[93] Yet as another naturalization official confided to me, if the SPD were not stuck in coalition

[92] Interview #1004, Berlin, June 5, 2014.

[93] Anonymous interview #1005 with official charged with naturalization issues for the Senate Interior Administration of Berlin (*Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht Referat in der Senatsverwaltung für Inneres*), Berlin, June 5, 2014.

with the CDU at the time, they would be able to make even greater efforts to facilitate naturalization.[94]

Even the state of Baden-Württemberg, Bayern's conservative and economically dynamic southern neighbor, the story seemed to be changing with the political circumstances. A CDU stronghold since World War II, the first non-CDU government was elected in 2011. The new Green-SPD coalition, facing an ELP score of 2.22 (double that of the ENRP score), has been especially forthcoming about its plans to exploit its policy discretion and increase naturalization rates where it can.[95] The Baden-Württemberg government, with the new Integration Ministry under the direction of the SPD's Bilkay Öney, introduced in 2013 new administrative guidelines specifying the discretionary rules of the Land to grant citizenship.[96] As she claimed, "since the beginning of the legislative period we have emphasized the features of our new naturalization-friendly climate. We have liberalized naturalization policies, systematically used our policy discretion in the federal law, and advertised for naturalization actively."[97] As a result, Baden-Württemberg's naturalization rates have skyrocketed, in 2015 reaching their highest number of naturalizations since 2003.

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[94] Anonymous interview #0102 with head official in the Office of the Senate Representative for Integration and Migration in Berlin, Berlin Germany, July 18, 2013.

[95] Interview #1027 with Daniel Lede Abal, Green party MP changed with integration issues, Stuttgart, July 10, 2014.

[96] *Verwaltungsvorschriften des Ministeriums für Zustimmungserfordernisse im Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht (VwV ZustStAR).*

[97] *Migazin*, "So viele Einbürgerungen wie seit zehn Jahren nicht," 15 April 2016. http://www.migazin.de/2016/04/15/baden-wuerttemberg-so-einbuergerungen-jahren/. See also *Migazin*, "Baden-Württemberg erleichtert Einbürgerung", 20 August 2013. http://www.migazin.de/2013/08/20/baden-wuerttemberg-erleichtert-einbuergerung/

Finally, in both Austria and in the more restrictive *Länder*, or smaller, less urban locations in the rest of Germany, it became a very consistent theme in my interviews that those officials perceived very little discretionary room in the current law to affect the naturalization process. In Germany, this may be due to the fact that more conservative governments do not attempt to identify it or use it as much as leftist ones do, or that the political orientation of the *Land* or locality helps determine whether one observes the existence or relevance of policy discretion. In Austria, it may actually be a reflection of the actual lack of *Spielraum* at the state level. Most officials reported that the *Länder* in Austria had a high level of discretion over the naturalization process until the 2006 reform, at which point this was regulated away by the federal government. No local politician I interviewed at the state level spoke about the discretion of the states over naturalization, and all referred me to speak to politicians at the national level. Only two issues remain under the discretion of the *Länder*: the regulation of the citizenship tests, and the costs of citizenship, both of which vary widely from state to state. The other difference that officials mentioned centered on the amount of finances and resources the *Länder* devote to the naturalization process. Several, especially those in less populous *Länder* such as Salzburg or Oberösterreich mentioned they do not enjoy the same level of resources that a city like Vienna has as its disposal, and thus cannot naturalize as many people.[98] However, a theme I noted in conversations was that 'Red Vienna' (*rotes Wien*), so named because its left-of-center Social Democrats

[98] Anonymous interview #1034 at the Citizenship Bureau of the Office of the Oberösterreich Land Government, July 22, 2014, and anonymous interview #1036 at the Citizenship Office of Salzburg (*Salzburger Staatsbürgerschaftsbehörde*), July 23, 2014.

have held the mayor's position and a majority in the *Landtag* uninterrupted since World War II, had been particularly active in using its subnational mandate to accommodate of immigrants and their rights in the past. Unfortunately no SPÖ member of parliament would suggest to me that they had actively sought to increase naturalization rates in years past.

Conclusion

Both the quantitative and qualitative case study evidence gathered in this chapter lend additional confirmation to the broader theory of citizenship acquisition that I formulated in Chapter 3 and applied at the cross-national level in Chapter 6. The economic context in individual *Länder*, at least measured by unemployment, seems to have had a significant effect on naturalization rates. A weak labor market thus has a negative effect on naturalization rates, and the association was particularly strong among Turkish immigrants for whom the economic context is on average more precarious than the average immigrant population. The naturalization officials with whom I spoke across both countries tended to confirm this hypothesis as well. Furthermore, many of the political variables performed as expected. Throughout the analysis it was assumed that the political variables operated according to the discretionary hypothesis, whereby the prerogative to implement policy at the state level enabled states to interpret citizenship policy in a more or less restrictive direction. The tests for naturalization campaigns and the qualitative evidence of it as well suggests this mechanism is at work. However, it could also be that the political climate of the state itself also structures the immigrant demand for citizenship – thus a conservative region like Bayern may simply be more

inhospitable to immigrants than a socially and economically progressive one like Hamburg. Although both are likely, these two causal pathways were not tested directly in this chapter.

While the cross-national study has already demonstrated that the theory is generalizable at the national level in Europe, can the quantitative and qualitative findings from the subnational level be applied to other, non-federal or quasi-federal countries in Europe? In most unitary states, the political supply of citizenship may be much more circumscribed by national level policy. Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom each are unitary states, but each have regions with very strong political power that nearly qualify them as federations like Germany and Austria. To the extent that these subnational units have any discretion over the implementation of policy, or to the extent that political culture somehow structures the hospitability of a subnational region, then this very well may be the case. The subnational analysis of naturalization rates seems to be a promising avenue for future research.

Chapter 8: Citizenship and Integration in Europe Today

As long as humans have settled in communities larger than the immediate family unit, the question of who belongs has likely accompanied them. And as long as humans have been on the move, the reality of migration has likely forced them to answer it. With some 232 million people living outside their country of birth in 2013 (United Nations 2013a), the question of who belongs is certainly as relevant today as ever before.

With nearly 50 million foreign born residents in the European Union in 2014 and millions of additional asylum seekers flooding northward across Europe's Mediterranean borders, it certainly is a relevant question in Europe today. The states of Europe, hardly strangers to the question of who belongs and the migration of peoples that challenge it, were arguably forged through centuries of such conflict over this very question. After the mass dislocations and population resettlements that followed the political, economic, and social calamity of World War II, European democracies inherited the long legacy of wrestling over this question, with many falling back on strict citizenship laws that had evolved over the previous centuries to exclude foreigners and define a national identity, others on laws that had attempted to accommodate the diversity and political exigencies of empire, while yet others began searching for new means by which to answer this timeless question in the context of a transformed continent. Yet even among the relatively homogenous European democracies that crystallized in the postwar period, the nationalist, ethnic, and even racial stasis that had emerged as a consequence of the war would be short-lived, and the question of who belongs would hardly be settled

for long, if it ever was. Overseas colonies collapsed. Postwar economies demanded inexpensive foreign labor from abroad. European integration proceeded apace. Cold War tensions and post-Cold War conflicts generated new refugee flows. Economic globalization and interdependence increasingly drove people across borders, often from neighboring European countries, often from beyond. Seventy years have elapsed since World War II, and, transformed by the migratory pressures and challenges that these forces have brought to the continent, Europe once again – and perhaps belatedly – finds itself confronting this question anew.

The Theoretical Contribution

This dissertation has focused on citizenship in Europe, which is inherently intertwined with the question of who belongs, who does not, and by what means do European states adjudicate between the two. In the introductory chapter, I posed two specific questions: what are the causes, and what are the consequences, of citizenship policy in Europe? More specifically, I sought to investigate the making of citizenship policy and the outcomes of citizenship policy. First, what determines the institutional contours of citizenship policy requirements that regulate immigrant acquisition of citizenship across countries and across time? Despite a vast literature that has developed on the macrohistorical determinants of citizenship policy in Europe (Howard 2009; Janoski 2010; Brubaker 1992; Favell 1998; Castles and Miller 2003; Schain 2008; Joppke 2003b; Joppke 2010; Jacobson 1996; Soysal 1994) as well as the more proximate electoral correlates of citizenship policy change in recent years (Howard 2010; Goodman 2014; Janoski 2010; Schain 2008), few existing studies have offered systematic analyses of the direction, content, or timing

of such policy change. Second, I asked, given variation in citizenship policies across countries, who acquires citizenship, and under what conditions? There is a vast body of research on the question, focusing on the individual factors such as the level of economic, social, or cultural adaptation to the receiving country, or on institutional and other structural factors such as toleration of dual citizenship or distinct characteristics of the country of origin (Yang 1994; Jones-Correa 2001b; Diehl and Blohm 2003; Dronkers and Vink 2012; Vink et al. 2013; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010; Janoski 2010; OECD 2011; Koopmans et al. 2012). However, given the lack of systematic measurement of citizenship policy across countries or across time, there remains much to understand about how citizenship policies, and their vast array of requirements, affects citizenship acquisition.

In Chapter 3, I presented and discussed my theoretical framework for integrating the relationship between citizenship policy, citizenship acquisition, and immigrant integration in European societies. First, I focused on citizenship policymaking. Contrary to one strong strand in the literature, I argued that citizenship policy in Europe results not principally from path dependence or macrohistorical legacies of the past, but from acute electoral competition among political parties and demographic change. In tight electoral systems with numerous parties on the left and right of the political spectrum, politicians often find themselves in competition with other similarly situated parties for the votes of similar constituents. In the competition for vote share, right-of-center parties may be tempted to politicize the immigration issue if it strengthens their electoral hand, and under such conditions right-of-center governments would be most likely to

enact policies that restrict access to citizenship and increase the requirements to acquire it. Where far right parties gain electoral strength or join the government, citizenship policy is highly likely to be restricted. At the opposite end of the political spectrum, I expected the opposite dynamics. Electoral competition on the left might incentivize left-oriented governments to liberalize citizenship policy because immigrant voters function as an important constituency for traditional socialist and labor/working-class political parties, but the rise of other parties on the left, for instance the Greens, may increasingly adopting pro-immigrant and multicultural positions and challenge the traditional electoral dominance of mainstream left parties. With heightened left party competition, left-oriented governments and governments with far left party participation should be more likely to liberalize citizenship policy in an attempt to curry favor with left-libertarians and potential immigrant voters. In sum, I hypothesized that policy change would occur under governments that faced stronger competition on their side of the political spectrum (H.CP1).

Next, I theorized that the size of the naturalized immigrant population in liberal democracies may function as an additional and potentially alternative mechanism for citizenship policy stasis or change. Naturalized immigrants within a state could function as a well-organized pro-immigrant constituency to help sustain accessible citizenship policies, while a lack of them would leave countries open to restrictive change. The countries that had initially open citizenship regimes in the post-war period enabled a sizable immigrant electorate to develop in the subsequent decades that may have helped sustain pro-immigrant policies over time,

while restrictive countries lacked the initial development of organized immigrant constituencies that would serve as a powerful electoral bulwark against restrictive change in the future. Thus I hypothesized that in liberal citizenship regimes, larger immigrant populations would help sustain liberal, accessible policies over time, while larger immigrant populations in initially restrictive regimes would be unable to forestall additional restrictions in future decades (H.CP2).

In my theory, the citizenship acquisition process occurred within the intersection of what I called the political supply of citizenship and the immigrant demand for citizenship. On the supply side, I argued that the same political constellations at work behind citizenship policy would operate on citizenship acquisition. Using citizenship policy to set a high *integration cost of citizenship*, conservative governments would attempt to restrict citizenship acquisitions in an attempt to incentivize immigrant integration on the path to citizenship, while left-oriented governments would attempt to reduce the *integration cost of citizenship* in an attempt to incentivize higher numbers of acquisitions on the path to integration. Beyond formal policy, however, policymakers would alter the supply of citizenship through the administrative and regulatory discretion that accrues to governments in deciding how best to implement and interpret citizenship law in practice. Thus left and right governments could increase or decrease acquisition rates through policy (H.S1), through discretion (H.S2 and H.S3), or through electoral competition (H.S4). On the demand side, I focused on those factors that would affect immigrant incentives to acquire citizenship. Here I postulated that stronger economic contexts (H.D1), perceived value of citizenship status in the future (H.D2), and the declining

value of non-citizenship status (H.D3) would be positively associated with immigrant demand for citizenship. In a given country context, the political supply of citizenship and the immigrant demand for citizenship determine the naturalization rate and level of integration expected of new citizens in any given country context.

This framework integrating the relationship between citizenship policy, citizenship acquisition, and immigrant integration is my first novel contribution to the literature on these subjects. Previous scholarship typically focuses on one of the three in isolation, or two of the three together. But according to the work here, each of these processes should be understood together, for they are all interconnected. The causal mechanism explicated in Figure 3.1 suggested a unidirectional pathway from citizenship policy through political supply and immigrant demand to naturalization and integration. Yet it also acknowledges the temporal endogeneity between each of these variables. The naturalization rates and integration outcomes of last year affect the size and composition of the naturalized voting population this year as well as the electoral incentives and political orientations of parties in the following election cycle. Political ideology on the supply side may increase or decrease immigrant demand, and economic context on the demand side may interact with the supply of certain new citizenship policy requirements. As with all political phenomena, such endogeneity is unavoidable. This dissertation sought to explore the basic relationships of the framework, but it leaves plenty of unexplored territory for future research.

Furthermore, the application of supply and demand terminology appropriated from economics is also somewhat novel. While many scholars cast

immigration in terms of supply and demand forces, the use of these terms for citizenship is quite rare; in fact in my work on this project I found the terms used on occasion, but never once uncovered scholarship that explored their application to the domains of citizenship, naturalization, or integration. This is another contribution to the literature, and one that leaves the market for citizenship open to be examined by other scholars.

The theory in this dissertation certainly suggests that citizenship policymaking and citizenship acquisition in Europe (and likely in any other immigrant-receiving country) often boil down to economic calculus and incentive structures, and the empirical evidence gathered in support of the theory strongly supports this perspective. Today, for better or for worse, citizenship policy is an instrument of the state to achieve the objectives of those who write the policy; citizenship acquisition is an instrument of immigrants to achieve the objectives of those who acquire it. Among the politicians I interviewed, few spoke of citizenship in terms of anything beyond its meaning for integration and incorporation, and certainly not in terms of civic virtue, patriotism, and cultural identification. Among the immigrants that I interviewed, few saw the acquisition process as anything other than a cost-benefit analysis of citizenship versus non-citizenship, and among the naturalization officials that over the decades have inquired of immigrants why they are naturalizing, the answers they receive sound similar. Whether or not citizenship should be the result of economic calculus, or civic virtue, and cultural identity is a subjective question best left to political theorists, but one I will briefly return to below

Yet, to be clear, casting citizenship in terms of a marketplace subject to economic forces is not meant as a normative judgment for how citizenship and integration *should* work, nor is it a theoretical justification for the neoliberal appropriation of citizenship whereby citizenship is bought and sold according to some civic profit motive, even as I suggest below that political intervention in the market is an inefficient means of incorporation. Instead, the supply and demand framework is but a useful heuristic by which to explain the intricate relationships among these endogenous variables. And on the basis of the evidence presented, I believe it to be a useful lens by which to view them. Immigrants demand citizenship or they do not. Citizenship is supplied on the cheap, or at great cost, or perhaps not at all. Politics sets the rules of the nationality acquisition game, which incentivizes some able and willing migrants to pay the respective cost of citizenship for membership, while they discourage or others from doing so.

The Empirical Contribution

Chapters 4 through 7 explored the supply and demand framework empirically. In Chapter 4, I first presented the integration cost of citizenship index (ICCI), my conceptualization and measurement of sixteen Western European countries from 1970 to present. According to my theory, citizenship is the institutional device that denotes and distinguishes members of a political community from non-members, those who belong from those who do not. It is attaining membership in the political club. Citizenship policy, therefore, formalizes the degree of integration within that polity an immigrant must exhibit as qualification for membership, the cost of membership that an immigrant must pay

for access. Thus the ICCI casts citizenship policies in terms of the integration-related costs of membership in the polity.

I also began my investigation of the historical evolution of citizenship in Europe in the postwar period. Using the ICCI, I offered one of the most detailed quantitative assessments of the simultaneous processes of convergence and divergence in European citizenship policy to date. Contrary to accounts arguing that states' citizenship policies reflect the resiliency of national historical differences (Brubaker 1992; Favell 1998; Castles and Miller 2003; Koopmans et al. 2005; Schain 2008), or that policies are limited by nationally and historically defined paths (Goodman 2012a; Mouritsen 2013), I find little continuity between past and present approaches. Where four distinct citizenship strategies have emerged in Europe in recent years from several decades ago, there seems to be only the weakest resilience of traditional national models of incorporation in Europe today. While the most traditionally exclusive countries have driven this movement away from latent-based criteria for membership, most European countries have jettisoned their traditional strategies that rely on unobservable latent integration requirements in favor of more measurable manifest integration requirements. Likewise, my findings in the chapter suggest we need to be more nuanced regarding citizenship policy change. Rather than liberal convergence (Howard 2010) or restrictive convergence (Joppke 2007a), I find that both are occurring simultaneously on different dimensions.

The empirical analysis of citizenship policy was the subject of Chapter 5. While most scholars only use party manifestos or government positions as proxies for political outcomes, I used my citizenship policy index as my dependent variable

in one of the only systematic analyses of citizenship policy change current available. I demonstrated that the left and right party competition variables generally explain overall citizenship policy change in Europe. Left competition certainly accounts for policy liberalization, and especially the latent dimension, while right competition similarly accounts for policy restrictions. However, the competition variables were largely insignificant on the manifest dimension, along which most parties in Europe today find themselves under pressure to levy additional requirements. On this dimension, we find simply the presence of the radical right in forging this restrictive trend. The radical left, so instrumental in moving policy in a more accessible direction on the latent dimension, simply does not have the same degree of influence on the manifest dimension. Because most mainstream parties feel the effects of the radical right in a way that all mainstream parties do not with the radical left, this may explain why governments from across the political spectrum have moved to introduced changes on the manifest dimension of policy, not simply conservative ones. In other words, there may in fact be electoral threats of competition from the radical right influencing all parties in a single direction on manifest policy. Nonetheless, party competition does matter, and points the literature in a new direction for future research.

I also found some modest evidence in support of my hypothesized mechanism of demographic change. A larger foreign born population in the early postwar years is associated with more liberalized citizenship requirements on the latent dimension, but this applies to all countries, not just the previously liberal ones. However, a larger foreign born population at the outset, as well as increased

radical right support, is also associated with more restrictions on the manifest dimension in subsequent decades. In terms of overall path-dependent arguments, the predictive power of citizenship starting points and legacies inherited from decades past finds little support in the data analyzed here. The strength of the estimated effect seems to diminish over time, and hardly explains the contours or direction of citizenship policy today. This is an additional contribution to the growing literature on citizenship policies in Europe.

In Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, I used my citizenship policy index not as the dependent variable but as a central explanatory variable in an analysis of naturalization cross-nationally and sub-nationally. In each sets of analyses, I found strong statistical confirmation of the hypotheses presented in Chapter 3. The integration context of naturalization clearly structured the equilibrium naturalization rates across countries. Economic context and changing citizenship status strongly structure the immigrant demand for citizenship, while the national citizenship policy, a leftist political orientation of governments, and higher degrees of policy discretion structure the political supply of citizenship. I found the same robust results when applied to the case of intra-EU migrant naturalization as well. This was in many ways a hard test case for the theory, since this population should be among the least likely to acquire citizenship in another European state. Yet the Euro crisis has apparently altered the value of naturalization vis-à-vis remaining a non-citizen tied to a precarious economic or political climate at home, and even among this subpopulation the theory still finds strong confirmation. Finally, I turned my attention to the subnational level in Germany and Austria, where I found

additional confirmation of the theory: a weak labor market dampens naturalization rates, especially for immigrants such as Turks for whom the economic context is often more discouraging. The statistical evidence and qualitative interview evidence gathered also reveal that politics also matters beyond the direct mechanism of citizenship policy. Parties of all political persuasions have interests with regard to citizenship acquisition, and often take full advantage of political discretion in order to achieve those interests in practice.

The Implications for Citizenship in European Democracy Today

What does this study mean for citizenship in the 21st century in Europe? Citizenship is fundamental to our understanding of modern liberal democracy. It is the institutional device that defines the people from whom democratic governments are constituted, and to whom democratic governments are accountable. It distinguishes membership in a political community, providing the institutional demarcation of inclusion and exclusion and the boundaries within which democratic governance extends (Hansen and Weil 2001, 1). Indeed, as Linz and Stepan (1996) argue, "[w]ithout a state, there can be no citizenship; without citizenship, there can be no democracy" (28).

The postwar liberal democracies that emerged in Europe largely adopted the liberal and universalistic conception of citizenship theorized by Marshall (1964), according to whom citizenship was fundamentally about ensuring equal treatment and equal access to the societies of which people were part, regardless of personal circumstances or status. Recognizing that the purposeful exclusion of certain groups from the full rights and protections of the state was illiberal, Marshall saw the

piecemeal expansion of citizenship rights into civic, political, and social domains as achieving the demands of liberal democracy. Extending rights to individuals and groups previously excluded would, by this perspective, facilitate their full integration within the polity. As Kymlicka and Norman (1994) explain, "where any of these rights are withheld or violated, people will be marginalized and unable to participate" (354). Most liberal theory generally holds to this view. Withholding rights and equality of status from certain groups within a liberal community is, in other words, illiberal. For Rawls (1971), "in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests" (4). Since liberal democracy requires equality and fundamental rights for all members of a political community, to withhold such rights or access from such persons living within a democratic community would thus require serious ethical justification. As Walzer (1983) likewise maintains, no state that denies political rights and equality to anyone, especially settled immigrants, could describe itself as fully democratic; for him the "rule of citizens over non-citizens, members over strangers, is probably the most common form of tyranny in human history"(62). In his discussion of the required institutions of modern liberal democracy, Dahl (1989, 120; 2005, 189) maintains that 'inclusive citizenship' is essential, and without it a polity falls short of its democratic ideal.

If citizenship is so fundamental to liberal democracies, then how should states define who constitutes the people? Who belongs, who does not, and by what criteria should that decision be reached? On what terms should newcomers be

welcomed, and how best to welcome them? By definition, naturalization is the process by which an immigrant acquires the citizenship of a country other than his or her birth. It is, therefore, this naturalization process that adjudicates these questions. Naturalization for many political theorists and scholars of immigration has consistently played a central role in the incorporation of foreigners (Walzer 1983; Hammar 1985, 1990; Brubaker 1992; Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001; Bauböck 2006). If liberal democracy presupposes liberal citizenship, as Linz and Stepan (1996) argue, then naturalization is the mechanism by which many, if not most, foreigners are converted into citizens. It is the mechanism by which individuals are endowed with full formal membership of the political community, complete with the rights and duties and equality that accompanies it. It is the mechanism by which liberal democracies persist across years of migratory pressures, population shifts, and demographic changes.

Naturalization, and the process by which European countries have attempted to adjudicate the lines of inclusion and exclusion, has been the focus of this study. As I have discussed throughout this dissertation, European countries have pursued a variety of strategies to incorporate newcomers. Although in Chapter 4 I identify four distinct strategies for the integration of newcomers through naturalization, at their most basic level these four strategies emerge from two more fundamental paradigmatic approaches to this process. As Kraler (2006) observes, the distinction is between 'one that sees citizenship as a means to integrate newcomers more fully into the national community and therefore welcomes the timely acquisition of

citizenship, and a second which sees citizenship as a "prize", a reward and honour granted by the state' for successful integration (47).

The distinction is sequential, and yet highly consequential. In the former paradigm – what I called 'integration through citizenship' – citizenship is a means to full integration within the polity, and consequently states grant immigrants extensive rights and craft accessible citizenship policies with low thresholds to facilitate their integration. This is the predominant liberal approach advocated by many political theorists. For the liberal minimalist, stipulating extensive requirements or conditions for membership beyond a modest residency requirement is illiberal. For Carens (1989, 2005), requiring integration as a requirement of political membership violates the foundations of liberal democracy based on toleration, pluralism, and freedom of the individual. Walzer (1983) argues that with closed naturalization procedures for those already admitted within the political community, 'the political community collapses into a world of members and strangers, with no political boundaries between the two, where the strangers are subjects of the members" (62). Thus by this logic, language requirements, civic knowledge exams, become illiberal obstacles to political incorporation; the refusal to grant dual citizenship becomes a means of exclusion rather than a means of incorporation. More open and permissive policies should increase integration outcomes either by granting immigrants greater access to social and political power structures, or render naturalizations less costly, thus opening the door to deeper integration in the process (Kymlicka and Norman 1994).

The other paradigm – what I called 'citizenship through integration' – suggests that citizenship should be the final outcome of the integration process. By this perspective, accessible citizenship grants immigrants easy admission to the full rights and advantages of membership without any of the requisite expectations, costs, or commitments. Accessible citizenship without first requiring integration undermines its value and creates passive, dependent, and isolated citizens. Instead of promoting integration through citizenship, accessible citizenship rights undermine integration because it requires nothing of the immigrant to attain those rights (Pickus 1998, 2005; Renshon 2001, 2009). As I discussed in Chapter 3, *jus domicilii* is becoming the norm in many immigrant-receiving democracies that adopt the integration through citizenship approach, whereby permanent residents are granted domestic rights on the basis of their domicile in the country rather than their by blood or birthright. This granting of political, economic, and social rights to all who claim residence in the polity has led to a decoupling of formal citizenship from much of its substance, as many scholars have noted (Hollifield 1992; Bauböck 1994; Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996; Sassen 1998; Joppke 1999, 2001; Hammar 1990). Schuck (1998, 1989) has argued that citizenship in the United States, as in many parts of Europe, has been devalued over time because it requires little of the immigrant to acquire and the rights exclusive to it differ very little from those granted to permanent residents. Thus immigrants have little incentive to naturalize or integrate and become part of society, ultimately weakening it. By this perspective, naturalization should be conceived not as a prerequisite for further integration, but as the final reward for successful integration.

This distinction is not simply academic. I found in my fieldwork that all countries of Europe have vacillated between these two broad approaches over time. In my theory, this entails four distinct strategies: the 'citizenship through latent integration,' 'citizenship through manifest integration,' and 'citizenship through assimilation' are all approaches developed to incentivize immigrant integration on the road to full citizenship, even if they differ on the contours of the criteria used and the costs imposed. Conversely, the 'integration through citizenship' strategy offers citizenship as a step on the road to full integration. But are these two approaches effective? The theory developed in Chapter 3 provides a straightforward means of assessing the relationship between citizenship policy, citizenship acquisition, and integration, and thereby also provides the means of understanding the tradeoffs between these different approaches. Let us return to the model of the citizenship marketplace, pictured again in Figure 8.1. In it are depicted the two basic approaches to citizenship. The more restrictive 'citizenship through integration' approaches are represented by policy S_1, while the more accessible 'integration through citizenship' is represented by policy S_2. As we have examined in this dissertation, policymakers select the policies that conform most closely to their political ideologies and electoral interests. Not surprisingly, most leftist governments would opt for maximally accessible 'integration through citizenship' policy for both political and electoral reasons, while most conservative governments would opt for the more restrictive 'citizenship through integration' policy for similar reasons. Of course, few parties have the ability to develop policy independent of other parties, and citizenship policies are no different. Hence citizenship policies are

determined through political compromise somewhere on the spectrum between S_1 and S_2.

As European governments feverishly work to develop new immigrant incorporation strategies, what does the model tell us about the tradeoffs between the two paradigms? First, consider a maximally restrictive policy at S_1 or higher. In order to acquire citizenship at this level, an immigrant may need to have ten years of permanent residency, present a clean criminal record, enroll in language courses, pass a civic knowledge exam, demonstrate economic self-sufficiency, and relinquish his or her former citizenship. Birthright citizenship would be precluded. Through the successful fulfillment of each of these requirements, immigrants will be rewarded for their efforts with full citizenship. However, the model suggests that this approach will impose what economists might call a deadweight loss in the form of fewer integrated citizens and ever larger populations of noncitizens. To see why, consider Figure 8.2, which portrays the original immigrant demand curve D, a collectively-defined political supply curve S without a formal government policy, a baseline citizenship policy CP, and a restrictive citizenship policy CP_R. The restrictive policy here operates similarly to the price floor in economics. Holding immigrant demand constant, if citizenship is priced above its Pareto optimal level, at IC_R instead of IC*, there will be N^*-N_R fewer naturalizations among a smaller yet more integrated immigrant populace. In other words, fewer immigrants are naturalizing, but those that do are able and willing to meet the high demands for political membership. This provides satisfaction for those nativists and policymakers who desire more integrated citizens. However, it also results in N^*-N_R

fewer citizenships demanded among the many immigrants who would otherwise be willing to acquire it, and at a higher cost IC_R than society as a whole would be willing and able to confer it at IC*. This then results in a deadweight loss for society, represented by the shaded area in the figure. There is a net loss of integration effort from immigrants due to the fact that many have been excluded from desired political membership at N_R, despite an increase in the surplus political benefit that the receiving country gains for conferring citizenship at a higher price than they were willing. There is also the loss to society of having a larger number of non-citizens 'priced out' of political membership. In this case, restricting citizenship policy at CP_R results in fewer net numbers of integrated citizens and greater numbers of noncitizens.

Shifting citizenship policy in an even more restrictive direction – perhaps in response to domestic radical right political pressures - yields even fewer integrated citizens and even more noncitizens. While this is even less efficient in terms of deadweight loss, from the perspective of policymakers and those demanding such a 'price floor,' it may be politically viable, since the 'producer' surplus accruing to policymakers continues to increase at the expense of the immigrant surplus. With lagging demand for citizenship being coupled by restricted supply of it, we would expect even stronger political pressures to shift citizenship policy in a further restrictive direction, because under these conditions it *appears* that fewer immigrants are interested in integrating or naturalizing despite the reality that they are being systematically marginalized and priced out of the market. In other words,

requiring ever higher levels of integration as the cost of citizenship will result not in greater immigrant integration, but permanent exclusion.

What about the case of an accessible 'integration through citizenship' policy, set at S_2 in Figure 8.3? The motivation of this strategy is to use citizenship as a means for future integration. To acquire citizenship at this level, an immigrant may earn citizenship with three years of permanent residency and need not demonstrate a clean criminal record, language proficiency, civic knowledge, economic self-sufficiency, or give up one's former citizenship. Many would acquire citizenship automatically by birth. By facilitating access to the political community through full citizenship and its attendant rights and privileges, immigrants will face few future barriers to integration and will maximally enabled to integrate over the course of their lifetime.

In Figure 8.3, however, the model suggests that this approach may also be problematic. A liberal and accessible policy operates more in line with a price ceiling in economics Holding immigrant demand constant, shifting policy to CP_L generates N_L-N* additional naturalizations at a lower integration cost IC_L, which yields a large net increase in new citizens but who are less integrated on average. In other words, at the new point 1 more immigrants are acquiring citizenship at a highly discounted price for political membership. This provides satisfaction for those immigrants who would prefer citizenship without the upfront cost, and for those in society who desire increased naturalizations and fewer non-citizens. Because there is no 'surplus' demand for citizenship, as government provides the excess citizenship

Figure 8.1: The Supply and Demand of Citizenship, With Citizenship Policy



Figure 8.2: Restrictive Citizenship Policy and Political Inefficiency



Figure 8.3: Liberal Citizenship Policy and Political Inefficiency



below market equilibrium, there is no deadweight loss as we have with a restrictive citizenship policy. However, the state offering citizenship at such a discount is in essence giving away or subsidizing political membership to those unwilling or unable to pay the integration cost of it, a loss to the state represented by the shaded area. While this shift may be more efficient according to this analysis, and more desirable in that it does not systematically exclude immigrants from liberal rights, it may also be just as costly and less politically viable, since the surplus accruing to the state and society decreases at the expense of the immigrant surplus. With lagging demand for citizenship being offset by high political supply of it, under these conditions we would likewise expect political backlash against immigrants and against an accessible citizenship approach, because under these conditions it *appears* that immigrants receiving a net transfer of rights without paying the integration cost, even if in the long-term these rights may facilitate their full incorporation.

If the foregoing analysis is correct, this then creates a citizenship-integration trade-off that European countries face between these two policy paradigms: a population with small numbers of integrated citizens and large numbers of non-citizens on the one hand, or a population with large numbers of nonintegrated citizens and small numbers of noncitizens on the other hand. By adjusting citizenship policy, states may either get one, or the other, but not both. In the case of the former, which may represent Austria, Germany, or Denmark today, large segments of these societies have little access to citizenship, no incentive to acquire it, and a political climate that signals exclusion and closure. Too many are disincentivized to integrate. Immigrants, not surprisingly, remain marginalized in

the *Parallelgesellschaften* that so many conservative Germans lament. In the case of the latter, which may represent Belgium, France, or Sweden today, most immigrants have nearly as many rights as citizens, and readily accessible citizenship if they have not already acquired it automatically by birth. But here the answer appears the same: too many are disincentivized to integrate. Many immigrants likewise remain marginalized. That the Belgian and French suicide bombers of recent months had such easy access to citizenship obviously did little to set them and their cohorts on the path to integration and membership within the political community. In other words, set the cost too high and discourage integration; set the cost too low and discourage integration. The implication of the model then is that, *assuming constant immigrant demand for citizenship, policy responses to political pressures for shift citizenship policy away from some equilibrium CP in either direction will result in non-integration and backlashes for restrictions*. By interfering in the so-called market for citizenship by shifting policy above or below some equilibrium, states not only then discourage integration but also introduce inefficiencies that would not otherwise exist.

How, then, can the democratic states of Europe overcome this dilemma? Too often, the political response in Europe and in the United States swings between the extremes, with liberal progressives demanding easy access to citizenship who are yet blind to the lack of integration that inevitably results, and nativist conservatives demanding highly restricted access to citizenship who are yet blind to the systematic exclusion that their policies inevitably produce. The answer, according to the theory, departs from the supply side and focuses on the immigrant demand side. Based on the theoretical framework, receiving countries can resolve the citizenship-

integration trade-off by directly addressing any of the determinants of lagging immigrant demand for citizenship. The dotted demand curves in Figures 8.2 and 8.3 demonstrate how this works. In 8.2, assuming that a restrictive citizenship policy creates a naturalization equilibrium at point 1 with the expected deadweight loss, increasing immigrant demand for receiving country citizenship by a proportional amount to point 2 would result in no net reduction in naturalizations, increase the integration level of those naturalizing immigrants, and largely eliminate the deadweight loss to society caused by the integration price floor created by the restrictive policy. Eliminating the restrictive elements of the policy would eliminate the deadweight loss altogether. In Figure 8.3, governments would do better to replace an inefficient liberal price ceiling below the equilibrium level with an increase in the demand for citizenship among immigrants themselves. Rather than transfer political membership at a discount at point 1, governments could incorporate more citizens at a higher level of integration at point 2.

The policy implication, then, is that by increasing immigrant demand for citizenship, policymakers may be better able to create the conditions for higher numbers of naturalizations and more integrated citizens, with less extremist political backlash against those immigrants perceived to be setting up parallel societies. Yet of the determinants of demand theorized in this project, two stand out, although they are not equally beneficial. On the one hand, improving the socioeconomic context of immigrants or enhancing the future expected value of citizenship would likely do the most to incentivize *both naturalization and integration*. As I demonstrated in this project, economic context, and in particular the labor market, is strongly associated with increased naturalization rates. By

facilitating greater economic opportunities, through employment, education, training, and access, immigrants not only become more productive members of society, but likely feel greater attachment to the country of residence and view future prospects in the country positively as well. This does not imply a lack of government: to the contrary, few groups are in need of more government support than immigrants as they endeavor to integrate and become productive citizens. Thus government intervention is essential here, but one that is costly and too often politically controversial.

The second option though – increasing the costs of alternatives to naturalization – may actually be counterproductive for integration and citizenship. The example of the United States may be instructive here. The 1990s saw a rise in restrictive policies enacted in order to limit immigrant access to certain rights and benefits. For example, in 1994 Prop 187, the highly controversial ballot initiative in the state of California, was designed to screen illegal aliens from the use of certain types of welfare. At the federal level, the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) and the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) both made immigrants in the United States ineligible for a number of state and federal welfare benefits. Largely in response to nativist pressures (Tichenor 2002), these laws all endeavored to encourage personal responsibility and self-integration by rendering non-citizenship more costly, cumbersome, and even painful. While this had the effect of boosting naturalizations as a consequence (DeSipio 1996), as the theory would suggest, it also directly undermined the very institutional support mechanism that would

facilitate immigrant integration in the first place. Of the two options, however, it is unfortunately the more politically attractive one.

The questions investigated in this dissertation – who may acquire citizenship, who may not, and what criteria are used to adjudicate between the two – are consequential questions for any modern democracy, and certainly for Europe today. The incorporation of immigrants is neither easy nor always desirable. But in a world of international migration, it is necessary, and for democracies it is essential. As Putnam (2007) predicts, "the most certain prediction that we can make about almost any modern society is that it will be more diverse a generation from now than it is today… [and] immigration and ethnic diversity challenge social solidarity and inhibit social capital" (138). Europe today confronts its most significant challenge in resettling the millions of refugees fleeing conflict and poverty in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, washing up on its shores and crossing over its porous land borders. This will transform the continent economically, socially, culturally, and politically, and in the short-term will most certainly challenge the solidarity and social capital on which European democracy depends. Yet rather than repeat the mistakes of the past and respond to progressive calls for costless citizenship for these newcomers or to nativist pressures that call for inaccessible citizenship in an attempt to exclude them, European countries would do well to find ways to supply citizenship for those who desire it, and increase immigrant demand so that the long-term prospects for incorporation are more hopeful than they have been in the past.

Appendix A: National Statistical Offices of Europe

Austria: Bundesanstalt Statistik Österreich.

http://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/index.html

Belgium: Direction générale Statistique. http://statbel.fgov.be/

Denmark: Danmarks Statistik. http://www.dst.dk/en/Statistik

Finland: Tilastokeskus. http://www.stat.fi/

France: Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques (INSEE).

www.insee.fr

Germany: Statistisches Bundesamt. https://www.destatis.de/DE/Startseite.html

Greece: Hellenic statistical authority. http://www.statistics.gr/

Ireland: Central Statistics Office. http://www.cso.ie/en/

Italy: Istituto Nazionale di Statistica. http://www.istat.it/en/

Luxembourg: Service Central de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques.

http://www.statistiques.public.lu/fr/acteurs/statec/index.html

Netherlands: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek. https://www.cbs.nl/

Norway: Statistisk sentralbyrå. http://www.ssb.no/

Portugal: Instituto Nacional de Estatistica.

https://www.ine.pt/xportal/xmain?xpgid=ine_main&xpid=INE

Spain: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE). http://www.ine.es/

Sweden: Statistiska centralbyrån (SCB). http://www.scb.se/

United Kingdom: Office of National Statistics. https://www.ons.gov.uk/

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